Delphine All��s : ��The war in Ukraine has revealed that there is neither unity in the non-Western world nor in the Global South.��

2024.09.11

Interviewed and written by Mao Shishido
Published : September 11th, 2024

The vice president of the National Institute for Oriental Languages and Civilizations (Institut national des langues et civilizations orientales (INALCO), in French) responded to questions about the emerging concept of ��Global South�� and Indonesia, religion in international relations, and France and Indonesia��s relation in the Indo-Pacific region. Her research themes are religion and international relations, non-Western approaches to International relations, diplomacy, security, and multilateral cooperation in Southeast Asia, including Indonesia and the Indo-Pacific region.

Indonesia as a country of ��Global South��?

-----With the rise of the "Global South" concept in recent media and Indonesia's role in the 2022 G20 Summit, how do you see Indonesia's potential to navigate and influence an increasingly divided world?

I'll answer your question in two parts because I would like to go back to the notion of the Global South, which is currently used very frequently. I think it's very interesting to see how this notion has recently attracted, as you said, a lot of attention, especially in the context of the war in Ukraine. It is important to take it seriously because it makes political sense for many political actors who have increasingly used it to showcase solidarity and dissatisfaction with the standards of the International system, which are predominantly considered to favor the "North" or the "West."

Deconstruction of the new notion ��Global South.��

However, the Global South is not uniform in its condition or political stances �C just like there is no homogeneous ��North.�� This term is often used in a way that it is seen as equivalent to the non-Western world despite the fact these two notions do not fully overlap. Japan, for instance, is seen as being part of the North, but at the same time, it's not part of the Western world either. It's the same thing for Singapore and South Korea. There are many examples like this, and the war in Ukraine has revealed that there is neither unity in the non-Western world nor the Global South. If you look at the votes condemning the Russian invasion of Ukraine at the General Assembly of the United Nations, most states, including states from the South and non-Western states, did condemn the breach of international law. A small number systematically refused to condemn the Russian invasion, and a bit more chose to remain neutral on most votes. It is also the same thing if we look at the ongoing conflicts; regarding the case of the conflict between Israel and Palestine, there are very strong divisions among states that are considered the most important ones in the global South, for example. India has taken stances that were in support of Israel, as opposed to most other countries in the South. So, I think it's very important to look beyond this notion first because it tends to shape and give substance to the idea that the world is divided into two homogeneous groups. While taking this notion seriously, I think it very important to show that there are nuances or nuanced and intermediary positions that do not correspond to a dualistic worldview.

Indonesia��s role as a ��Global South�� country

Now, moving to your question about the role that Indonesia can play, Indonesia's position is very interesting precisely because it is a country that has historically sought to be non-aligned. As you know, Indonesia has upheld this foreign policy tradition dating back to the 1950s, in the context of the Cold War and the aftermath of the country��s struggle for independence.

The first Indonesian leaders sought to remain independent in the context of the Cold War, hence the role they played in organizing the Afro-Asian conference in Bandung in 1955 and then in shaping the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Since then, Indonesia has sought to uphold and update this foreign policy narrative. Of course, in practice, it has led them to have very different positions depending on the foreign policy orientations of the successive governments and the international context. So, the substance of non-alignment has evolved depending on the international context and political priorities of the time, but the fact that the narrative has been present since the 1950s is important because Indonesia has increasingly showcased itself as a country that seeks to bridge gaps between worlds or groups of countries that are divided, or that see themselves as being divided.

Another important dimension is that in contrast with many other countries of the so-called Global South, Indonesia has always upheld, since the 1950s, a foreign policy narrative that has been universalistic. Even when Indonesian leaders were very critical of how the world system functions, they always sought to improve global multilateral institutions and global governance rather than separate or build an alternative system. There was a short exception at the end of the Sukarno years, in 1964-65, when Sukarno��s Indonesia quit the United Nations and sought to build a new international organization with other states to denounce Malaysia��s election as a non-permanent member of the Security Council, but that was a sidestep in history.

