東京外国語大学　国際日本学研究プログラム―文部科学省「国立大学の機能強化」事業―

東京外国語大学 国際日本学研究 報告Ⅵ

日本―アフリカ関係を通したグローバル資本主義の批判的検討：土地、空間、近代性

Re-examining Global Capitalism from the Perspective of Afro-Japanese Relations: Land, Space and Modernity

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日本—アフリカ関係を通したグローバル資本主義の批判的検討：土地、空間、近代性

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報告集発行にあたって

　　本報告書は 2018 年 1 月 29 日に東京外国語大学で開催された国際シンポジウム「日本－アフリカ関係をとおしたグローバル資本主義の批判的検討：土地、空間、近代性」（大学院国際日本学研究院・現代アフリカ地域研究センター共催）の記録である。シンポジウムでは、アフリカ（武内進一、以下、敬称略）、コロンビア（幡谷則子）、インド（佐藤宏）、日本（原口剛）からの事例報告とグローバリゼーション資本主義批判のための問題提起（中山智香子）がなされ、領域横断的で実に刺激的な討論が交わされた。出席がかなわなかったキャロル・グラック教授にはとてもすばらしいビデオ・プレゼンテーションを送っていただいた。なお司会は坂井真紀子と友常が担当した。

　　このシンポジウムの構想は、キャロル・グラック教授による本学大学院での 2016 年度冬期集中講義（2017 年 1 月）"Rethinking Modernity: Japan and World History" に端を発している。グラック教授のセミナーでは、Marius Jansen らの 1960 年代北米の日本近代化論をふまえ、竹内好、安丸良夫、Arif Dirlik などの議論を通して、日本、オスマントルコ、中国、現代アフリカの近代化論がとりあげられた。さらに IMF と世界銀行による 1990 年代アフリカにおける「構造調整」を告発するアブデラマン・シサコの映画 *Bamako* があつかわれた。このセミナーをとおして、アフリカからグローバル資本主義を問うことの現代的意義と、戦後世界において、アジア・アフリカを往還しつつ人々を飲み込んでいく近代性＝モダニティを原理的に考え抜いていくことの重要性を私たちは体感した。

　　さらに、2017 年 4 月に本学に創設された現代アフリカ地域研究センターと、武内進一教授によって提起されている「土地改革」という視角がこのシンポジウムを可能にした。モダニティについての原理的批判の視角をワールド・ヒストリーの観点から学び、それを地域研究の最前線からの報告にくぐらせる。そのような観点から遂行されるワールド・ヒストリーと地域研究の協働作業は、批判的に現代社会をとらえ返し、リアリティとアクチュアリティをもって世界との関係を再構築する知的実践である。この国際シンポジウムはそうした視点を具体化するひとつの試みであった。

　　こうした知的姿勢は国際日本研究における歴史学と地域研究にとっても不可欠である。2009 年のマダガスカルのクーデターはアフリカと東アジアをつなぐ一例だろう。このクーデターの背景には韓国の大宇ロジスティックスがマダガスカルの全農地の半分を、バイオ燃料の原料となるトウモロコシ生産のために 99 年間無償でリースする契約を結んだという事情があった。この契約を結んだ政権に対する反対運動は軍部の支持を得て政権を打倒し、暫定政権を生み出すまでになり、その暫定政権はリース契約を破棄したが、今度はその政権が前政権勢力やアフリカ諸国によって否認され、再び新たな政権が生まれるという事態になった。「リース」という手続きをとった土地収奪が一国の政治的危機をもたらし、そこに東アジアの資本が深くかかわっていたのである。これは韓国の新興財閥を出自とする一企業の土地開発がもたらした事態だとはいえ、そうした土地利用・土地開発の慣行を理解するうえで、戦前日本帝国主義による植民統治の影響はけっして無視できない。植民地主義の歴史はブーメランのように戻ってきて、世界のあちこちで姿を現すのである。

　　「土地改革」をめぐる世界的な動向という観点からいえば、2020 年東京オリンピック開催を前に展開されている都市再開発に加えて、2009 年に成立した日本の農地法改正も参照しておく必要がある。明治期の地租改正、戦後の農地改革に次ぐ「第三の土地改革」「農地法体系の大改正」と呼ばれたこの農地法改正によって、非農業法人である私企業の農地取得が進み、土地所有者と土地利用者の分離が起きている。土地と空間をめぐるこうした劇的な変動を前にして、原理的なモダニティ批判をふまえたグローバル資本主義批判という立場は、現代日本を研究していくうえでも必要不可欠な視点なのである。この国際シンポジウム報告集が、そうした課題についての議論を深めていく手がかりとなることを期待したい。

　　最後に、国際シンポジウムおよびこの報告集作成にあたってご協力いただいた報告者、また、翻訳や編集実務にかかわっていただいた皆様に心から感謝申し上げたい。

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東京外国語大学大学院国際日本学研究院
友常勉

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Reference

Tomotsune Tsutomu. 2019. "Making Heterogeneous Space: Land Development and the Proletarianization of Urban Underclass in Post War Japan," *International Journal of Japanese Sociology*, Volume 28. Issue 1.

An Introduction to the International Symposium "Re-examining Global Capitalism from the Perspective Afro-Japanese Relations: Land, Space and Modernity"

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This collection of papers is based on the symposium "Re-examining Global Capitalism from the Perspective Afro-Japanese Relations: Land, Space, Modernity," held by Institute of Japan Studies and African Studies Center in Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, on January 29, 2018. It was very unfortunate that Prof. Carol Gluck, one of the key note speakers, was unable to participate in the symposium However, we had five extraordinary presentations based on case studies and theoretical criticism: African Studies by Prof. Takeuchi, Columbian Studies by Prof. Hataya, South Asian Studies by Mr. Sato, Geographical Studies in Osaka, Japan, by Prof. Haraguchi, and a theoretical approach for criticism against global capitalism by Prof. Nakayama. It was a realized inter-disciplinary and exciting discussion. Prof. Gluck sent us a commendable video presentation, which was greatly appreciated. Prof. Sakai and Tomotsune were in charge of chairs and discussants then.

The idea of the symposium has its roots in Prof. Gluck's previous seminar, "Rethinking Modernity: Japan and World History," which was held as the intensive winter session for post graduate course by Institute of Japan Studies, TUFS, on January 2017. In the seminar, beginning with arguments of modernization in Japan such as Marius Jansen during early 1960, historical and theoretical works such as Yoshimi Takeuchi, Yoshio Yasumaru, Arif Dirlik, we had dealt with various approaches for modernity based on the case studies of Japan, Ottoman empire, China and Africa. Not only these but also, Bamako (2006), a marvelous and deeply critical film by Abderrahmane Sissako, which problematizes notorious Structural Adjustment Programme in Africa conducted by IMF and World Bank during 1990s. Through the seminar, we experienced how it is important to question the global capitalism from the perspective of Africa and to understand modernity principally which has been swallowing people's aspirations for westernization or modernization and making them homogeneous but unequal world in Asia or Africa.

We should also notice the importance of the perspective of "land reform" in contemporary society as another root of the symposium, which is raised by Prof. Takeuchi and the works of African Studies Center in TUFS. In Sum, we tried to realize the following intellectual practice through the arguments above: re-learning principal criticism against modernity from the perspective of world-history and at the same time, letting the practice pass through the frontier works of area studies. This collaborative practice based on world-history and area studies turns to the critical engagement toward contemporary society to reconstitute the picture of the world keeping with tense reality and actuality. This international symposium would be regarded as one of the attempts to embody the idea.

This intellectual engagement is necessary for Japan studies, especially for history and area studies. The so-called Madagascar political crisis in 2009 could be raised as one of the good examples to understand why Afro-(East) Asian approach is essential. In this incident, Daewoo, a Korean international logistics company, entered into a lease contract with the Malagasy government. Under this usufruct agreement, Daewoo acquired almost half of Madagascar's national property for 99 years, for the purpose of producing corn for biofuel. Because of this outrageous contract, selling all national resources to a foreign private company, the regime was instantly overturned by a coup d'état. Although the case was triggered by an affiliated company of newly-risen zaibatsu in Korea, it is noticeable that the conventional custom of land reform or land development in Korea is formulated through the strong influence of Japanese colonialism. Historical "legacy" of colonialism would be boomeranged on some places in the world (Tomotsune, 2019).

In terms of the contemporary tendency of "land reform" issue, in addition to the rapid land development at the moment of 2020 Tokyo Olympics, we should also refer to the revised act of Agricultural Land Law enacted in 2009 in Japan, by which agricultural land can be used by private companies through a lease agreement with a maximum of 50 years. This measure intends to expand the separation of land owners from users. This manner of recent land development includes hazardous destruction of land by ignoring historical conditions or residents' lives (ibid.).

In this sense, it is indispensable to maintain the criticism against global capitalism with principal approach towards modernity to study contemporary Japan. We expect the papers collected in the symposium to be a clue to deepen these issues.

Finally, we honestly appreciate the presenters, discussants, and those who worked for editing and translation.

Reference

Tomotsune Tsutomu. 2019. "Making Heterogeneous Space: Land Development and the Proletarianization of Urban Underclass in Post War Japan," *International Journal of Japanese Sociology*, Volume 28. Issue 1.

Contents / 目次

The World Today: Why Modernity Matters More in Lesotho than in London

Carol GLUCK

(Columbia University)

Let me begin with a story. The place is Lesotho; the time is 1983. Mr. Lebona has declared his intention to build what he called a "European–style" house: a rectangular house with a cement floor and a steel roof. He mentioned this intention to an American anthropologist — James Ferguson is his name — who was at that time happily lodged in a traditional round house with mud–and–stone walls and a thatched grass roof, a house that stayed cool in summer and warm in winter. The well–meaning anthropologist asked Mr. Lebona why he would want to build a less practical, more expensive house. Why would he want a "European" house, when the "local" Sesotho round house had all the advantages? Mr. Lebona looked the anthropologist in the eye and asked, "What kind of house does your father have, there in America?" "Is it round?" No, it is rectangular, answered the anthropologist. "Does it have a grass roof?" No, it does not. "Does it have cattle dung for a floor?" No. "How many rooms does your father's house have?" he asked. "About ten, I think," mumbled the anthropologist. After pausing a moment to let this sink in, Mr. Lebona said, *"That is the direction we would like to move in."*

Chastened, the earnest young anthropologist realized that Mr. Lebona's aspiration for a European–style house was not simply a matter of copying Western ways, but it was — I quote the anthropologist again — "a powerful claim to a chance for transformed conditions of life — a place–in–the–world, a standard of living," In short, "a direction we would like to move in."[1]

One name for the direction that moves toward such transformed conditions of life is "modernity." But what exactly does "modernity" mean? The answer depends not only on time — the time when one asks or answers this question. It also depends on place, the country a person lives in and the person's status in that country, his or her own "place–in–the–world," as the anthropologist called it. Moreover, not everyone lives in the same time, even those who live in the same place in the same historical period, including the present one. This is because the unevenness always associated with modern societies and capitalist economies occurs within countries, within cities, within communities, as well as between them. If you live in a well–off country, one of the G–8 for example, and if you and your family are relatively well–off economically (with four rooms, say, rather than ten), you may think you are living in postmodern times, in the period after modernity. And you probably do not think that modernity is something to aspire to or reach out for. Or perhaps you have another name for what it is you aspire to and reach out for. Lucky you, one might say, living in the middle–class equivalent of a ten–room house, but for much of the world, modernity is not at all an antiquated abstraction. Modernity is instead a "folk category," as some anthropologists have come to define it: "a concept that people use to make sense of their own lives, to make certain identity claims, to

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1 James Ferguson, *Global Shadows: Africa in the Neoliberal World Order* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006), pp. 18-19 (italics mine).

give voice to certain kinds of aspirations they have for their lives. And in that sense, one has to take it very seriously. It's one of the discussions within which very important kinds of political, cultural, social claims are being made."[2]

Yet because the definition of modernity is neither monolithic nor static, we also have to take seriously what exactly such claims might mean. Here I focus broadly on how understandings of the modern have changed over the past several decades and what those changes might mean, not only for Lesotho and London, but for Tokyo, Delhi, Rio, and everywhere else.

Modernity As It Was – and As It Became

Modernity, once so consciously and assertively new, is by now an old idea. The conventional, historical definition of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries centered on a collection of characteristics that Narita Ryūichi has called the "grammar of modernity."[3] These characteristics include the nation–state, a political form that increased in number from fifty nations at the beginning of the twentieth century to nearly two hundred today; capitalism in its industrial and postindustrial modes, which has changed socio–economic life across the globe, including in socialist economies; mass society, increasingly urbanized, with accompanying disruptions of communal life; a national citizenry, with the insistence, even if only rhetorical, on national political participation; national identity, knowing that one is Japanese, French, or Nigerian, a knowledge not required before the emergence of modern nation–states; and integration in the world order, what is now called globalization, which is not new, only intensified in recent times.

These characteristics are now numbingly familiar because they constitute a good deal of modernity as it happened. What in the nineteenth century was once prescriptive — modernity must/ought/will develop in ways described by Marx, Weber and others — has now become descriptive — this is the way modernity is, more or less, in the present–day. We live, for example, in a world of nation–states, with few viable alternative political forms on offer, the recent expansion of deterritorialization and globalization notwithstanding. When it comes to the economy, Hernando de Soto has famously insisted that in the twenty–first century "capitalism is the only game in town."[4] Global interdependence, too, has become inescapable, anywhere and everywhere on the globe. This by now empirical definition is both macro and national in focus, defining modernization in terms of entire societies, polities, and economies. It is also far too blunt an analytic instrument, assuming a linear and teleological process unfolding globally in the direction of progress, a happy tale from the nineteenth century that we now know not to be true: things can get worse, not better, while inequality remains the ground bass of modern historical change. Nonetheless, according to the canonical definition, the world is now modern, if in profoundly different and unequal ways.

The oft–told tales of becoming modern generally took the form of two master narratives of national history: one of emancipation (France, the United States, for example), the other of development (the majority of countries). Whatever the narrative, these national processes proceeded along two vectors. The first was modernization by force: in the nineteenth and early twentieth century, changes imposed by colonial powers, gunboat threats, and world–order imperatives such as sovereignty, imperialism, and international law; in the second half of the twentieth century changes imposed by the bipolar Cold War powers,

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2 James Ferguson, "Theory Talk #34: James Ferguson on Modernity, Development and Reading Foucault in Lesotho," http://www.theory-talks.org/2009/11/theory-talk-34.html. Also, *Global Shadows*, p. 177.

3 Narita Ryūichi, "Kindai no bunpō," *Shisō* 845 (November 1994).

4 Hernando de Soto, *The Mystery of Capitalism: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else* (London: Bantam, 2000), Ch. 7.

international organizations like the IMF and the World Bank, or the norms of neoliberal economics. This is what I call the *coercive modern*.

The second vector was modernization by aspiration, in which people reached for modernizing change. National and social reformers, militaries seeking national strength, capitalists pursuing expanded markets and profits, portions of the population disadvantaged by class, wealth, or power — a wider range of people than one might think regarded modern ways as desirable in themselves, judging modernity to be not only European in origin but universal in application. People reached for change, not only because circumstances forced them to, but also because they thought it served their individual, family, or community interests. Japanese peasants paying to send their children to school in great numbers is a late nineteenth–century instance; Mr. Lebona wanting a house with many rooms is an example from the late twentieth century. I call this the *aspirational modern*. Such people believed in what one scholar has called "the promissory notes" of modernity.[5] This is what modern life offers — promises — to you.

If this is modernity as defined and experienced over two centuries of global history, then we might conclude, as some theorists of postmodernism do, that we are all modern now and can therefore move on to something else. But of course the promissory notes of modernity were either unevenly fulfilled, or for some people in some places, never fulfilled at all. And over the past several decades the definitions of modernity have gradually changed. In the second half of the twentieth century one can say that the two master narratives continued to hold sway, with the story of emancipation focused on liberation from colonial rule in much of Africa and South and Southeast Asia; and tales of development retaining their force in the Global South and beyond. But in recent years the main locus of action has shifted. Modernizing change — or change for the better — has come also to be described in terms that are less national than individual in focus; less as GDP–centered national economic growth than as jobs and livelihood; less as economic development than as human development; less as abstract freedom than as the possibility of personal choice. For this reason, such aspects as gender, health, and education have become central to the idea of development.