For most of the country��s history, in line with the Bandung principles, the Indonesian government has rather upheld universal values and based its foreign policy narrative on human rights, equality among sovereign nations, etc. This record does not mean that these principles were perfectly upheld at home, especially under the Suharto presidency. Still, it is important to recall that some of the critiques against global governments are no longer aimed at improving the international system but rather aimed at establishing a parallel international system. Indonesia is still in a position that seeks to improve the existing institutions. I think it is a crucial and distinctive dimension of Indonesia��s foreign policy, and the country��s international partners need to recognize and encourage this narrative as we live in a historical moment in which divisive perceptions are very hard to reconcile.

So, to answer your question about what role Indonesia can play in this increasingly divided world, this world is indeed increasingly divided, especially in terms of the way actors perceive it. Indonesia can play a key role in demonstrating that a large country located in the South, with a history of non-alignments and a struggle for independence, can still uphold a universalist foreign policy narrative and seek to build an inclusive global governance system.

Religion in international relations

-----You mentioned why the Israeli-Palestinian conflict also becomes a new element that creates divisions among the countries, and you also specialize in religion. Then, what about in Southeast Asia? How does the Israeli-Palestinian conflict create divisions among countries, especially in Southeast Asia, where countries like Malaysia, with large Muslim populations, tend to support Palestine? How might religion influence Indonesia's stance on this issue?

It is a very good question. When you look at the history of the relationship between Indonesia, the Palestinian Authority, and Israel, or the history of Indonesian foreign policy discourses about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, there has been an evolution that is very visible and sensitive. Indonesia has never entertained official diplomatic ties with Israel, and the successive Indonesian governments have been very critical of Israel's colonization of parts of Palestine and the way Palestinians were treated by Israeli authorities. It is a position that was grounded in a universalist narrative rooted in international law, international rights, and human rights. While the position remains the same, it has increasingly evolved towards a religious solidarity narrative.

It's not only Indonesia that has had this evolution because the Israel-Palestine conflict has been increasingly seen and presented, including by various Palestinian and Israeli actors, as a conflict between religions - which does not correspond to its history. There are Palestinians of various faiths, with Christian Palestinians who are in the same situation as Muslim Palestinians. In Israel, you also have non-Jewish people. The historical roots of the conflict are rather rooted in land appropriation and distribution, in the failed promise of a solution with two states coexisting in peace, and in the question of the Palestinian refugees�� right to return to the territories of their ancestors.

Nevertheless, it has indeed been more and more seen and presented by the local actors as a religious conflict because raising religious solidarity is a way of attracting more external attention and support from co-religionists. In the case of Indonesia, the government was ready to open commercial relationships with Israel at the beginning of the 2000s under President Abdurrahman Wahid, a very important religious leader before he became president of Indonesia. Still, this endeavor could not happen because of civil society mobilizations, which were primarily rooted in religious solidarity. President Wahid��s argument at the time was that he had witnessed the signing of the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan, a neighboring country with which the conflict was very intense. So, he considered that since Indonesia was located in another part of the world, mutual recognition with Israel would be mutually beneficial on the economic level but also on the political level as it would enable Indonesia to more directly contribute to the search for a solution in the conflict between Israel and Palestine. This is a discourse that we still hear in Indonesia, but only on the part of a small minority of political or religious leaders. Although discussions have recently started again along these lines in the context of Indonesia��s attempt to join the OECD, it is very unlikely that this will change in the near future because civil society is strongly opposed to any change in this position.

ASEAN and Indo-Pacific Dynamics Post-AUKUS

-----Let's get into ASEAN and the Indo-Pacific, especially regarding France. After the AUKUS shock, France has been trying to strengthen its ties with ASEAN, India, Japan, and other actors. How do you think ASEAN or Indonesia views these French moves, and what are the prospects for their future relationship?