Everyday Modernity

We might think of this as everyday modernity: modernity in everyday life, modernity as a "folk category," the kind of modernity Mr. Lebona in Lesotho wished to move in the direction of.

The discourse on development now includes a number of indices of such an everyday modernity. Perhaps the best known is the Human Development Index of the United National Development Program (UNDP), which ranks countries by three criteria: life expectancy (health), access to knowledge (education) and standard of living (per capita income), with the goal of "human development for everyone." Since 1990 the focus of the index has shifted from "pursuing material opulence to enhancing human well–being, from maximizing income to expanding capabilities, from optimizing growth to enlarging freedoms." The stated emphasis falls on "the richness of human lives rather than on simply the richness of economies."[6] Despite efforts to escape "the tyranny of GDP," the list of countries in the 2016 Human Development Report (for the year 2015) was headed by Norway, Australia, and Switzerland; the United States was tenth,

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5 Bjorn Wittrock, "One, None, or Many? European Origins and Modernity as a Global Condition," *Daedalus*, v. 129, no. 1 (Winter, 2000), pp, 37-38.

6 United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report 2016: Human Development for Everyone* (New York: United Nations Development Programme, 2016), p. 2. http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/2016_human_development_report.pdf

the United Kingdom sixteenth, and Japan seventeenth, all ranked in the top group of 51 countries with "very high human development," out of a total of 188 countries. The majority in the group of 41 nations with "low human development" were in Sub–Saharan Africa, suggesting that decoupling the richness of human lives from the richness of economies will not be an easy task, the more so since the top 1% of the population holds 46% of the world's wealth.[7]

       The United Nations program in Human Security, a term introduced in the 1990s, declares a similar objective in its attempt to expand the traditional notion of national security into a "people–centered" approach that includes human rights, human dignity, and basic needs.[8] The Global Social Progress Index, produced by the Social Progress Imperative, a non–profit organization based in the United States, measures basic human needs (food, water, sanitation); foundations of well–being (access to knowledge, health care, safe environment); and opportunity (rights, choice, inclusion, advanced education). Echoing others, the index seeks to avoid "traditional measurements of success like income and investment" and instead assess "the capacity of a society to meet the basic human needs of its citizens…. enhance and sustain the quality of their lives…and create the conditions for all individuals to reach their full potential." In the 2017 report on 128 countries, the United States and Japan were in the second group (High Social Progress), while the Scandinavian countries, Canada, and others were in the first (Very High Social Progress), and Sub–Saharan African nations ranked in the lowest two categories.[9]

Social Progress Tier
- Very High
- High
- Upper Middle
- Lower Middle
- Low
- Very Low
- Incomplete Data

       The World Happiness Index, first published in 2012 by the United Nations Sustainable Development Solutions Network, ranks 155 countries based on Gallup World Polls, which brings subjective perceptions to bear on the subject. The results are ranked according to six key variables: GDP per capita (income), healthy years of life expectancy, social support (having someone to count on in times of trouble), trust

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7 Ibid., pp. 198-201; wealth, p. 7. The "tyranny of GDP" is frequently mentioned by Helen Clark, UNDP administrator from 2009-17, e.g., http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/presscenter/speeches/2017/02/11/helen-clark-keynote-speech-at-the-global-dialogue-for-happiness-where-is-happiness-on-the-global-agenda-.html

8 E.g. Introduction by UN Secretary General to the Report on Human Security to the General Assembly, May 20, 2010. https://www.un.org/press/en/2010/ga10942.doc.htm

9 Michael E. Porter and Scott Stern with Michael Green, *Social Progress Index 2017* (Washington, Social Progress Imperative, 2017); rankings, pp.4-5 ; map, p. 23. http://www.socialprogressimperative.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/English-2017-Social-Progress-Index-Findings-Report.pdf

(perceived absence of corruption in government and business), perceived freedom to make life decisions, and generosity (recent donations to others). In the 2017 report Scandinavian countries and Switzerland ranked at the top, the United States 14th (the U.S. has never made the top ten, sliding further in 2018 to 18th place), the United Kingdom, 19th, Japan 52nd, South Korea 56th, China 80th. Taiwan, the happiest country in East Asia, ranked 33rd.[10] Many of the nations in Africa, while far too diverse to wrap up in a single continental package, had what the report calls a "happiness deficit."[11]

Self-reported Life Satisfaction, 2016

Life satisfaction is self-reported as the answer to the following question: "Please imagine a ladder, with steps numbered from 0 at the bottom to 10 at the top. The top of the ladder represents the best possible life for you and the bottom of the ladder represents the worst possible life for you. On which step of the ladder would you say you personally feel you stand at this time?"

Source: World Happiness Report (2017)   OurWorldInData.org/happiness-and-life-satisfaction/ • CC BY-SA

Initially greeted by critics (and cynics) as soft news, the World Happiness Index has gained in credence in recent years, not least because its results are similar to those of the other indices that have sprung up. Many of these initiatives were influenced by prominent critics of GDP–ism such as the economists Joseph Stiglitz, Amartya Sen, and Jean–Paul Fitoussi, whose 2009 report proposed well–being, quality of life, environmental sustainability, and the like, as better metrics for economic performance than statistics based solely on GDP.[12] In sum, these several indices and others like them betoken at least a discursive, if not a decisive, shift in definitions of development, a better life, and, in many places, a more "modern" one.

The increasingly important place of gender appears in nearly every recent measure of social well–being. The Global Gender Gap Report, published annually by the World Economic Forum, tracks data on women in the economy, education, health, and politics in societies around the world. The 2017 report had (no surprise) Scandinavia ranked the highest, with Rwanda as number 4 between Finland and Sweden; the United Kingdom 15th; the United States, 49th; and Japan, extremely low on the list, at 114th of 144 countries.[13]

There are other such indices, such as the Better Life Index of the OECD, Afrobarometer, Americas

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10 John Helliwell, et al., *World Happiness Report 2017* (New York: Sustainable Development Solutions Network, 2017), pp. 20-22. https://s3.amazonaws.com/happiness-report/2017/HR17-Ch2.pdf

11 Valerie Møller, et al., "`Waiting for Happiness' in Africa," *ibid.*, pp. 85, 108-9

12 Joseph E. Stiglitz, Amartya Sen, Jean-Paul Fitoussi, *Report by the Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress* (2009). http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/118025/118123/Fitoussi+Commission+report

13 *Global Gender Gap Report 2017* (Geneva: World Economic Forum, 2017), pp. 10-11.

Barometer, and so on. Their categories relate in one way or another to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) adopted by the United Nations in 2015 to be reached by 2030. (These replaced the Millennium Development Goals of 2000, which were meant to be achieved by 2015). The new set has seventeen Goals, beginning with No Poverty and Zero Hunger on through Good Health and Well–being, Gender Equality, to Climate Action and Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions.

The SDGs are intended to be "universal" (applying to developed and developing countries alike) — which is new (the Millennium Development Goals targeted only developing countries) — "inclusive" (leaving no one behind), and "planetary" (sustaining the natural resources on which human society depends).[14] Although the word "modern" is used here primarily as an adjective (modern technology, modern health care, modern energy), in fact the SDGs envision a program of social, national, and international development in the name of progress and a better life. As promissory notes, the SDGs are likely to prove as unattainable as the goals of modernity of the nineteenth and twentieth century, but their focus clearly lies elsewhere, less centered on national economy and security than on the well–being of individual human beings and their social lives in the spaces of everyday modernity.

Africa and the Global Modern

Where does Africa fit in the revised definitions of what might be regarded as a new global modern? A continent of fifty–four countries, with 1.2 billion people who constitute 16% of the world's population — 70% of whom are younger than thirty years old — Africa by 2050 will have 2.5 billion people and a quarter of the earth's population. The world often subsumes these vastly diverse countries under a single continental perspective, often negative, with frequent references to failed states, kleptocracy, HIV/Aids, abject poverty, and the like. Similar views underlay the requirements of Structural Adjustment for World Bank and IMF loans in the 1980s and the conditions of good governance and open economies required for debt forgiveness in the 1990s and 2000s. The generally pessimistic neoliberal view of the "hopeless continent" was countered in the first decade of the twenty–first century by the image of "Africa Rising," a narrative of economic growth that itself became something of a stereotype, which was more recently counter–countered by depictions of terrorism and civil war.

The economic fortunes of the poorest parts of the developing world continue to be a topic of debate.

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14 E.g., "Transforming our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development" (Resolution adopted by the General Assembly, September 25, 2015). http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/70/1&Lang=E,
    Chart of the goals, https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/?menu=1300

In 2007, 70% of the "bottom billion" of the world's poor lived in Africa; with dim prospects for relief, either from their own government or from international aid, which often failed reach its target populations.[15] In 2015, in contrast, a cheerful economist celebrated the present as "a time of the Greatest Development Progress among the Global poor in the history of the world," including many countries in Sub–Saharan Africa.[16] This division of opinion is nothing new, but in terms of the indices quoted here and reflected in the UN Sustainable Development Goals, many countries in Subsaharan Africa are still beset by extreme poverty, a fact recognized even by the cheerful economists. And while child mortality rates have declined sharply, African women and girls are still deprived of health care, education, and other social goods included in the Human Development Index.

In the World Happiness Index Africa is the unhappiest continent. Its chapter in the 2017 report is entitled "Waiting for Happiness," from the title of a 2002 film by the Mauritanian director, Abderrahmane Sissko. Unsurprisingly, the more "lived poverty" (the term used by Afrobarometer), the less happiness. Mr Lebona's Lesotho ranks 139 of 155 countries. In the Human Development Index, Lesotho is 160th out of 188 countries, with violence–riven Central African Republic at the bottom. In the Social Progress Index, Lesotho ranks 103 of 128, followed by mostly Sub–Saharan African countries, with Central African Republic again in the lowest place. But in the Gender Gap Report, Lesotho ranks quite high, at 57th of 144 countries, not much below Italy at 50th and far, far above Japan at 114th. Women in Lesotho have miserably low scores in health and education, but high scores in political empowerment (women in government) and in economic participation and opportunity. This means that women are less unequal compared to men, not necessarily that their wages, jobs, or livelihoods are improved, rather that some half of the men and women are either doing better while the rest remain impoverished, only more equally so than in other places.

If one asks what Africans want, the answer is exactly what the new global goals say they should have: basic human needs (food, water); access to health care; employment (for a surging youth population without work and no industrial sector to absorb them); a decent standard of living; education; infrastructure (roads, etc.); less corruption and more democracy. There is also an expressed desire for "inclusion" — a word heard almost as often among Africans discussing their future as "sustainable" is heard in devel-

15 Paul Collier, *The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries are Failing and What Can Be Done About It* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 7.

16 Stephen Radelet, *The Great Surge: The Ascent of the Developing World* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2015), pp. 3-5.

opment circles at the United Nations. "Inclusion" stands against inequality, powerlessness, and a lack of individual or familial choice. And what do Africans get, in their view? At home, civil war, corrupt leaders, epidemics, and encroaching climate change; from the world, international aid that often misses the mark because it does not lay down local roots (in health care delivery, for examples), foreign direct investment, including land grabs and exploitation of resources, including labor, not only by the former imperial powers but by Chinese, South Korean, and Japanese enterprises. The explosive expansion of China in investment, infrastructure funding, trade, Chinese workers, and the like is both welcomed and bemoaned, the attitudes varying by country and socio–economic status.[17] Investment and economic benefits on the one hand, exploitation and disempowerment on the other repeats a pattern familiar from the long years of European colonial rule.

Yet it is also true that expectations for the future are higher among Africans, and even higher among African youth, than is the case in "happier" societies elsewhere. According to one study, optimism is frequently strong among the poorest and least secure, where it often correlates with more positive attitudes about democracy than about the market. Critics argue that material wealth in itself is not enough and that consumerist modernity can be as much a burden as a promise for the future. Such a view is expressed in a work of video art by Wangechi Mutu entitled "The End of Carrying All." It features a woman walking across an African landscape carrying a basket on her head. As she trudges along the basket fills with the trappings of modern life: first household objects, a bicycle wheel and satellite dish, then oil rigs and skyscrapers. The burden of material modernity gradually grows so heavy that it weighs her down to the ground, representing both the negative aspects of development and the role of women in African life and labor. As the woman and her burden meet the future – or the end of the world – the basket of modern objects, now a large and unwieldly blob, topples off a cliff into the abyss.[18]


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17 Fei-Ling Wang and Esi A. Elliot, "China in Africa: Presence, Perceptions and Prospects," *Journal of Contemporary China,* 23, no. 90 (2014), pp. 1012-32.

18 Wangechi Mutu, "The End of Carrying All," Venice Biennale 2015: All the World's Futures. Born in Kenya in 1972, the artist lives and works in the U.S.

In contrast to this powerful if bleak vision of the future of uneven capitalist development, sometimes a different, often buoyant future can feel as if it has already arrived. In large cities in Africa as in India, for example, youth (and others) are connected electronically, in what has been called "pirate modernity," or "recycled modernity," in which cell phones and other devices are taken apart, and repurposed, producing a shadowy but dynamic economic zone of internet connectivity and ingenious chargers that outwit the lack of electricity and capital. Such technological failures as computer breakdowns and degradation of well–worn digital media produce not only obstacles but spurs to creativity. Studies of the way contemporary media both impede and enable locally created music and video in urban sites like Kano in Nigeria and Soweto in South Africa reveal new technologies of everyday — and aspirational — modernity.[19]

Everyday Modernity and Global Responsibility

If we are indeed to pursue the goal of "human development for everyone," as declared by the United Nations, it will require considerably transformation of thought and action, both at home and in the international arena. Modernity means more in Lesotho than in London in part because we have yet to revise our understanding of the meaning of modernity in the twenty–first century. Most people agree that London and Tokyo are modern in the older definition of the term, but if everyday modernity is the goal, then it remains far from achieved, precisely because so many are excluded from it. And everywhere the excluded tend to be the same parts of society: minorities and marginal groups, the indigent and the indigenous, women and foreigners, and so on. Uneven modernity across the globe is matched by uneven modernity at home. The goals of everyday modernity hold not only for the developing world but for the poor, disenfranchised, and unempowered in the heart of the global North. Just as Africans deserve our attention to their aspirations for a better life, so, too, do all those left behind who live down the street or across the county.

What are the conditions that impede the aspirational modern in places like Lesotho, and how does Japanese (or any other) foreign aid, policy, and investment make things better or worse for people like Mr. Lebona? And what are the conditions at home that make Japan rank so (unmodernly) low in the gender gap, so much lower than Lesotho? While it may seem that such comparisons are odious, that is precisely the point: no one occupies a privileged position in terms of fulfilling the aspirations for progress and a better life. The task, it seems to me, is to try to improve our global modernity, at home and abroad, in order to impel it, as Mr. Lebona said, toward "a direction we would like to move in" — toward a better, more humane "place–in–the–world" — for everyone, everywhere, in the everyday.

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19 Ravi Sundaram, "Recycling Modernity: Pirate Electronic Cultures in India," *Third Text* 13, no. 47 (Summer, 1999), pp. 59-65; Brian Larkin, *Signal and Noise: Media, Infrastructure, and Urban Culture in Nigeria* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008); Gavin Steingo, "Sound and Circulation: Immobility and Obduracy in South African Electronic Music," *Ethnomusicology Forum* 24, no. 1, pp. 102-23.

世界はいま——〈モダニティ〉がロンドンではなく、レソトで問われる理由

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　　まず、ひとつの話をしよう。1983 年、アフリカ南部に位置するレソト王国でのことだ。レボナという一人の男性が、あたらしく家を建てることについて話をしていた。セメントの床と鉄骨の屋根からなる四角形の家を、彼は〈ヨーロピアン・スタイル〉だと考えていた。レボナがそのように語っていた相手は、アメリカから来た文化人類学者ジェームス・ファーガソン。彼がそのとき寝泊まりしていたのは、泥と石でつくった壁や、草の屋根からなる、丸い形をした伝統的な家で、夏は涼しく冬は暖かい。ファーガソンにとっては幸運なことだった。良心的な研究者である彼は、なぜレボナがそのような家を、すなわちレソトでは実用性が低いのにコストばかり高くかかってしまう家を建てたいのかと、問いかけた。あらゆる面で、この〈地方〉のソト族が住む丸い伝統的な家に利点があるというのに、なぜ〈ヨーロッパ〉の家をつくりたいのかと尋ねたのだ。レボナは、この学者の目を見て問い返した。「きみの父さんはアメリカでどんな家を持ってるんだ？」、「丸い家か？」と。ファーガソンは、長方形だと答えた。「草の屋根か？」——「いや、違う」／「床に牛のフンが転がっていたりする？」——「いや」／「部屋の数はどれくらい？」——「だいたい 10 くらいだと思う」。その文化人類学者は、レボナからの問いに小さくつぶやいて答えていた。少し考える間をおいて、レボナはこう言った。「そこに向かって、私たちは進んでいきたいんだ」と。

　　若く誠実な文化人類学者であるファーガソンが、このことを反省してみて気付いたのは、〈ヨーロッパ〉の家をレボナが熱望していることが、西欧の模倣といった単純なことがらでなく、ファーガソンの言葉をひくなら、「それまでとは違う生活条件——世界における自身の立ち位置、すなわち生活水準——を得る機会への強い権利主張」であるということだった。「そこに向かって、私たちは進んでいきたい」という言葉は、そのことを端的に言い表したものだ[1]。

　　ここで語られているような、一変した生活条件へと向かう方向性にたいして与えられた言葉のひとつが〈モダニティ〉である。しかし、〈モダニティ〉とは、正確には何を意味しているのだろうか。この問題への答えは、問答がなされるタイミングによってのみ異なるだけではない。場所、すなわち、ある人が暮らしている国によっても変わるし、当人がその国のなかで占めている地位、ファーガソンの言う、「世界における自身の立ち位置」によっても異なりうるのだ。さらに、すべての人が同質の時代を生きているのではない。同じ場所で、現在を含む、同じ歴史の期間を過ごしている人びとであってもだ。なぜなら、近代的な諸社会と資本主義的な諸経済に必ずつきまとう不均等性が、国内、都市内、共同体内、さらにこれら相互の間に存在しているからである。G8 参加国のように裕福な国で暮らしているか、あるいは、自分や家族が割に経済的な余裕（10 部屋の家とまでは言わずとも 4 部屋ほどの家にあたるような）を持っているとしたら、自分はポストモダンの時代を、すなわち〈モダニティ〉の過ぎ去った時代を生きている

1　James Ferguson, *Global Shadows: Africa in the Neoliberal World Order* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006), pp. 18-19.（傍点引用者）

のだと考えるかもしれない。そしておそらく、切望したり、得ようと手を伸ばす先のものとして〈モダニティ〉があるとは思わないだろう。あるいはひょっとすると、そこに〈モダニティ〉ではない別の言葉をあてているのかもしれない。10 もの部屋がある家に住むことができるだなんて幸運じゃないか、という人がいるだろう。しかし、世界の大部分の人びとにとって、〈モダニティ〉とは決して時代遅れの抽象概念ではない。〈モダニティ〉とはひとつの〈習俗的な範疇 folk category〉であり、文化人類学では次のように定義されるようになっている。「人びとが自分の生活を理解するため、何らかのアイデンティティを主張するため、自身の生活に対して抱いているある種の熱望に言葉を与えるために使用する概念である。こうした意味で、〈モダニティ〉についてよく考えなければならない。これをめぐる討議のなかから、政治的、文化的、社会的な権利主張のきわめて重要なものが形成されていくのである」。

　　しかしながら、〈モダニティ〉の定義は一枚岩でも普遍的なものでもないため、この概念が正確に何を意味しているのかを、真摯に検討していく必要がある。ここでは、近代というものの理解がここ数十年の間にどう変容したのか、そして、レソトやロンドンだけでなく、東京やデリー、リオデジャネイロなどあらゆる場所にとって、その変容がどのようなことを意味するのかに、広く焦点をあてていきたい。

〈モダニティ〉の、かつての理解とその変容

　　かつては敢えてその新しさが取り上げられてきた〈モダニティ〉が、いまや古びた概念のようになっている。19-20 世紀という時代についての、これまでの歴史的な定義は、その特殊性を集めて積み重ねることに重点が置かれていた。これは成田龍一が「近代の文法」と呼んだものだ[3]。この特殊性のうちには、たとえば以下の諸点がある。まず国民国家という政治形態。これは 20 世紀はじめに 50 ほどだったところから、現在は 200 近くまでその数をのばした。そして、工業化および脱工業化時代の生産様式である資本主義は、全世界の社会経済的な生活を変化させ、社会主義経済もそのうちに含まれていた。次第に都市化がすすみ、共同体における生活の崩壊を経た大衆社会。国政へ参加するという権利主張をともなう、国民という概念。ある人が日本人かフランス人か、はたまたナイジェリア人なのかを弁別するナショナル・アイデンティティ。これは近代的な国民国家の登場以前に必要とされることのなかった知である。そして、国際秩序への統合。今ではグローバリゼーションと呼ばれているが、近時の傾向として強まりを見せているのみで、新しいものではない。

　　これらの特質が、われわれにとって無感覚なほどに馴染んでいるのは、これらが〈モダニティ〉の大部を、実際に起きたものとして構成しているからだ。〈モダニティ〉はマルクスやヴェーバーらが叙述したように発展しなければならない／するべきである／するだろうという具合に、19 世紀においては規範的だったものが、いまでは、これが現在における〈モダニティ〉のありようだというように、記述的なものとなった。たとえば、わたしたちは国民国家の世界に生きており、これに代わるような政治形態を提起できそうな見込みもほとんどない。近年における脱領土化やグローバリゼーションの広がりにもかかわらず、である。経済にかんしては、ヘルナンド・デ・ソトが、21 世紀において「資本主義は都市における唯一の選択肢だ」と主張したことがよく知られている[4]。グローバルな相互依存の関係から抜け出すことも、世界のどこにいようと逃れがたいものになった。このような

2　James Ferguson, "Theory Talk #34: James Ferguson on Modernity, Development and Reading Foucault in Lesotho," http://www.theory-talks.org/2009/11/theory-talk-34.html. あるいは , *Global Shadows*, p. 177.

3　成田龍一「近代の文法」『思想』845 号（1994 年 11 月）

4　Hernando de Soto, *The Mystery of Capitalism: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else* (London: Bantam, 2000), Ch. 7.

経験的な定義が、マクロおよびナショナルなスケールで焦点化されており、社会全体、政治形態、経済といった観点から近代化を意味づけている。近代化というものは分析概念としてあまりに鈍く、世界中で発展にむかって進行しているという単線的かつ目的論的な過程——19 世紀以来のめでたい物語が、嘘にすぎないとうことを、いまや私たちは知っている——を前提としている。状況は悪くなり、良くなってはいない。近代の歴史的な変化は、不均等をこそ、その基盤としつづけているのだから。

　　　近代へ移っていくというよくある話は、たいていの場合、ナショナル・ヒストリーの 2 つの定型をとって語られてきた。ひとつは解放（たとえばフランス、アメリカ合衆国）の物語で、もうひとつは発展（多数の国々）の物語だ。いずれにせよ、これらのナショナルな過程は 2 つのベクトルに沿って進んでいった。まず、暴力による近代化がある。19 世紀と 20 世紀初頭において、変化は宗主国や武力の脅威、主権といった世界秩序上の責務、帝国主義、国際法によって引き起こされてきた。20 世紀後半には冷戦下の東西両権力、IMF や世界銀行といった国際組織、あるいは新自由主義経済という規範のもとで変化が生じた。これを私は、強圧的な近代 coercive modern と呼んでいる。

　　　もう一方のベクトルは、熱望に導かれた近代化だ。そのなかで人びとは、近代化を遂げる変化へと手を伸ばす。国家および社会の改革者、国力を追求する軍人、市場と利潤の拡大を追求する資本家、階級や富、あるいは権力によって劣位にある人びと——近代という進路を自身にとって望ましいものと考え、それがヨーロッパに起源を置くだけでなく普遍的に応用できるものとみなしている人びとは、一般に考えられているよりも幅広い。変革を得ようとする人びとは、状況がそうさせたのみではなく、彼／彼女ら個人、家族、または共同体にとって有益であると考えたからだ。日本の農民がきわめて多くの子どもたちを学校に送ったことが 19 世紀後半の一例である。レボナが部屋の多い家を欲しいと思うのは、20 世紀末の例だ。これを私は「熱望の近代 aspirational modern」とする。これらの人びとは、ある研究者が「約束手形 the promissory notes」と呼ぶものが〈モダニティ〉には存在していると信じていた[5]。近代的な生活が人びとに差し出し、示しているのはこのこと——すなわち約束——なのである。2 世紀にわたるグローバル・ヒストリーを経て定義、経験された〈モダニティ〉がこのようなものだとすると、わたしたちはポストモダニストの理論家のように、こう言うだろう。今やわたしたち全員が近代的であり、それゆえ、何か別のものへと進んでいくことができる、と。しかし当然ながら、〈モダニティ〉の「約束手形」は不均等に、ある場所の一部の人びとのもとでのみ履行されるか、全く履行されないかのどちらかである。すると、過去数十年のあいだに〈モダニティ〉の定義が変化してきた。20 世紀後半には、先にのべた 2 つの定型に沿った語りが支配的で、そこにはアフリカや南・東南アジアの多くの国々が植民地支配から離れていくことに焦点をあてた解放の物語があった。また、それらの国々がグローバルサウスや、これを越えて力を得つつある発展の物語もあった。しかし、物語の中心が近年のあいだに変化しているのだ。近代化という変化——あるいは、より良きものへの変化——が、国民国家というよりも個々人に焦点をあてた視点で記述されるようにもなっている。GDP から見た国家経済の成長よりも仕事や暮らしぶりから、または経済発展よりも人間の発展から、さらには、自由を抽象的に語るのではなく個人の選択可能性といった観点からの記述がなされている。だからこそ、ジェンダーや健康、そして教育といった側面が、発展という考えにとって重要なものになったのである。

日常的な近代

　　　わたしたちはこのことを、「日常的な近代性 everyday modernity」として考えてもよいだろう。これは日々の生活における〈モダニティ〉、民俗範疇としての〈モダニティ〉であって、レソトに住むレボナがすすもうと望んでいた方向性でもある。発展にかんする言説は、いまでは「日常的な近代性」

5　Bjorn Wittrock, "One, None, or Many? European Origins and Modernity as a Global Condition," *Daedalus*, v. 129, no. 1 (Winter, 2000), pp, 37-38.

といったことについての指標を数多く含んでいる。おそらく最もよく知られているのが国連開発計画（UNDP）の人間開発指数だ。これは世界の国々を、平均寿命（健康）・知識へのアクセス（教育）・生活水準（1人あたりの収入）という3つの尺度で格付けして、「すべての人のための人間開発」という目標を掲げている。1990年から、指標の焦点が「物質的な豊かさの追求」から「人間の福祉の拡充」へと、また「所得の最大化」は「能力拡大」へ、さらに「経済成長の最適化」が「自由の拡大」へと移った。国連開発計画の報告は、「単純な経済的豊かさよりも人間生活の豊かさ」を強調している[6]。「GDPの専横」から抜け出そうという努力にもかかわらず、人間開発報告書2016（2015年についての報告）ではノルウェー・オーストラリア・スイスが先頭にたち、アメリカが10位、イギリスと日本がそれぞれ16・17位となり、計188か国中の上位51か国が「非常に高度な人間開発度」となっている。「低度の人間開発度」とされている41か国のうち多数はサブサハラ・アフリカ地域にあり、人間生活の豊かさを経済的豊かさとを分けるという課題の困難さを示唆している。最上位1%の人口が世界の富のうち46%を握っているという状態であるのだから、なおさらのことだ[7]。

　　国連のプログラム「人間の安全保障」──この言葉は1990年代になって導入された──は、国家の安全保障という従来の考えを、人権や人間の尊厳、基本的欲求をふくむ「人間中心」のアプローチへと拡充させるという試みで、類似の目標を公表している[8]。アメリカに拠点を置くNPO、Social Progress Imperative（社会進歩の責務）が作成した世界の「社会的進歩指標」は、人間生活の基本的欲求（食料・水・衛生）、福祉基盤（知識へのアクセス・医療・安全な環境）、機会（権利・選択・参画・高等教育）を測っている。ほかのものに呼応して、この指標は「収入や投資といった、成功の従来の尺度」を避け、そうではなく「市民の基本的な欲求を満たし、生活の質を高めて持続させ、すべての個人が潜在能力を十全にひらくことのできる社会の可能性」を評価している。128か国についての2017年報告では、アメリカと日本が第2グループ（高い社会的進歩）、スカンディナヴィア諸国やカナダなどが第1グループ（非常に高い社会的進歩）に属し、サブサハラ・アフリカ地域の国々は下位2グループへと位置づけられた[9]。

　　国連の「持続可能な開発ソリューション・ネットワーク」が2012年にはじめて発表した「世界幸福度指数」は、主観的な認識を幸福度に関連付けた世界世論調査（Gallup World Polls）にもとづいて155か国を格付けしている。調査結果は、一人当たりGDP（収入）、健康寿命、社会的支援（トラブル時の相談相手がいるか）、信用（政府や企業に汚職が無いという認識）、人生決定をおこなう自覚的な自由、寛大さ（必要性に応じた他者への贈与）という、6つの変数にしたがって評価されている。2017年報告ではスカンディナヴィア諸国とスイスがトップに立ち、アメリカ14位（この国は上位10か国に入ったことがなく、2018年報告では18位になった）、イギリス19位、日本52位、韓国56位、中国80位となっている。東アジアで最も幸福な国だとされる台湾は33位に入っている[10]。アフリカ諸

6　United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report 2016: Human Development for Everyone* (New York: United Nations Development Programme, 2016), p. 2.
http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/2016_human_development_report.pdf

7　Ibid., pp. 198-201; wealth, p. 7. The "tyranny of GDP" is frequently mentioned by Helen Clark, UNDP administrator from 2009-17, e.g., http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/presscenter/speeches/2017/02/11/helen-clark-keynote-speech-at-the-global-dialogue-for-happiness-where-is-happiness-on-the-global-agenda-.html

8　E.g. Introduction by UN Secretary General to the Report on Human Security to the General Assembly, May 20, 2010.
https://www.un.org/press/en/2010/ga10942.doc.htm

9　Michael E. Porter and Scott Stern with Michael Green, *Social Progress Index 2017* (Washington, Social Progress Imperative, 2017); rankings, pp.4-5 ; map, p. 23. http://www.socialprogressimperative.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/English-2017-Social-Progress-Index-Findings-Report.pdf

10　John Helliwell, et al., *World Happiness Report 2017* (New York: Sustainable Development Solutions Network, 2017), pp. 20-22. https://s3.amazonaws.com/happiness-report/2017/HR17-Ch2.pdf

国の多くは、単一の大陸としてまとめあげるにはあまりに多様だが、この報告が「幸福の欠損」と呼ぶ問題を抱えている [11]。

　　　当初は軽々しいニュースだとして批判（と皮肉）を受けた「世界幸福度指数」は、近年になって信頼を得つつあるが、それはとりわけ、調査結果がほかの指標から得られた結果に近似しているからである。これらの率先した取り組みは、ジョゼフ・スティグリッツやアマルティア・セン、ジャン＝ポール・フィトゥンなどによる GDP 中心主義への重要な批判から影響を受けている。彼らは 2009 年に発表した報告で、幸福や生活の質、環境の持続性などが、経済のパフォーマンスを測る基準として GDP の統計にのみ依拠するよりも適していると提起したのである [12]。

　　　社会的な幸福を測った最近のものでは、ほぼすべてにおいてジェンダーの重要性がましつつあるように見える。世界経済フォーラムから毎年発行されている「世界男女格差報告書」は、全世界のさまざまな社会における経済、教育、健康、政治について女性に関わるデータを追跡している。2017 年の報告書では、スカンディナヴィア諸国が最上位にあり（想像どおりだ）、フィンランドとスウェーデンにはさまれてルワンダが 4 位となっている。イギリスは 15 位で、アメリカが 49 位、日本は表のかなり下のほう、144 か国中 114 位である [13]。

　　　指標はほかにもある。経済協力開発機構の「より良い暮らし指標」や「アフロ・バロメーター」、「アメリカ・バロメーター」などだ。これらの指標のカテゴリーは、2030 年に達成すべきものとして国連が 2015 年に採択した「持続可能な開発目標」（SDGs：the Sustainable Development Goals）に、なんらかの点で関連している。（この目標は、2015 年までに達成されることになっている「ミレニアム開発目標」という 2000 年の目標に代わるもの）。新たに設定された「持続可能な開発目標」は 17 の項目を挙げていて、「貧困をなくそう No Poverty」や「飢餓をゼロに Zero Hunger」にはじまり、「健康と福祉 Good Health and Well-being」と「ジェンダー平等 Gender Equality」などを含み、「気候変動に具体的対策を Climate Action」や「平和と公正をすべての人に Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions」といったものに至る。

　　　SDGs は、「普遍的」（先進国にも発展途上国にも同等に適用する）――これは発展途上国のみを対象にした「ミレニアム開発目標」に対して新たな点だ――、「包摂的」（誰一人取り残さない）、そして「地球的」（人間社会の依存する地球資源を維持する）であろうという意図を持っている [14]。「近代 modern」という言葉は主として形容詞（近代技術 modern technology や近代医療 modern health care、近代エネルギー modern energy）として用いられているが、実際に SDGs で明確に思い描かれているのは、発展という名の社会的、国家的、国際的な発展のプログラムと、よりよい生活なのである。約束手形としての SDGs は、19 世紀や 20 世紀の〈モダニティ〉が目指したもののように実現しがたいものとなりそうだが、SDGs の焦点は異なるところにある。国家の経済や安全保障よりも、「日常的な近代性」という場における、個々の人間の幸福や社会的生活に重点を置いているのだ。

アフリカと、グローバルな近代

　　　以上をふまえて、新しい、グローバルな近代ということができるだろう。このように改められた定義からすると、アフリカはどういった位置づけを得るのだろうか。44 か国からなり、12 億という

11　Valerie Møller, et al., "'Waiting for Happiness' in Africa," *ibid.*, pp. 85, 108-9

12　Joseph E. Stiglitz, Amartya Sen, Jean-Paul Fitoussi, *Report by the Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress* (2009). http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/118025/118123/Fitoussi+Commission+report

13　*Global Gender Gap Report 2017* (Geneva: World Economic Forum, 2017), pp. 10-11.