It is very interesting that even before the AUKUS shock, France had sought to strengthen its ties with Indonesia as an individual country, but indeed, this tendency has amplified, of course, after the big disappointment that came from Australia��s decision to cancel a submarine deal with France. Following this event, it became even more necessary for France to diversify its allies in the region, and it also happened at the moment in which most Indo-Pacific strategies on the part of non-regional states increasingly started to focus on ASEAN as a key partner in the region.

Indeed, most states have come to realize that you can only build the Indo-Pacific by considering the position of countries that are, of course, central in the area. Now, in terms of how ASEAN or Indonesia deals with those moves, firstly about ASEAN, it is important to take into account the fact that ASEAN has a weak administrative structure. There is a secretariat, but it represents the interests of various members of ASEAN rather than an autonomous position on the part of the association. So you are right to focus on Indonesia as the country has been the driving force in designing the ASEAN Indo-Pacific outlook, which is, to a large extent, a regionalization of Indonesia��s own take on the Indo-Pacific.

The Indonesian leaders see the increasing activism of France in a very positive way as it contributes to diversifying their own strategic partnerships, which is important for a non-aligned country that seeks to uphold its autonomy. At the same time, Indonesia has been increasingly courted by many partners. France has a lot of assets because it is present in the region, because it is one of the most prominent navies in the world, and because of its defense industry. It is also an important economic partner, but sometimes there is a bit of curiosity regarding the fact that important European countries are not as coordinated as they could be in approaching Indonesia and ASEAN since each has its own Indo-Pacific strategies and priorities, which do not always entirely align with the European Union��s own Indo-Pacific strategy.

Talking with actors in various Southeast Asian countries, they feel like all this activism on the part of several European countries plus the European Union should be coordinated to be more efficient and that there is sometimes a degree of competition between European States. Nevertheless, at the end of the day, it is good that European countries and France, in particular, have realized the strategic importance of Southeast Asian countries. In that sense, how France approaches Indonesia has also positively evolved in recent years. It's now framed in terms of partnership rather than support, which is important considering the Indonesian elites�� attachment to independence, sovereignty, non-alignment, etc. This spirit of partnership is essential for the conduct of diplomacy among equals.

-----As you mentioned, ASEAN is a fragile institution; ASEAN's neutral stance faces challenges such as the unstable international environment, difficulties in consensus building within ASEAN, the US-China rivalry, and various other elements in the region. In your opinion, should ASEAN��s neutral stances be maintained in the future, or how can they make ASEAN function better if they adhere to their current principles?

Historically, ASEAN has had institutional influence in East Asia because it has initiated the construction of the regional political and security architecture. Based on ASEAN's model, most of the broader forums or organizations were built. However, ASEAN is weakened by the difficulties it encounters at home. So, the issue is not so much about neutrality towards external affairs as much as it is about its ability to facilitate political solutions and peace-making within its own.

For instance, the Myanmar crisis is weakening the institution as it has been unable to facilitate an efficient way out of the violent conflict that ensued from the February 2021 coup. This provoked a major crisis within the institution, which is paradoxical because, at the beginning of the crisis, ASEAN took stances that were significantly stronger than what had been the case in the past in situations of domestic conflict or instability. By refusing to invite the leader of the military regime to the ASEAN summit, ASEAN took a stance that was quite strong for an institution that is premised on the non-interference principle. Considering the organization's history, how ASEAN navigated this situation, and its own principles of non-interference and consensus were very creative. They argued that inviting the military regime would build consensus among members, so they should not be present at the Summit, only represented. This thinking was a way of taking a bold move, but unfortunately, it has not been followed by actions or an involvement that was strong enough to have a concrete influence on the conflict or the search for a peaceful solution.

So, as long as the civil war in Myanmar goes on, it will be very difficult for ASEAN to regain its credibility as an actor of stability within the region. Of course, there are divisions among ASEAN members as to what stance should be taken about China, too. Some countries are in open territorial conflict with China, while others are heavily dependent economically and politically. This also contributes to dividing the organization and limiting its ability to adopt strong and coherent positions on regional matters, such as territorial disputes in the Southern China Sea.