14　E.g., "Transforming our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development" (Resolution adopted by the General Assembly, September 25, 2015). http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/70/1&Lang=E
Chart of the goals, https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/?menu=1300

人口は全世界の 16％を占めている。また、そのうち 7 割は 30 歳未満である。このアフリカは 2050 年までに人口が 25 億人まで増加し、世界総人口の 4 分の 1 に達すると言われている。これらのそれぞれ全く異なる国々を、世界の人びとはしばしば、ひとつの大陸という視座のうちに組み込んでしまう。しかも、腐敗した国家や泥棒政治、HIV、悲惨な貧困といったことに頻繁に言及しながらだ。これに似た見方が、世界銀行や IMF による 1980 年代の融資を受けるための構造調整の要求や、1990 年代から 2000 年代の債務免除のために、「優れた統治」および開放経済という条件を求めるということの根拠になっていた。この「救いのない大陸」という、一般に悲観的で新自由主義的な見方は、21 世紀はじめの 10 年で「立ち上がるアフリカ」というイメージとともに反証された。ただし、アフリカの経済成長をめぐるこの語りは、それ自体がある種のステレオタイプとなり、最近においてはテロリズムや内戦の描写によってさらに反証されてしまった。

　　　発展途上にあって最も貧困である地域の経済的な命運は、いまも議論の争点でありつづけている。2007 年には、世界の貧困層である「最底辺の 10 億人」のうち 7 割がアフリカに居住していた。自身が暮らす地域の政府や国際的な救済を受ける事のできる見込みはかすかで、それらの救済が真に対象としているところまでたどり着くのもしばしば失敗していた [15]。対照的に、2015 年には上機嫌のエコノミストらが、「世界史上、地球上の貧困に対してこれほど大きな開発の進展が起きた時代はない」と、サブサハラ・アフリカ地域を含めた状況を言祝いでいた [16]。このような意見の分離はなにも新しいことではない。ただ、先に触れた指標に関連して、また国連の「持続可能な開発目標」に照らして考えれば、サブサハラ・アフリカ地域の国々の多くは依然として極度の貧困に苦しんでいる。これは、ごきげんなエコノミストらにすら認識されている事実である。乳幼児死亡率が著しく低下している一方で、アフリカの女性や子どもたちは未だに医療や教育、そのほか人間開発指数に含まれているような公共財から疎外されているのだ。

　　　世界幸福度指数によれば、アフリカは最も不幸な大陸となっている。2017 年の報告に収められた章のタイトルは、モーリタニアの映画監督アブデラマン・サシコが 2002 年に発表した作品から引いて、「幸福を待ちわびて Waiting for Happpiness」と名付けられている。「生活貧困 lived poverty」（これはアフロバロメーターで使用されている用語）が増すほどに幸福が減じていくということは、驚くに値しない。レボナが暮らすレソト王国は 155 か国中 139 位だ。人間開発指数では、レソト王国は 188 か国中 160 位に立っており、暴力によって分裂している中央アフリカ共和国が最下位となっている。社会的進歩指標については、レソト王国が 128 か国中 103 位で、これに多くのサブサハラ・アフリカ地域の国々が続き、ここでも中央アフリカ共和国が最下位に立っている。しかし、世界男女格差報告書でのレソト王国はかなり上位の 55 位／ 144 か国にあり、50 位のイタリアからそう遠くない位置におり、114 位の日本のはるか上にいる。レソト王国の女性は医療や教育面で悲惨なほどに低いスコアとなっているが、政治的な権限（政府における女性）や経済的な参画とその機会について高いスコアを記録している。これは、男性に比して女性の方が不均等の度合いが小さいということを意味している。それは必ずしも女性の賃金や仕事、生活状況が改善されたということではなく、ある部分の男性と女性がどちらもうまく生活している一方でほかの人びとが貧困化しているものの、他の場所よりは平等に近いということである。

　　　アフリカの人びとは何を欲しているのか、という質問に対する答えは、新たに設定されてきたグローバルな目標のなかで、彼／彼女らが有するべきものと言われる内容に一致する。すなわち、人間生活の基本的欲求（食料や水）、医療へのアクセス、雇用（無職の若年層と、これを吸収する産業の欠

15　Paul Collier, *The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries are Failing and What Can Be Done About It* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 7.

16　Stephen Radelet, *The Great Surge: The Ascent of the Developing World* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2015), pp. 3-5.

如への対策）、生きるにふさわしい生活水準、教育、インフラストラクチャー（道路など）、腐敗の追放と民主主義の増進、といったことだ。「包摂」への願望もアフリカでは表明されている。この言葉はアフリカの人びとが将来について議論を交わす際によく聞かれるものであり、国連の開発団体において「持続可能な」という言葉が聞かれるのと同様である。「包摂」は不平等や無権利、そして個人や家族による選択が欠如している状態に反対するものだ。では、アフリカの人びとは、本人らの立場からして、何を得たのだろうか。国内では内戦や腐敗した指導者、伝染病、土地を侵害していく気候変動。国際的には、国際援助が地域に根付かず対象へ届かなかったり（医療の提供など）、外国からの直接投資を受けたりしている。外国からの投資は土地の収奪や、労働力を含む資源の搾取を含んでおり、かつての帝国主義権力だけでなく、中国や韓国、日本企業によってもなされている。投資やインフラ整備への資金提供、貿易、中国人労働者といった側面での、中国の影響力の爆発的な増大は歓迎されると同時に不満の思いをも招いている。その態度は、それぞれの国とそこでの社会経済的な状況によって異なっている[17]。投資や経済的な利益が一方にあり、他方では搾取や他方にある。これはヨーロッパ諸国による植民地支配からよく繰り返されてきたものだ。

　　しかしながら、将来に対する期待がアフリカに暮らす人びとの間で高まっているということ、とりわけ若年層の間でそうであるということも事実である。「より幸福」だとされている他の社会よりも、だ。ある研究によると、楽観主義はしばしば最も貧困で不安定な社会で強まる。そうしたところでは、そうした楽観主義が民主主義や市場に対する積極的な態度と相関関係にある。物質的な富それ自体が人びとの必要を満たすことはなく、消費至上主義的な近代性は、将来を確約することと同じく大きな重荷になる、と批評家らは論じている。こうした考え方はワンゲチ・ムトゥの映像作品『The End of Carry All』に表現されている。この作品は、頭の上にバスケットをのせながら、アフリカの風景を横切っていく女性を映しだしている。彼女はバスケットをたずさえ、重い足取りで歩いていく。そのバスケットは近代的な生活を象徴するものや虚飾に満ちている。家財道具にはじまり、自転車の車輪、そして、衛星放送受信用のアンテナ、石油プラットフォームや高層ビルなどが、そこに積まれている。物質的な〈モダニティ〉の重みは次第に増していき、彼女は地面に押しつぶされそうになってしまう。開発のネガティブな側面と、アフリカでの生活と労働における女性の役割を象徴している。この女性と、彼女に重くのしかかる荷物が約束された将来――あるいはそれは、世界の終わりでもある――にたどり着いたとき、近代を飾る数々の物体を積んだバスケットは、もはや手に負えぬ塊となり、崖からどん底に向かって転落してしまう[18]。

　　不均等な資本主義的発展の将来を映しだす、荒涼としながら説得力に満ちたこの映像に対して、別の異なる、しばしば楽天的でもあるような将来を、あたかもすでに到達しているかのように感じることのできる場面もある。たとえば、インドのように、アフリカの大都市では、若い世代をはじめとする人びとが電子機器を通じたつながりを持っており、その領域は「海賊的な近代性 pirate modernity」や「リサイクルされた近代性 recycled modernity」と呼ばれている。そこでは携帯電話をはじめとする機器が分解されて別の用途にあてられ、インターネット接続環境と、そこで電力や資本の欠如を切り抜ける有能な牽引者のつくる、影に隠れていながらも活発な経済圏が生み出されているのである。コンピュータの故障や、陳腐なデジタルメディアの品質低下といった技術的な欠陥は、単に障害をもたらすだけでなく、創造性を刺激する。ナイジェリアのカノや南アフリカ共和国のソウェトのような大都市で、その地域の音楽や映像を創作していくといったことに対し、阻害にも促進にもなる現代のメディア使用をめぐ

17　Fei-Ling Wang and Esi A. Elliot, "China in Africa: Presence, Perceptions and Prospects," *Journal of Contemporary China,* 23, no. 90 (2014), pp. 1012-32.

18　Wangechi Mutu, "The End of Carrying All," Venice Biennale 2015: All the World's Futures. Born in Kenya in 1972, the artist lives and works in the U.S.

る研究から、日常的な──そして熱望の──近代性における新たなテクノロジーの存在が明らかになっているのだ[19]。

日常的な近代性とグローバルな責務

　　わたしたちが本当に「すべての人のための人間開発」を、国連が宣言したように追求していくのであれば、思考と行動のきわめて大きな転換が、国内および国際的な場において必要とされるだろう。〈モダニティ〉はある意味、ロンドンよりもレソト王国においてこそ重要なのであり、それは私たちが未だに、21世紀における〈モダニティ〉が何を意味しているのかということへの考えを改められていないからだ。ほとんどの人は、ロンドンや東京が、かつての意味において近代的だということに異論を持たないだろう。しかし、日常的な近代性を目標としたとき、それは到達するにはまだはるか遠くに残されている。あまりにも多くの人びとが排除されているから、である。そして、排除される人びとが、それぞれの社会において占める位置というのは、いずれの場所にも通ずる傾向がある。マイノリティや周縁的なグループ、低所得者層や先住民、女性や外国人などだ。地球上に広がる不均等な近代性は国内における不均等な近代性と対応する。日常的な近代性は発展途上国だけでなく、貧困層や公民権を奪われた人びとと、無力化された人びととなど、グローバル・ノースの中心部にもあてはまるのである。アフリカの人びとが私たちの注意を、彼／彼女らのよりよい生活への熱望に向けるのとまさに同じように、路上や地域にひろがって暮らしている、取り残された人びとにも注意を向けていかなければならないのだ。

　　レソト王国のような場所で、熱望の近代を阻害している要因は何であるのか？日本あるいは他の国の対外援助や政策、投資はレボナのような人びととの状況をより良く、あるいは悪くしてしまうのだろうか？男女格差について日本の順位をきわめて（非近代的に）低く、レソト王国から大きく離れた位置へと下げている国内のいかなる条件がはたらいているのだろうか？このような比較はほんとうに不快だと思うかもしれないが、それが重要なポイントになっている。つまり、進歩やよりよい生活への熱望を満たすという点について、誰ひとりとして特権的な地位を占めることは無いのである。これからの課題だろうと私が考えているのは、グローバルな近代性を増進していくということ。国内および国外にわたって、レボナが「そこに向かって、私たちは進んでいきたい」と述べたように、──より良い、より人道的な、「世界における自身の立ち位置」に向かって──近代性を押し進めていくということである。すべての人びとのために、あらゆるところで、日々の暮らしのなかで。

<div align="right">翻訳：小美濃彰（東京外国語大学大学院 国際日本専攻博士後期課程）</div>

19　Ravi Sundaram, "Recycling Modernity: Pirate Electronic Cultures in India," *Third Text* 13, no. 47 (Summer, 1999), pp. 59-65; Brian Larkin, *Signal and Noise: Media, Infrastructure, and Urban Culture in Nigeria* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008); Gavin Steingo, "Sound and Circulation: Immobility and Obduracy in South African Electronic Music," *Ethnomusicology Forum* 24, no. 1, pp. 102-23.

Land and Power in Contemporary Africa: Understanding Drastic Rural Changes in the Age of Land Reform

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1.　Introduction

Drastic changes have recently been taking place with regard to land in Africa. Land related troubles, including large–scale land appropriation and serious land conflicts, have attracted worldwide attention. One of the most well–known examples was a scandal over a huge land deal in Madagascar, revealed in 2008, the year of food crisis, under which a Korean company had concluded a lease contract on 1.3 million hectares. The deal was severely criticized as "land grab", thus leading to the collapse of Ravalomanana regime the following year. Large–scale land deals have been a matter of serious concern in recent Africa, as they will considerably constraint the land use of small farmers. As for land conflicts, they have provoked extreme violence, as witnessed in the civil war in Côte d'Ivoire and the post–election violence in Kenya. These land related problems including large–scale land deals and serious violence should not be considered as mutually disconnected phenomenon, but as a part of drastic rural transformation that is underway in Africa.

The period when Africa has seen these drastic rural changes overlaps with the period when African governments have launched land reforms. Since the 1990s, a number of African countries have formulated new land policies and revised existent land laws or adopted new ones. While backgrounds of these policy changes vary from one country to another, the direction of changes has been similar. Generally, they have been legal system reforms, claiming to strengthen tillers' land rights, and have officially recognized customary rights and clarified rights for individuals as well as particular groups. We need to take seriously the facts that the above–mentioned drastic rural changes, which often threaten land use of small farmers, have taken place in the age of legal land reforms, advocating to strengthen tillers' rights. This bitter irony calls for serious reflections.

The purpose of this paper is to reflect on the relationship between the wave of land reforms and drastic rural changes in recent Africa. In summary, this paper argues that the recent land reforms have had significant consequences for African state and society not only by contributing to promoting commercialization and privatization of the land, but also by enabling some African countries to strengthen the state control over rural societies. In the following section, this paper begins with clarifying backgrounds of recent simultaneous land law reforms. Then, main characteristics of recent rural changes will be sum-

Shinichi Takeuchi
Land and Power in Contemporary Africa:
Understanding Drastic Rural Changes in the Age of Land Reform

marized. After examining the nature of recent land reforms on the basis of concrete cases, the paper explores the impact of the land reforms on rural changes. The discussion in this paper is mainly based on a research project and the case studies of ten African countries, namely Burundi, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia[1].

2.   Land reforms in Africa after the 1990s

The significance of land reforms in the context of development is quite obvious. In developing countries depending heavily on subsistence agriculture, the land is, for an overwhelming part of the population, the only property, a crucial means of production, and critical goods for survival. Therefore, in such countries, the structure of land tenure, such as a landlord–tenant system, determines the characteristics of the society. In addition, the land is often deeply related to identity and spirituality of people. Generally speaking, the land assumes a socio–political character rather than a simple economic good, and the nature of effective land ownership — whether it lies in the state, individuals or communities — determines the characteristics of the society. Therefore, the state–society relations tend to be reflected in institutions and property rights over land (Takeuchi 2014).

A land reform is an attempt to change institutions over land through policy interventions. Its objectives could be various including agricultural development and correction of social inequality. Such a variation is quite natural as the land is not a simple economic good. The purpose of the land reform carried out in Japan after the Second World War was not only addressing the inequality of land holdings to increase agricultural productivity, but also fostering middle–class farmers to prevent penetration of communism. The method of this land reform was the redistribution of land, confiscating land from landlords and distributing it to their tenants. The policy of land redistribution, which was also implemented in other Asian countries including South Korea and Taiwan, has been a main policy measure for a land reform until recently.

In Sub–Saharan Africa, just like in other regions of the world, the land question has been one of the most important issues in the development, and thus various policy measures have been taken since independence (Bruce 1988). What is important in the African context is the sweep of land reforms since the 1990s. Table 1 shows main land policies and land laws newly adopted after the 1990s. Obviously, a lot of African countries have introduced new policy measures over land. Another important point to make is that methods and contents of the land reforms in this period have been remarkably similar across African countries. Almost all of these land reforms have adopted different methods from above mentioned Asian countries. They have been related to laws and institutions rather than redistribution of land. Although a lot of African countries have launched land reform in this period, the only two countries, South Africa and Zimbabwe, have implemented land redistribution policies[2]. In all other countries, the land reform has only dealt with laws and institutions focusing on land rights under customary tenure.

The customary land tenure should not be understood as a simple "traditional" system. While it certainly includes elements of the precolonial land tenure system, it has been repeatedly reorganized and transformed since the colonial times (Chanock 1991). Separating the territory for Africans from that

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1 Analysis of this paper is based on a research project, funded by the Institute of Developing Economies - JETRO during 2015 and 2016, in which ten countries were selected for case studies by eight researchers.

2 As we discuss later, the Rwanda's land sharing might be regarded as a redistribution policy. However, the government has never claimed it as a land reform.

for Europeans, the colonial authority stipulated that the former should be ruled by customary laws. In other words, the customary lands were placed out of the framework of state laws in the colonies. Private property rights were basically denied there and rights for redistribution and disposition of land were attributed to particular African actors such as families and traditional leaders.

This bifurcated land tenure system persisted in the post–colonial African states, in which rural areas, overwhelming part of the territory, were put under the customary land tenure. Land ownership in rural areas were nominally attributed to the state, but it can be substantially claimed by a variety of actors including traditional leaders, extended families, and individuals. In reality, the land has been held and cultivated mainly by nuclear families in the majority of agricultural areas in Africa, but it was also true that tillers' land rights were ambiguous. In the 1990s, when the marketization came to be actively promoted, it was argued that the ambiguities of tillers' land rights could lead to proliferation of land conflicts and hamper investment. In this context, opinion claiming that tillers' land rights should be clarified and strengthened came to be prevailing, thereby forming the background of the wave of land policy reforms.

3.　Context of the land reform

(1)　Internal contexts

This section examines national and international contexts of the recent land reforms to explore reasons why a number of African countries simultaneously undertook reforms. International factors might be more important than national factors for explaining backgrounds of land reforms conducted through similar methods and in similar period. Nevertheless, this section begins with examining national factors, as motivations of the African side will matter in the later discussion.

Focusing on inherent factors of African countries, three reasons should be emphasized. First, it was compelling for some countries to revise their previous land policies that had produced fatal outcomes. African socialist countries like Tanzania and Mozambique had actively promoted villagization and collective farms in the 1970s. However, they had delivered so disastrous results that the governments were obliged to initiate argument for revision as early as in the 1980s. For these countries, new land reforms were indispensable.

Secondly, armed conflicts that took place frequently in this period in Africa were another important factor for land reform. Those who seize political power will make efforts to build a land tenure system that is advantageous for themselves. In fact, land reforms have often been carried out as a result of the revision of political order following armed conflicts. A good example is Rwanda, where the former rebels, Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), has carried out a series of land reforms following the victory in the civil war in 1994 (Takeuchi and Marara 2014). Through active interventions in land related matters, the RPF–led government has attempted to create a new property regime, corresponding to the new political order.

In Kenya, which was seriously destabilized by the Post–Electoral Violence during 2007 and 2008, land problems have been the central focus in negotiations for restoring the political stability. In this case, land reforms were urgently requested in order to solve the conflict. Although the land problem was

Shinichi Takeuchi
Land and Power in Contemporary Africa:
Understanding Drastic Rural Changes in the Age of Land Reform

not the direct cause of the PEV, Kenyan political elites shared the perception that it is necessary to address them as they were a long–term cause of popular dissatisfaction.

Finally, drastic changes in politics and economy which took place in Africa since the 1980s have exerted crucial influence over the simultaneous and similar land reforms. In fact, African countries have seen dramatic policy changes in this period. In the 1980s, radical economic liberalization was started due to the introduction of the structural adjustment policies. The end of the Cold War brought about a rapid transition from one–party to multi–party system in a significant number of countries. Abolition of Apartheid regime in South Africa was also an extremely important event in this period. These macro–level drastic changes in political economy created historic opportunities for reviewing all fundamental policies, including land–related ones. In Africa, the state had exercised strong power over land. Until the 1980s, it was common that land ownership belonged to the state, that purchasing and selling of land were prohibited, and that individual land rights were ambiguous. In the context of the end of the Cold War, strongly promoting democratization and marketization, policies strengthening individual property rights came to be willingly accepted and adopted in African countries.

Introduction of policies aiming at reinforcing individual property rights was accelerated in the course of political change in the 1990s. As a result of Zambian multi–party election in 1991, newly established Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) defeated United National Independence Party (UNIP), which had been the ruling party since independence, and formed the government. During the election campaign, the MMD promised to change the UNIP's socialistic policies and strengthen private property rights. Following the electoral victory, the MMD adopted a new land law in 1995, reinforcing individual rights over lands (Brown 2005).

(2) Promotion of land reform by the international community

International factors have played significant roles in the African land reforms of this period. In fact, drastic policy changes in African political economy during the 1980s and the 1990s had been triggered by the pressure from the international community. It is not too much to say that the structural adjustment programs were imposed by the international financial institutions as a result of the failure of import substitution policies and the debt crisis. Also, the decisions of African countries to introduce multi–party system in the 1990s were strongly influenced by donors' new policy linking development aid with democratization efforts (Bratton and van de Walle 1997). While the liberalization of politics and economy formed the general background to the wave of land reforms in Africa, it was under the international pressure that African countries took decision of implementing the policies for liberalization.

Donors have ardently provided assistances to African countries launching land reforms on a rising tide of marketization and democratization. Moreover, they have inculcated their ideas and logics of land reform in African governments (Manji 2006). Generally, donors have promoted a land reform with two logics. First, securing tillers' land rights for increasing investments and improving productivity. This logic can be clearly read in the report of "Commission for Africa," which was set up on the initiative of the UK's Blair government. The report emphasized the necessity for land rights reforms, arguing that securing property rights would be indispensable for promoting investment, and thus for agricultural development. Considering the land registration as a precondition of land security, the report recommended to use the geographic information systems (GIS) as well as computers for reducing the cost. It argued that clarification of land

rights through the registration of each parcel would increase incentives for investment not only among farmers but also investors, and activate rural financial markets by making it possible to take loans while using parcels as collateral (Commission for Africa 2005 46, 223, 231). Presuming such a path for economic development, the establishment of private property rights has been considered as a key economic policy. The idea is a textbook–style policy for market–oriented economic growth. It is well known that de Soto (2000), a book advocating this line of development path, has been widely accepted by donors and has had a significant political influence.

Another logic promoting a land reform is the reduction of land conflicts and the improvement of governance. This logic can be found in the World Bank policy paper (Deininger 2003), which was published three decades after the previous policy paper on land (World Bank 1975). Contrary to the 1975 one, which focused exclusively on the establishment of private property rights as a method of securing land rights, the 2003 paper recognized that tillers' rights could be well secured under the customary land tenure system. It argued that customary lands had been generally well managed under traditional authorities and are equipped with conflict resolution mechanisms, and therefore that official recognition of the customary tenure would lead to low–cost and effective land management, thus stabilizing land rights for each member of the community. Considering the disappointing results of land registration policies carried out before the 1990s as well as theoretical development of economics, the 2003 paper emphasized the significance of officially recognizing customary land rights (Deininger and Binswanger 2001). It argued that tillers' rights will be secured regardless of land tenure system, if the legitimacy of their rights is willingly accepted among stakeholders and a sustainable land management mechanism exists. For establishing common understandings of legitimacy, a good governance will be a critical element. In short, the 2003 paper argues that governance matters.

Close relationship between land reforms and good governance has been recently stressed among World Bank researchers (Deininger and Feder 2009, Deininger, Selod and Burns 2012). They argue that constructing a mechanism for effective and equitable land management will contribute to not only securing land rights and increasing agricultural productivity, but also empowering the rural poor, enhancing gender equality, as well as successfully implementing policies regarding decentralization and peace–building. Here, the institutional land reform is considered as a measure boosting a good governance. The argument supposes that official recognition of customary land rights by the state will change the perception of local communities and make them see the state as legitimate, thus improving and stabilizing the state–society relations. In this logic, we can find the same line of arguments with donors' policies on the state–building, which has been mainstreamed in development aid since the 2000s (OECD 2008). Just like other issues for global governance in the post–Cold War period including democratization, decentralization, and peace–building, land reforms have been carried out under the strong influence of liberal democracy.

4. Main features of rural changes in recent Africa

Although African rural areas have been continuously transformed since long, recent changes are particularly rapid and even drastic with regard to land. In this section, main characteristics of recent rural changes in Africa are summarized.

(1) Proliferation of large-scale land deals

First and foremost, the number of large–scale land deals has tremendously increased in recent

Shinichi Takeuchi
Land and Power in Contemporary Africa:
Understanding Drastic Rural Changes in the Age of Land Reform

years. Table 2, which was tabulated from data of the Land Matrix Global Observatory, clearly indicates to what extent large–scale land deals have been significant in Africa. The data are cumulative total amounts of land deals (982 contracts) reported to the Land Matrix as of February 2017. In some countries, the intended and contact sizes of land deals exceed considerably the size of cultivable lands, and they are significant even in comparison with total land area. In whole Africa, the area equal to a fourth of the total cultivable lands has been intended for deals, and contracts have been concluded for lands equivalent to 13% of them. The purpose of these investments includes producing crops as well as biofuels, cattle raising, and logging. The average size of the deals is as vast as tens of thousands hectares, and almost all of these deals started after the 2000s. It is clear that Africa has recently seen very drastic development of large–scale land deals.

The Land Matrix recognizes that accuracy of the data could not be completely ensured. Gathering information through media reports and various researches, its data tends to have a bias for larger land deals, which are likely to attract attention. In addition, there would be a gap between the time of a land deal and that of registration to the database. In spite of these drawbacks, the database is valuable for the overview of current land deals in Africa. Even taking the statistical limits into consideration, it is fair to say that huge amounts of agricultural investments have been carried out in Africa in recent period.

Since the 2000s, demand for African lands has risen sharply due to the significant increase of demand for food and energy. In this context, a huge swathe of land can be transferred to foreign investors in a short period, once African governments adopt policies promoting foreign investments. Having been elected President of Sierra Leone in 2007, E. B. Koroma launched policies for promoting foreign direct investments to the agricultural sector, thus actively encouraging agricultural investments (Ochiai 2017). As a result, it was estimated that "between 2009 and the end of 2012, foreign investors had taken out or were set to take out long leases (50 years with possible extensions) on at least 1,154,777 ha, about 21.4 per cent of the country's total arable land for large–scale industrial agriculture" (Baxter 2013, 14). This commercialization of land with tremendous size and astonishing speed took place before the stipulation of the new land policy.

(2) Enclosure from below

Secondly, African lands have been rapidly privatized and commercialized in recent years also by local initiatives. Above mentioned large–scale land deals have been basically carried out by external actors and came to be salient particularly after the global food crisis in 2008. However, commercialization and privatization of African lands have been also developed by actors coming from inside of African countries. The locally–driven rural changes with respect to lands have started much earlier than the rise of foreign direct investment. Woodhouse (2003) emphasized this point and argued, on the basis of case studies in Kenya, Botswana, Mali, and South Africa, that initiatives of African local communities, not the policy intervention, have played important roles to mobilize people's investments over lands.

There are a lot of examples of the locally driven enclosure. The phenomenon has been quite salient in Kenya, where a series of policies for establishing private land rights have been taken since the 1950s. In Maasailand, for instance, the group ranching system, allocating a sizable amount of lands to a group, was introduced in the 1960s for the purpose of ensuring sustainable development of cattle raising. However, the group ranching system was later gradually eroded because members of the groups de-

manded to reallocate the group land for private uses of each member. In short, people preferred private use of land to the group ranching (Campbell 1993).

The locally driven enclosure can be found in many other countries in Africa. In Tanzania, Yasu (1999) reported that villagers planted trees around their fields for claiming a private rights, aiming at protecting their land ownership against the backdrop of interventionist *Ujamaa* policy. A drastic change of land use was reported by a researcher carrying out fieldwork in other areas in Tanzania (Yamamoto 2013). In her research area, seasonal wetlands that used to be reserved for communal use have been rapidly cultivated for private uses and have almost disappeared. Such "enclosure" movements are expanding against the backdrop of inherent transformation of the rural societies, of which population increase has been one of the main triggers.

Among our case studies, Zambia and DR Congo show clear examples of locally initiated enclosure. In Northeastern part of Zambia, not only villagers but also city residents have actively bought rural lands (Oyama 2017). Urban dwellers have purchased village lands for insurances, as their salaried works in the city tend to be vulnerable, and agriculture could still play an important role for their livelihood. The acquisition of land can be therefore regarded as an investment for their retired life. In addition, the price of rural land tends to be extremely low for salaried urban dwellers, thus facilitating the purchase of large plots in a village. My own fieldwork in Western DR Congo (Mai–Ndombe Province) has revealed that the enclosure has been observed even in remote villages, where access routes to urban areas are very poor and demand for land appears to be low. In the area, the villagers have voluntarily created enclosure for two decades for the purpose of cattle ranch and agricultural production for market.

In both Zambia and DR Congo, the enclosure by local initiatives began to be active from the 2000s. In case of Zambia, it is clear that the enactment of the 1995 Land Law, which has reinforced chiefs' authority, clearly facilitated this move. But the example of DRC shows that an enthusiasm for land acquisition has grown without recent policy factor[3]. In both cases, it seems that some astute villagers anticipate economic opportunities in the future and make enclosures with a speculative motive. The enclosure under local initiatives can be observed in many African countries and may result in a huge socio–economic gap in rural societies in a near future.

(3) Consequences of population increase

Africa has been regarded as a land abundant and labor scarce area (Herbst 2000), but such a concept has turned out to be increasingly inaccurate. Land scarcity has come to be serious in many parts of the African continent including the Great Lakes region, Ethiopian highlands, Nigeria and Malawi, to mention a few. While influence of the population increase has been far–reaching as well as wide, one of the most conspicuous consequences would be that population movements of migrants and refugees have created serious tensions over land properties. This is the third feature of current rural changes in Africa. On the understanding that land is abundant, resettlement policies have been implemented in some countries including Ethiopia and DR Congo. In addition, protracted refugees and internally displaced people have often remained during long period in rural areas. Recently we have often witnessed cases, in which the changes in the composition of rural population, which had been caused by population movement,

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3 In case of DRC, it was the 1973 Land Law (Loi no.73-021 du 20 juillet 1973 portant régime général des biens, régime foncier et immobilier, et régime des sûreté), stipulating the procedure for the acquisition of "concessions" for private use, that has given legal foundation on the enclosure.

Shinichi Takeuchi
Land and Power in Contemporary Africa:
Understanding Drastic Rural Changes in the Age of Land Reform

have intensified tensions over land.

Cote d'Ivoire is one of typical cases. The country has experienced high economic growth since independence, sustained by the production of coffee and cacao. Their yields rapidly increased through the introduction of migrant workers from the North and the neighboring countries, thus expanding extensively production areas. After having worked a certain period of time as laborers, the migrant workers used to be able to obtain land ownership. While a lot of migrants flowed into Southern Cote d'Ivoire under this incentive structure, social tension rose up against the backdrop of sense of land scarcity and political power struggles, thus leading to the policy revision for restricting migrants' land rights (Boone 2014).

Serious land conflicts in the North Kivu in DR Congo have also a part of their roots in population movements. From the 1930s to the 1950s, the Belgian colonial authority promoted Rwandans to work in the Eastern DR Congo, as white settlers cultivating coffee in this area suffered from labor scarcity. In addition, huge number of Rwandan refugees flowed into the area following the political turbulence around independence. As a result, the number of Rwandans exceeded indigenous Congolese communities such as Hunde and Nyanga, thus creating deep dissatisfaction that they were deprived of their own lands. The tension over lands between these communities led to serious violence, which was severely aggravated by a series of wars in this region in the 1990s and continues until today.

In Africa, migrant groups could often enjoy land use rights in building cliental relationship with host communities. Although the relationship tends to be peaceful when land is abundant, it can turn out to be tense when they begin to feel land is scarce and/or political power struggle intensifies among politicians originated from the two communities. In recent period, Africa witnessed a number of conflicts between local communities, in which one group considering themselves as autochthones discriminates against others as strangers (Geschiere and Nyamnjoh 2000, Dunn 2009). In such a "politics of belonging", land rights have often been one of the most important factors creating tension between communities, as they can be used as a tool of classifying people into "us" and "them".

(4) Strengthening traditional leaders

Finally, there is a general tendency that traditional leaders have been empowered in recent Africa. While they have historically held considerable power over land, such a power has been often officially recognized and strengthened in the recent period. Traditional leaders have a number of appellations such as headmen, chiefs, and paramount chiefs, and their functions and scopes of power may considerably vary. One of their common characteristics is that their status was recognized and reorganized in the colonial period. Under the indirect rule, the colonial authorities utilized traditional leaders for the establishment of a stable ruling system and devolved ruling power to them, thus making them informal colonial state agents. Because of their intimate relationship with the colonial authorities, some post–colonial African countries, particularly socialist–oriented governments, took policies oppressing traditional leaders[4].

Since the 1990s, such hostile policies against traditional leaders have been revised, and some

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4 In countries like Tanzania and Mozambique, the governments took decision to abolish the chieftainship just after independence. However, the policy did not necessarily deprive traditional leaders of their power, because many of them continued to work in local administrations. New African governments were compelled to employ them as their complete exclusion should paralyze local administrations.

governments recognized and reinforced their roles as well as their authority. For instance, the Ugandan constitution in 1995 endorsed the institution of traditional leaders[5]. While the constitution defined them as "cultural leaders", it has promoted activities of groups based on ancient kingdom or ethnic communities including Buganda, Nyoro, Toro, Teso, and Acholi. The South African constitution in 1996 recognized "[t]he institution, status and role of traditional leadership, according to customary law, …, subject to the Constitution", and also customary law to be applied in the courts[6].

While backgrounds of these recent decisions recognizing traditional leaders' authority are various from one country to another, what is equally important has been the influence of a decentralization policy introduced since the 1990s in the context of democratization in Africa[7]. While these policies did not directly aim at reinforcing traditional leaders, their status has been often strengthened as the policies promoting delegation of political power to local actors.

5.　Comparing land law reforms

Recent land reforms in Africa have advocated the strengthening of tillers' rights and promoted the registration of land for this purpose. Even if customary land rights have been generally recognized in the reforms, the registration has been necessary for individuals or groups for claiming their rights and protecting them. In this context, African governments have carried out the systematic land registration or have encouraged the registration by facilitating the procedure. This section compares the recent land reforms in Africa, particularly in focusing on land registration, for the better understanding of their impact on drastic rural changes. Here, land reforms in ten case study countries (Burundi, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia) will be examined by three criteria: 1) whether or not the government has carried out institutional reforms of customary land tenure since the 1990s; 2) whether or not the government has implemented systematic land registration schemes in significant areas of the country; 3) whether or not traditional leaders play important roles in the procedure of land registration. The examination illuminates a considerable variation in recent land reforms, and contribute to make reflection on their relations with rural changes in later sections.

(1)　Reforms of customary land tenure

A number of African countries have implemented land reforms since the 1990s as shown in the first section. Among the ten case study countries, Burundi, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Zambia have adopted new land laws in this period. All of these new land laws aimed at clarifying land rights for individuals and/or groups, and promoting land registration.

However, the other four countries (DR Congo, Kenya, Sierra Leone, and South Africa) have not implemented the reform. Among these countries, Sierra Leone, having already adopted a new National Land Policy in November 2015, will certainly start land law reforms in a near future. DR Congo has attempted to revise the land law since the mid 2000s but has failed due to political instability. In consequence, the land law enacted in 1973, recognizing private land ownership and particularly advantageous

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5　Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, 1995. Art. 246.

6　Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. Art. 211 (1)(3).

7　The context is a bit different in case of South Africa, which recognized the roles of traditional leaders in integrating former Homeland and implementing decentralization policies (Bruce and Knox 2009).

Shinichi Takeuchi
Land and Power in Contemporary Africa:
Understanding Drastic Rural Changes in the Age of Land Reform

for political elites, is still effective in the country. Kenya is a unique country in Africa, because it has implemented policies promoting privatization of lands since the 1950s. The policy providing strong private land rights began under the British colonial rule for the purpose of appeasing rural radicals (Mau–Mau rebels), and has been carried on after independence. Direction of the policy has not been revised thus far. Although these three countries have not carried out land reforms since the 1990s, their policy stances promoting clarification of land rights for individuals and/or groups are deemed similar to the above mentioned six countries.

As for South Africa, the story is a bit different, as problems with regard to customary lands in the country are inseparably related to integration of the former Homelands. The government enacted a law aiming at managing former Homeland areas in 2004 (Communal Land Rights Act, 11 of 2004. Hereinafter CLaRA), but the law could not be implemented because the Constitutional Court judged it as unconstitutional. Post–Apartheid South Africa has therefore no clear policy on customary lands so far. However, South Africa has taken a different stance from other African countries, as it has not been eager to promote large–scale agricultural investments in the former Homelands. As backgrounds of this policy stance, two points are deemed to be important. The first one is related to historical experiences. Considering that South Africans living in its rural areas have been exposed to harsh deprivation of land and properties since the colonial period, it is understandable that the post–Apartheid government has been reluctant to promote investments there. Secondly, a country, which does not rely on foreign assistance, can keep distance from donors' arguments for economic liberalization and promoting foreign investments. Consequently, South Africa has not seen rapid development of large–scale land deal and/or land privatization in the former Homelands.

(2) Systematic land registration

Among the case study countries, the systematic land registration scheme has been implemented in only two countries: Rwanda and Ethiopia. While Rwanda has carried out the systematic land registration all over the country, it has been implemented only in Highlands in Ethiopia. Both of the two areas have extremely high population density and strong demands for the efficient land use. Undoubtedly, this has been an important background that two countries have been eager to carry out the systematic land registration. In addition, donors actively assisted both of the countries.

We need to pay attention to the fact that the governments of the two countries are led by former rebels, which seized power through military victory in civil wars. Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) and Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) won the war in 1991 and 1994, respectively, and have substantially monopolized political power since then. Because of the monopolization, political liberty has been severely restricted in both countries, but they have demonstrated strong capacity for policy implementation. While donors' assistance would have been indispensable, it is fair to say that their remarkable capacity for policy implementation enabled them to carry out the systematic land registration.

Comparison with Burundi would provide interesting insights on this point. Contrary to the two countries which have succeeded in obtaining donors' assistance for the systematic land registration, Burundi could not profit from such a benevolence, despite the fact that it is also an extremely densely

populated country[8]. The reasons for this difference are multiple, but the political structure could provide one of the more important explanations. In case of Rwanda and Ethiopia, the ruling parties, having had no serious internal opposition, could assign a high priority to the land–related issues, which were crucial not only for efficient land use but also for consolidating political power[9]. In post–civil war Burundi, the situation has been quite different, as its constitution adopted in 2005 stipulates a rigorous power sharing system, which has been a direct consequence of the peace agreement mediated by the international community (Takeuchi 2013). Under the power sharing system, Burundian political elites gave priority to struggle for state power rather than land problems. It is undeniable that Rwanda has been a "donor darling" and could get aid more easily (Marysse et al. 2006). However, the different nature of political power also mattered for the policy making.

(3) Roles of traditional leaders

While African countries have recently promoted the land registration, its procedure varies significantly from one country to another. There are therefore various patterns of how traditional leaders involve in the procedure of land registration.

In Rwanda and Ethiopian highlands, where lands were systematically registered, the procedure was entirely conducted by governmental institutions such as local administrations. Roles of traditional leaders were thus negligible. In fact, in these two countries, traditional leaders had been already eliminated from the political scene due to revolutionary changes in the politics. In Rwanda, the traditional power structure controlled by Tutsi elites fell apart as a consequence of the "social revolution" around independence of 1962 (Lemarchand 1970). In Ethiopian highlands, traditional leaders lost their power during the Derg regime, which was established as a result of the coup d'état in 1974 and carried out harsh social remodeling under the Marxist–Leninist ideology.

The situation would be similar in Burundi. Unlike the two above–mentioned countries, Burundian traditional leaders had not been politically eliminated by the revolutionary movements[10]. Nevertheless, they lost power over land particularly because of high population density. As the population in-

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8 Population density of Burundi has been as high as that of Rwanda. They exceed 400 persons per square kilometer in recent years (World Development Indicators).

9 This point is very clear for Rwanda. Following the victory in the civil war in 1994, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) launched a series of active land reforms (Takeuchi and Marara 2014). The first land reform that the new RPF-led government carried out was the land sharing, ordering the Hutu residents to transfer the half of their land property to Tutsi returnees. This radical land redistribution policy, which has significantly contributed to secure livelihood of the latter to the detriment of the former, was imperative for the RPF to take care of their main supporters. In addition, the RPF had a high capacity of policy implementation, as no opposing group substantially existed in the country following its military victory and the local administration, the de facto implementing agencies of the land sharing policy, was controlled by its supporters, namely Tutsi returnees and the genocide survivors. The RPF-led government could implement the radical land sharing policy on the basis of this favorable political power structure. The active interventions in land have been quite understandable considering the facts that the main supporters of the RPF have been Tutsi, the ethnic minority, and their core members including the RPF's leaders are former refugees, who had been compelled to reside outside of the homeland during a couple of decades.

10 It should be noted, however, that the Chiefdom, constituting the social basis of traditional leaders, had been abolished just before independence (in 1959) in Ruanda=Urundi (Burundi was administered by Belgium as a UN's trust territory with Rwanda between 1945 and 1962). Undoubtedly, the abolition weakened political influence of Burundian traditional leaders.

Shinichi Takeuchi
Land and Power in Contemporary Africa:
Understanding Drastic Rural Changes in the Age of Land Reform

creases, availability of communal lands tends to decrease, thus reducing power base of traditional leaders. Currently, the land rights are substantially held by nuclear families in Burundi. The revised land law adopted in 2011 facilitated the land registration by providing the lowest administrative unit, colline, with bigger authority for registering land and issuing a certificate. It means that chiefs of the colline can play important roles in the land registration procedure. However, the colline chiefs today have generally nothing to do with traditional leaders.

While Tanzania has introduced a similar mechanism to Burundi's for the management of customary lands, it works differently. The 1999 village land act, stipulating the management of lands in rural areas, provided the lowest administrative unit, village, with the authority of land management. Precisely, the act recognizes the "village council" (an organization in charge of the administration of a village) to manage its territory by customary laws. This is a tricky provision. Tanzanian rural societies have been considerably transformed since the colonial period. Very roughly speaking, the indirect rule in the colonial times strengthened power of chiefs and contributed to the territorialization of their power. After independence, the country adopted the socialist policy and repressed traditional chiefs[11]. Villagization schemes under the Ujamaa policy also considerably transformed Tanzanian rural areas until the mid–1980s. However, the influence of traditional leaders has remained effective in rural areas. Unlike Rwanda and Burundi, Tanzania has a large territory and the extent of policy implementation has significantly varied. After the abolition of chiefdom in 1963, many traditional leaders joined in the bureaucracy and retained their influential power (Miller 1968). While the ruling party, CCM — former TANU, has continuously attempted to strengthen its control over the rural society since independence, it would be appropriate to assume that influence of traditional leaders still remain to some extent in Tanzanian "village council".

A number of African countries explicitly recognize roles of traditional leaders in the procedure of land registration. Mozambique is one of such cases. The traditional authority (*autoridade tradicional, réglo*[12]) is supposed to participate in a consultation, as a member of the "communal authority" (*autoridade comunitária*), for making a decision whether a title for land use rights (called DUAT) shall be provided. In other words, the traditional authority is officially recognized to be engaged in the procedure of land registration and have a certain power in the issuing process of DUAT. However, their substantial power over the decision making is problematic, as the communal authority includes not only the traditional authority but also other local stakeholders such as members of local administration. In addition, the communal authority tends to be politicized, as the FRELIMO, the ruling party, exerts strong influence over the other members of the communal authority (Aminaka 2017). Even if the role of traditional authority is explicitly recognized, Mozambican system of rural land management, which has been run under the close control of the ruling party, looks like those of Tanzania, Rwanda, and Ethiopia.

In some African countries, the recent land law reform clearly strengthened traditional leaders' power over land. Zambia is a typical case. Following the adoption of the 1995 Land Act, requiring consent

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11 Tanzania abolished the chief system by the African Chiefs Ordinance (Repeal) Act in 1963. Background of this act was that having had generally close relations with the colonial authority, the traditional chiefs took negative stances against the nationalist movement, TANU, which took power after independence.

12 "*Réglo*" is a traditional chief in Mozambique. The origin of current réglos can trace back to the appointment by the colonial authority. As a result of the reform of the colonial administration in 1907, new administrative units for Africans (*regedoria*) were created and *réglos* were appointed as heads of *regedoria*.

and approval of chiefs for the alienation of lands[13], the power of traditional leaders for the distribution of lands has been reinforced. The chiefs' power over land has been so strong that some of them even issued their own "land allocation form", besides the "titles deed" issued by the government. In rural areas, the former tends to be more effective than the latter. Oyama witnessed on his research site that a chief nullified an official title deed owned by an outsider and permitted ordinary villagers to cultivate in the area (Oyama 2016).

Even if chiefs' roles are not stipulated in laws, their consent is often regarded as imperative for a deal of land. This is the case of Western DR Congo. The land law of the country does not have any provision with regard to traditional leaders. Nevertheless, to get an official certificate for a private farmland, the Congolese are required by local officials to show a letter of consent from a "land chief" (*chef de terre*), who has nominal ownership of the concerned area.

6.   Land law reforms and rural changes

(1) Effects on large-scale land deals

This section examines effects of land law reforms on recent rural changes. As mentioned earlier, Africa has seen the proliferation of large–scale land deals in the recent period. How can we evaluate effects of the land reforms? From Table 2, it seems difficult to find clear correlations between the land law reform and large–scale land deals. Comparing sizes of the contracted areas and the cultivable lands, we can understand that large–scale land deals have been actively carried out in countries like Republic of the Congo (the ratio attains 391%), Liberia (384%), Gabon (275%), DR Congo (163%), Sierra Leone (69%), Saô Tomé et Principe (57%), Mozambique (48%), Swaziland (23%), and Ghana (21%)[14]. These countries include not only those that have revised the land law but also those that have not, and it is at least clear that the land law reform did not hamper the proliferation of large–scale land deals.

The most important factor contributing to the increase of large–scale land deals seems to be a national economic policy. As the case of Sierra Leone (see section 4.(1)) clearly shows, such deals have significantly increased once African governments set policy promoting foreign direct investments. Since the 1990s, corresponding to donors' recommendations, many African countries have taken policy measures for the promotion of agricultural investments. In fact, developed countries have advocated the enhancement of the private sector for agricultural development in Africa[15].

The land law reform has been also understood in the same vein. In fact, the land law reform has contributed to the large–scale land transfer. Implementation of new land laws has clarified and individualized land rights, particularly through the registration. The clarification and individualization of rights in African lands, which normally includes multiple right–holders, have facilitated the selling as well as the purchase of land. Although its role has been secondary rather than primary for explaining the rapid

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13 Republic of Zambia, The Land Act, See for example, Part II, 3.(4)(b)(d) and 8.(2)(3).

14 The ratio of the contracted land to the cultivable land exceeds 20% in these nine countries. However, we need to be careful that countries with a large size of forest tend to be calculated as excessively high, because the definition of the cultivable size at FAO does not include the forest. In countries like the DR Congo, and Gabon, the majority of the land deals has been concessions for the production of timber.

15 This way of thinking can be clearly observed in the "New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition", launched in 2012.

Shinichi Takeuchi
Land and Power in Contemporary Africa:
Understanding Drastic Rural Changes in the Age of Land Reform

development of large–scale land deals, the implementation of the land law reform has contributed to enhancing commercialization of African land.

Another factor affecting the extent of large–scale land deals would be population density. Today, large–scale land deals involve basically customary lands that are currently not used as residential lots or farmlands (Alden Wily 2008). Customary lands have been functioned in a long period as a public goods for an entire community. These vacant lands tend to decrease as the population density increases, thus making large–scale land deals difficult to happen. There is a general tendency that they are not frequent in highly populated areas. This observation can be generally applicable for countries such as Rwanda and Burundi, although there are actually some cases of land grab (Ansoms and Hilhorst 2014). In fact, large–scale land deals can be made even in areas of high population density, as a number of large–scale land deals have taken place in Ethiopian highlands according to the Landmatrix. This shows that large–scale land deals can proliferate if the government implemented active policies for promoting foreign investments in such areas.

(2) Effects on state control over rural society

Recent land law reforms have had another important effect on African state–society relationship. Through the legal reform, particularly by promoting the land registration, African states have often strengthened their control over rural society.

In Rwanda, recent land reforms have been closely linked with the state–building process led by the RPF, the former rebel and current ruling party (Takeuchi and Marara 2014). Following their victory in the civil war and seizure of the state power, the RPF distributed the land to their supporters (Tutsi returnees) through the policy of the "land sharing". The land registration has not only strengthened the capacity of the administration for land management, but also officialized Tutsi returnees' land rights obtained by the land sharing. In total, the RPF–led Rwandan government has increased its capability to control the rural society through the process of land reform. Ethiopia is another example of increased capacity for controlling rural areas through land reforms. Under the EPRDF regime, the country has rapidly promoted land registration in the highlands. In this process, the government has tightened controls over lands by providing local governments with authority to confiscate lands, which were supposed to be in ineffective use, and to redistribute them to others. In this case, land registration has been used by the government as a tool for strengthening its control over society.

It seems striking but clear that the land registration as well as the distribution of land titles in recent Africa have not strengthened private property rights. Rather, it has strengthened the power of the state and/or traditional leaders to control rural societies. Among our case studies, the policy of land registration has been carried out since the 1990s in Zambia, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Mozambique, and Rwanda. In all of these countries, the recent land law reform did not change the provision giving land rights to the state. In case of Ethiopia, the constitution stipulates that the land "shall not be subject to sale or to other means of exchange"[16]. In Zambia, the land reform has made chiefs' power over land very strong to the extent that they issued their own land certificates and nullified effects of an official title deed. In this situation, it would be unavoidable that land rights of ordinary villagers depend substantially on their personal relationship with their chiefs. In other words, if their personal relationship with the chief deteriorates, their land rights are likely to be destabilized. All of above–mentioned cases show that following the land reform

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16 Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Article 40 (3).

and the land registration, there is a strong tendency to believe that individual land rights have most likely been politicized. Recent land reforms in African countries have hardly strengthened the private property rights, although they tend to advocate the contrary.

Boone distinguishes two different ideal types of property regime: one is "market–based" and the other is "authority–based" (2014, 21). In the former type of the property regime, production factors — namely land, labor, and capital — are distributed through competitive markets and the price mechanism. In the latter type, production factors are distributed through non–market mechanisms by political authorities. On the basis of these two ideal types, Boone argues that African lands have been generally managed under the "authority–based" property regime, in which the political authorities such as governments and traditional leaders have exerted strong influence over their distribution. In fact, until recently, lands under the private property rights were very rare and concentrated in Southern African countries, which were formerly dominated by white settlers.

Importantly, her arguments are still applicable to Africa even after a series of land reforms in these two decades. Following the recent land reforms, a number of African countries have implemented policy measures including a systematic land registration for the transformation of customary tenure. However, implementation of such policy measures does not mean that the African societies have turned into the "market–based" property regime. Even after the recent land reforms, African countries generally share characteristics of the "authority–based" property regime, in which political authorities such as the state and traditional leaders have strong influence over the distribution of land.

Conclusion

Focusing the simultaneousness on land law reforms in Africa in the recent period, this paper has identified two particular effects on the rural society. Firstly, the land law reform, specifically the land registration, has facilitated a massive transfer of African land in a very short term. The reform has been founded on assumptions that clarifying and individualizing land rights would enhance investments and stimulate economic development. The assumption did not take into account weak governance of the African states as well as the tremendous power inequality between local farmers and external investors. Exposed to the world economy craving for lands to invest, Africa has seen a huge swathe of customary lands transferred to internal and external investors.

This is not necessarily to say that African countries have lost control over their own territories to the detriment of foreign private companies. On the contrary, a number of African governments have utilized the land law reform for strengthening their control over rural areas. Countries like Rwanda, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Tanzania, in which the ruling parties maintain strong capability for controlling the society, took this opportunity of land reform not only to enhance efficient land use[17], but also to consolidate their political power over rural societies. These countries have had therefore their own motivation for carrying out the land law reform.

In addition to these motivations, policies recognizing customary rights and of land registration

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17 Improving efficiency of land use has been a strong motivation for the land law reform for countries suffering from land shortage. These countries tend to have a great incentive for reducing idle lands and redistributing them for producers necessary for additional plots. Such intentions can be clearly observed in new land policies of densely populated countries like Rwanda and Ethiopian highlands. For enabling rational land management, the new policies have provided stronger authorities for the administration.

Shinichi Takeuchi
Land and Power in Contemporary Africa:
Understanding Drastic Rural Changes in the Age of Land Reform

have indeed given to African political elites an opportunity for increasing their ruling power. Official recognition of customary land rights signifies that the state endorses the existent political order in the rural area, and has often strengthened political power of traditional leaders. In this context, the land registration, which has been promoted as an indispensable means for securing customary rights, has played an important role. The keener is a potential competition over land, the more important will be the function managing land–related matters such as conflict management and issue of certificates. As a consequence, the state administrations as well as traditional authorities dealing with land–related issues have often increased their controlling power over the society, as shown in the case studies of Zambia, Ethiopia, and Rwanda.

Consequences of the land law reform have been contrasting among these three countries in terms of the state power over the society. In Rwanda and Ethiopia, the states' capabilities for controlling lands have significantly increased through the reform, while Zambian land reforms have given strong power to traditional leaders. In other words, the land law reform in Zambia made the government delegate its power to traditional leaders. These two types, however, share the common characteristic: the land reforms have strengthened the existent political order either on national or local level. We could therefore argue that they have so far reinforced the existent "authority–based" property regime (Boone 2014).

While land titles have been actively distributed in the recent land reforms, it is debatable whether they will be able to guarantee stable land rights in the long run. As a great number of land titles have been rapidly provided during recent land reforms, it seems that legitimacy of these land titles tends to be closely associated with legitimacy of political authorities that issued them, namely the governments or traditional leaders. Land rights guaranteed by these titles will be effective as long as the political authorities are considered as legitimate and thus remain stable. However, once the political authorities lose legitimacy, it may undermine the legitimacy of the land titles. This point has been repeatedly proven in severe land conflicts, including those in the Eastern DR Congo and in Kenya during the Post–Election Violence. Therefore, it remains unclear for us to know what kind of capitalism will develop on the basis of these ambiguous property rights.

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Shinichi Takeuchi
Land and Power in Contemporary Africa:
Understanding Drastic Rural Changes in the Age of Land Reform

Table 1. Main land policies and land laws adopted after the 1990s in Africa	
Country	Main land policies and land laws adopted after the 1990s
Angola	Lei de Terras de Angola (2004)
Benin	Loi No.2013-01 du 14 août 2013 portant code foncier et domanial en République du Bénin
Botswana	Botswana National Land Policy (2002)
Burkina Faso	Loi nº 014/96/ADP portant réorganisation agraire et foncière au Burkina Faso (1996)
	Loi No.034-2009/an portant régime foncier rural (2009)
Burundi	Lettre de politique foncière (2009)
	Loi No. 1/13 du 9 août portant révision du code foncier du Burundi (2011)
Cameroon	Décret n° 2005/481 du 16 décembre 2005 modifiant et complétant certaines dispositions du décret n° 76/165 du 27 avril 1976 fixant les conditions d'obtention du titre foncier (2005)
Cote d'Ivoire	Loi n°98-750 du 23 décembre 1998 relative au domaine foncier rural (1998)
	Revision (2004, 2013)
Ethiopia	Federal Rural Land Administration Proclamation (1997)
	Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Rural Land Administration and Use Proclamation (2005)
Gabon	Loi n°3/2012 du 13 août 2012 portant ratification de l'ordonnance n°5/2012 du 13 février 2012 fixant le régime de la propriété foncière en République gabonaise (2012)
Ghana	Ghana Land Policy (1999)
	New land law under disucussion (as of 2016)
Kenya	National Land Policy (2009)
Liberia	Land Commission Act (2009)
	Land Rights Policy (2013)
	Land Rights Bill (under discussion as of 2016)
Malawi	Malawi National Land Policy (2002)
	Malawi Land Reform Programme implementation strategy, 2003~2007
	New land law under discussion as of 2016
Mozambique	Política Nacional de Terras (1995)
	Lei de Terras, Lei no.19/97 (1997)
Namibia	Agricultural (Commercial) Land Reform Act (1995)
	Communal Land Reform Act (2002)
	National Land Tenure Policy (2005)
Rwanda	National Land Policy (2004)
	Organic Law No. 08/2005 of 14/07/2005 Determining the Use and Management of Land in Rwanda (2005)
Senegal	Loi d'orientation agro-sylvo-pastorale (2004)
	Loi n° 2011-07 du 30 mars 2011 portant régime de la propriété foncière (2011)
Sierra Leone	National Land Policy (2015)
South Africa	Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994 (1994)
	While Paper on South African Land Policy (1997)
	Communal Land Rights Act 11 of 2004 (2004, suspended)
South Sudan	The Land Act (2009)
Tanzania	National Land Policy (1995)
	Land Act (1999)
	Village Land Act (1999)
	National Land Use Framework Plan 2013-2033, (2013)
Uganda	Land Act 1998 (1998)
	National Land Use Policy (2007)
	The Uganda National Land Policy (2013)
Zambia	Land Act (1995)
	National Land Policy (under discusion as of 2016年)
Zimbabwe	Land Acquisition Act (1992)

（Source）Made by the author.

Table 2. Size of large-scale land deals in Africa									
	number	Intended size (A) (1,000ha)	Contract size (B) (1,000ha)	Cultivable size(C) (1,000ha)	Population density (person/Km^2)	A/C (%)	B/C (%)	Total land area (D) (1,000ha)	A/D (%)	B/D (%)
Algeria	1	31	0	7,496	17	0%	0%	238,174	0%	0%
Angola	27	541	186	4,900	20	11%	4%	124,670	0%	0%
Benin	9	360	250	2,700	96	13%	9%	11,276	3%	2%
Botswana	1	40	25	272	8	15%	9%	27,360	0%	0%
Burkina Faso	3	402	203	6,200	32	6%	3%	56,673	1%	0%
Central African Republic	2	14	14	1,800	8	1%	1%	62,298	0%	0%
Cote d'Ivoire	12	689	174	2,900	71	24%	6%	31,800	2%	1%
Cuinea Bisau	1	1	1	300	66	0%	0%	2,812	0%	0%
DR Congo	65	11,912	11,589	7,100	34	168%	163%	226,705	5%	5%
Egypt	10	180	164	2,738	92	7%	6%	99,545	0%	0%
Ethiopia	118	3,881	1,411	15,119	99	26%	9%	100,000	4%	1%
Gabon	6	1,325	894	325	7	408%	275%	25,767	5%	3%
Gambia	2	230	30	440	197	52%	7%	1,012	23%	3%
Ghana	54	3,087	969	4,700	120	66%	21%	22,754	14%	4%
Guinea	8	2,639	210	3,100	51	85%	7%	24,572	11%	1%
Kenya	26	962	317	5,800	81	17%	5%	56,914	2%	1%
Liberia	20	2,104	1,921	500	47	421%	384%	9,632	22%	20%
Libya	1	40	0	1,720	4	2%	0%	175,954	0%	0%
Madagascar	47	3,584	607	3,500	42	102%	17%	58,180	6%	1%
Malawi	13	315	142	3,800	183	8%	4%	9,428	3%	2%
Mali	28	1,330	446	6,411	14	21%	7%	122,019	1%	0%
Mauritania	3	18	5	450	4	4%	1%	103,070	0%	0%
Mauritius	2	4	4	75	622	5%	5%	203	2%	2%
Morocco	7	720	704	8,045	77	9%	9%	44,630	2%	2%
Mozambique	134	4,704	2,699	5,650	36	83%	48%	78,638	6%	3%
Namibia	15	117	30	800	3	15%	4%	82,329	0%	0%
Niger	4	35	31	15,900	16	0%	0%	126,670	0%	0%
Nigeria	57	1,818	840	34,000	200	5%	2%	91,077	2%	1%
Republic of the Congo	8	2,618	2,148	550	14	476%	391%	34,150	8%	6%
Rwanda	7	118	26	1,183	471	10%	2%	2,467	5%	1%
Sao Tome et Principe	1	5	5	9	198	57%	57%	96	5%	5%
Senegal	31	902	310	3,250	79	28%	10%	19,253	5%	2%
Sierra Leone	33	2,253	1,087	1,584	89	142%	69%	7,218	31%	15%
South Africa	14	394	281	12,500	45	3%	2%	121,309	0%	0%
South Sudan	22	4,220	2,703	28,533	19	15%	9%	64,433	7%	4%
Sudan	36	4,905	713	17,220	22	28%	4%	186,148	3%	0%
Swaziland	4	55	40	175	75	31%	23%	1,720	3%	2%
Tanzania	67	1,521	357	13,500	60	11%	3%	88,580	2%	0%
Tunisia	2	19	3	2,853	71	1%	0%	15,536	0%	0%
Uganda	26	1,158	193	6,900	195	17%	3%	20,052	6%	1%
Zambia	46	1,880	617	3,700	22	51%	17%	74,339	3%	1%
Zimbabwe	9	589	413	4,000	40	15%	10%	38,685	2%	1%
Total	982	61,717	32,764	242,697		25%	13%	2,688,148	2%	1%

(Source)　Tabulated by the author from data of Land Matrix Global Observatory.　(http://landmatrix.org/en/)　(Downloaded 19 February 2017)

(Note)　1) Data on cultivable land and total land area was used from World Development Indicators.

2) Total land areas of Sudan and South Sudan were taken from the data

3) Population density was calculated on the basis of the data (year 2015) provided by World Development Indicators, except Sudan and South Sudan whose data was taken from the Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook. (https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/the-world-factbook/　accessed 1 December 2016)

現代アフリカにおける土地と権力
——土地法改革と急激な農村変容

武内　進一
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　　　1990 年代以降、アフリカ諸国の多くが土地法改革を実施した。土地法改革の基本的な方向性は、個人や集団の権利を明確化するものだった。これにより多くの国で土地登記を簡便化する政策が採られ、政府がシステマティックな土地登記を実施した国もある。本報告は、この土地法改革が何をもたらしたのかを幾つかの事例研究に基づいて考察する。

　　　1990 年代以降アフリカの多くの国々で土地改革がなされたが、表 1 に示すようにそのほとんどは法制度改革であった。この時期にアフリカで土地法改革が実施された背景として、国際要因と国内要因のそれぞれが重要である。国際要因としては、ドナーの政策に影響を与えた思想潮流を指摘できる。アフリカの農業発展のために耕作者の権利強化が必要だという声は 1980 年代から高まっていたが、冷戦終結後、所有権の確立こそ経済発展の要だという主張が影響力を強め、ドナーはこの方向での土地法制度改革を積極的に支援するようになった。

　　　一方、国内要因としては、次の点を指摘することができる。まず、1980 年代以降進んだ経済的自由化、また 90 年代以降の政治的自由化を受けて、開発の基本政策が再検討された。その中で土地に関わる政策も、ドナーの影響を強く受ける形で見直された。ただし、アフリカ諸国が個別に有する動機も土地法改革を推進させるうえで重要な意味を持った。独立以降社会主義的な思想に基づき土地に対する政策的介入を行ってきた国々では、期待した成果が上がらず 1980 年代までに事実上従来の政策を放棄しており、新たな土地政策を策定する必要性に迫られていた。また、1990 年代に頻発した武力紛争の影響も重要である。武力紛争の結果、政権が交代したり和平協定が締結されて新たな政治秩序が創出されれば、それに対応して新たな土地政策が求められたからである。政権交代の結果、積極的な土地政策を実施するようになったルワンダは、その好例である。

　　　これら土地法改革は何をもたらしたか。2 点指摘したい。第 1 に、それが土地の商品化と流動化を促進させたことである。表 2 に示す通り、大規模土地取引に関するデータベース「Land Matrix」によれば、近年アフリカでは大規模な土地取引が急速に進んでおり、取引対象の土地面積は、可耕地全体と比べても相当な規模に達している。大規模な土地取引を促すのは、土地法改革そのものというよりも、マクロな経済政策の動向であり、積極的な外資導入政策が採用されると短期間に広大な土地が取引の対象となった。ただし、土地法改革により土地権利が明確化されたことで、土地取引が容易になり、この傾向に拍車がかかったことは疑いない。

　　　第 2 に、土地法改革は地方分権化政策と組み合わされて実施されたが、幾つかの政権はそれを利用して農村社会に対する統制力を強化した。ルワンダやエチオピア高地では、元反政府武装勢力出身の政権与党が、土地法改革を通じて農村の資源に対するより実効的、効率的な統制を行いうるよ

うになった。タンザニアやモザンビークの新土地法では、ローカル・コミュニティによる土地配分への関与が制度化されたが、実態としては、政権与党の影響力が強まった。これらの国々では、土地法改革によって国民の多くが土地権利証書を手にしたが、それは私的所有権の強化に寄与したというより、むしろ国家（あるいは政権与党）による農村に対する統制力強化に寄与したのである。

　　もっとも、土地法改革の結果にはかなりのバリエーションがある。ザンビアでは、土地法改革によって伝統的指導者の土地配分権限が顕著に強化されたが、それが政権の基盤強化に直接つながったとは言い難い。土地法改革は土地配分に携わる国家や伝統的指導者の権力を強め、総じて既存の秩序を強化した。ただし、それが政権の権力基盤強化をもたらすかどうかは、それぞれの国の政治権力構造に依存して決まったと言える。

表 1　1990 年代以降のアフリカ主要国における土地政策、土地法の変化

国名	1990 年代以降の主要な土地政策、土地法
アンゴラ	土地法（Lei de Terras de Angola, 2004 年）
ウガンダ	土地法（Land Act 1998, 1998 年） 国家土地利用政策（National Land Use Policy, 2007 年） 国家土地政策（The Uganda National Land Policy, 2013 年）
エチオピア	連邦農村土地管理布告（Federal Rural Land Administration Proclamation, 1997 年） エチオピア連邦民主共和国農村土地管理・利用布告（Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Rural Land Administration and Use Proclamation, 2005 年）
ガーナ	国家土地政策（Ghana Land Policy, 1999 年） 土地法案審議中（2016 年）
ガボン	ガボン共和国の土地所有体制を定める 2012 年 2 月 13 日付 No.5/2012 オルドナンスの批准に関する 2012 年 8 月 13 日付 No.3/2012 法（Loi n°3/2012 du 13 août 2012 portant ratification de l'ordonnance n°5/2012 du 13 février 2012 fixant le régime de la propriété foncière en République gabonaise）
カメルーン	土地権利取得条件に関する 1976 年 4 月 27 日付 No.76/165 デクレの条項について変更、補完する 2005 年 12 月 16 日付デクレ（Décret n° 2005/481 du 16 décembre 2005 modifiant et complétant certaines dispositions du décret n° 76/165 du 27 avril 1976 fixant les conditions d'obtention du titre foncier, 2005 年）
ケニア	国家土地政策（National Land Policy, 2009 年）
コートジボワール	農村部の土地に関する 1998 年 12 月 23 日付 No.98-750 法（Loi n°98-750 du 23 décembre 1998 relative au domaine foncier rural, 1998 年） 2004 年 8 月 14 日、2013 年 8 月 23 日改正
ザンビア	土地法（Land Act, 1995 年） 国家土地政策（National Land Policy）審議中（2016 年）
シエラレオネ	国家土地政策（National Land Policy, 2015 年）
ジンバブウェ	土地収用法（Land Acquisition Act, 1992 年）
セネガル	農林牧畜業基本法（Loi d'orientation agro-sylvo-pastorale, 2004 年） 土地不動産体制に関する 2011 年 3 月 30 日付 No.2011-07 法（Loi n° 2011-07 du 30 mars 2011 portant régime de la propriété foncière）
タンザニア	国家土地政策（National Land Policy, 1995 年） 土地法（Land Act, 1999 年） 村落土地法（Village Land Act, 1999 年） 国土土地利用枠組計画 2013 ～ 2033 年（National Land Use Framework Plan 2013-2033, 2013 年）

ナミビア	農業（商業）用土地改革法（Agricultural (Commercial) Land Reform Act, 1995 年） 共有地改革法（Communal Land Reform Act, 2002 年） 国家土地保有法（National Land Tenure Policy, 2005 年）
ベナン	2013 年 8 月 14 日付土地法（Loi No.2013-01 du 14 août 2013 portant code foncier et domanial en République du Bénin）
ブルキナファソ	農業土地再編に関する No. 014/96/ADP 法（Loi nº 014/96/ADP portant réorganisation agraire et foncière au Burkina Faso, 1996 年） 農村土地制度に関する No.034-2009 法（Loi No.034-2009/an portant régime foncier rural, 2009 年）
ブルンジ	土地政策文書（Lettre de politique foncière, 2009 年） 土地法改訂に関する 8 月 9 日付 No.1/13 法（Loi No. 1/13 du 9 août portant révision du code foncier du Burundi, 2011 年）
ボツワナ	国家土地政策（Botswana National Land Policy, 2002 年）
マラウイ	マラウイ国家土地政策（Malawi National Land Policy, 2002 年） マラウイ土地改革プログラム実施戦略（Malawi Land Reform Programme implementation strategy, 2003~2007 年） 土地法案審議中（2016 年）
南アフリカ	土地権利返還法（Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994, 1994 年） 土地政策白書（While Paper on South African Land Policy, 1997 年） 共有地権利法（Communal Land Rights Act 11 of 2004, 2004 年）
南スーダン	土地法（The Land Act, 2009 年）
モザンビーク	国家土地政策（Política Nacional de Terras, 1995 年） 1997 年土地法（Lei de Terras, Lei no.19/97）
リベリア	土地委員会法（Land Commission Act, 2009 年） 土地権利政策（Land Rights Policy, 2013 年） 土地権利法案（Land Rights Bill）審議中（2016 年）
ルワンダ	国家土地政策（National Land Policy, 2004 年） 土地利用・管理に関する基本法（Organic Law No. 08/2005 of 14/07/2005 Determining the Use and Management of Land in Rwanda, 2005 年）

出所）筆者作成。

表2　アフリカにおける土地所有の規模

	件数	交渉された規模（1000ha）(A)	契約規模（1000ha）(B)	可耕地面積（1000ha）(C)	人口密度（人/平方キロ）	A/C(%)	B/C(%)	国土面積（1000ha）(D)	A/D(%)	B/D(%)
	表2			アフリカにおける土地取引の規模						
アルジェリア	1	31	0	7,496	17	0%	0%	238,174	0%	0%
アンゴラ	27	541	186	4,900	20	11%	4%	124,670	0%	0%
ウガンダ	26	1,158	193	6,900	195	17%	3%	20,052	6%	1%
エジプト	10	180	164	2,738	92	7%	6%	99,545	0%	0%
エチオピア	118	3,881	1,411	15,119	99	26%	9%	100,000	4%	1%
ガーナ	54	3,087	969	4,700	120	66%	21%	22,754	14%	4%
ガボン	6	1,325	894	325	7	408%	275%	25,767	5%	3%
ガンビア	2	230	30	440	197	52%	7%	1,012	23%	3%
ギニア	8	2,639	210	3,100	51	85%	7%	24,572	11%	1%
ギニアビサウ	1	1	1	300	66	0%	0%	2,812	0%	0%
ケニア	26	962	317	5,800	81	17%	5%	56,914	2%	1%
コートジボワール	12	689	174	2,900	71	24%	6%	31,800	2%	1%
コンゴ共和国	8	2,618	2,148	550	14	476%	391%	34,150	8%	6%
コンゴ民主共和国	65	11,912	11,589	7,100	34	168%	163%	226,705	5%	5%
サントメ・プリンシペ	1	5	5	9	198	57%	57%	96	5%	5%
ザンビア	46	1,880	617	3,700	22	51%	17%	74,339	3%	1%
シエラレオネ	33	2,253	1,087	1,584	89	142%	69%	7,218	31%	15%
ジンバブウェ	9	589	413	4,000	40	15%	10%	38,685	2%	1%
スーダン	36	4,905	713	17,220	22	28%	4%	186,148	3%	0%
スワジランド	4	55	40	175	75	31%	23%	1,720	3%	2%
セネガル	31	902	310	3,250	79	28%	10%	19,253	5%	2%
タンザニア	67	1,521	357	13,500	60	11%	3%	88,580	2%	0%
中央アフリカ	2	14	14	1,800	8	1%	1%	62,298	0%	0%
チュニジア	2	19	3	2,853	71	1%	0%	15,536	0%	0%
ナイジェリア	57	1,818	840	34,000	200	5%	2%	91,077	2%	1%
ナミビア	15	117	30	800	3	15%	4%	82,329	0%	0%
ニジェール	4	35	31	15,900	16	0%	0%	126,670	0%	0%
ブルキナファソ	3	402	203	6,200	32	6%	3%	56,673	1%	0%
ベナン	9	360	250	2,700	96	13%	9%	11,276	3%	2%
ボツワナ	1	40	25	272	8	15%	9%	27,360	0%	0%
マダガスカル	47	3,584	607	3,500	42	102%	17%	58,180	6%	1%
マラウイ	13	315	142	3,800	183	8%	4%	9,428	3%	2%
マリ	28	1,330	446	6,411	14	21%	7%	122,019	1%	0%
南アフリカ	14	394	281	12,500	45	3%	2%	121,309	0%	0%
南スーダン	22	4,220	2,703	28,533	19	15%	9%	64,433	7%	4%
モーリシャス	2	4	4	75	622	5%	5%	203	2%	2%
モーリタニア	3	18	5	450	4	4%	1%	103,070	0%	0%
モザンビーク	134	4,704	2,699	5,650	36	83%	48%	78,638	6%	3%
モロッコ	7	720	704	8,045	77	9%	9%	44,630	2%	2%
リビア	1	40	0	1,720	4	2%	0%	175,954	0%	0%
リベリア	20	2,104	1,921	500	47	421%	384%	9,632	22%	20%
ルワンダ	7	118	26	1,183	471	10%	2%	2,467	5%	1%
計	982	61,717	32,764	242,697		25%	13%	2,688,148	2%	1%

注1)Land Matrix Global Observatory （http://landmatrix.org/en/）から2017年2月19日にデータをダウンロードして作成。
　2)可耕地面積と国土面積に関するデータはWorld Development Indicatorsから作成。2013年の値を利用した。
　3)人口密度はWorld Development Indicatorsの2015年の総人口データから計算した。
　4)モザンビークに関するデータのうちNo.2373は「交渉された規模」（intended size）が不明で「契約規模」
　　（contract size）のみデータが記載されていたため、それを「交渉された規模」データに代入した。
　5)スーダンと南スーダンの国土面積は、Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbookに拠った。
　　（https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/the-world-factbook/2016年12月1日閲覧）

Land problems in Colombia after the Peace Agreement[1]

Noriko HATAYA

(Sophia University)

Introduction:

The process of economic globalization has generated a new type of social exclusion, affecting local spaces in which a great number of vulnerable people have developed and maintained their own customs, habits and methods of production (see Iyotani 2002). Though this argument is not new, it is highly relevant when we look at today's Colombian society.

Colombia is a country with a history of more than fifty years of armed conflicts which have involved different actors: leftist guerrilla movements, paramilitary right–wing groups and narcotic–funded self–defence groups. The local communities located in the areas where conflicts have taken place have been living in constant fear and suffering from shortages of basic needs, not only due to the presence of armed groups, but also due to the general absence of the State (in terms of provision of basic public services).

Even though, since the end of 2006, the government began to emphasize "the development of the post–conflict era" as its central mission. The present Santos administration finally signed a peace agreement with the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, the most persistent leftist guerrilla group) in 2016, which made definitive the post–conflict era.

The land problem was one of the most important issues during the peace–making dialogue and the topic of integral rural development was included as one of the six principal pillars of the political agenda in the peace agreement document. However, the present land policy still has many challenges and limitations. Peasants are now free of the threat of displacement by the armed conflict, but are equally vulnerable to the threat of losing their land due to possible land–grabbing either by the agricultural industry or through concessions for mining development projects backed by multinational (global) capital. What is worse, Colombian politics are already seeing campaigns for the coming congressional and presidential elections in 2018. Further, President Santos' popularity has recently declined, and the opposition forces led by Alvaro Uribe[2] have maintained their political influence. There is fear for the continuity of the Colombian peace–process and construction of a post–conflict society.

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1 The paper prepared for the international symposium on "Re-examining Global Capitalism from the Perspective of Afro-Japanese Relations: Land, Space and Modernity", held at Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, January 29, 2018. This paper is partly based on an article co-written with Colombian colleagues, Sergio Coronado, Flor Edilma Osorio and Nicolas Valgas (2014) and on Hataya (2016). The author's analysis on the current land policy and its polemics after the peace-agreement with the FARC in 2016 was newly added.

2 Ex-president, who held a strong "No" campaign against the Santos peace-making dialogue.

This paper presents an argument concerning the causal relation between the land problems with Colombia's long–lasting armed conflict. In today's Colombian context, which is entering the post–conflict era, land problems continue to be one of the most challenging issues to be dealt with under the government's extractivist economic policy, which aims to make the country more competitive in the global market.

1.   The Political Process under the Exclusionist Bipartisan Regime

Colombian political violence dates back to the initial period of the republican regime. Oligarchic groups, divided into two parties, the liberals and the conservatives, have dominated the Colombian political scene since the coalition of these two parties was established in the 1960s[3]. Many authors describe the Colombian political process as an exclusionist bipartisan democracy managed by a coalition of the two traditional parties (Kline, 1999; Livingstone, 2003). The leftist wing, the communist party and a radical group of liberals have struggled for a more egalitarian society and pluralistic political regime, which led to the emergence of leftist armed groups.

The FARC is historically the oldest organization among the leftist guerrillas in Colombia. Communism had a strong philosophical influence on its founders, who promoted Marxism–Leninism. It is said that FARC had close to 30,000 combatants at its peak.

The expansion of paramilitarism during the 1990s also contributed to the intensification of armed resistance of the FARC and the ELN (National Liberation Army), another radical leftist–guerrilla group. Particularly, since the formation of the AUC (United Self–Defense Forces of Colombia), ordinary civilians suspected of having contact with left–wing guerrillas, such as community leaders and social movement organizers in rural areas, had become targets of repression and massacres. Many farmers, unable to remain neutral in the conflict due to the worsening of political violence and the simultaneous presence of the state military, paramilitaries, and left–wing guerrillas in rural areas, were driven off or forcibly removed from their land. An estimated six million rural residents suffered this fate.

During the 1990s, as drug cartels declined in strength because they were pursued by government authorities, the FARC obtained capital for its activities by assisting the drug trade, and by this way, expanded its area of control in the rural sector. However, it also caused the FARC to begin straying from its original foundation in revolutionary philosophy and instead to take on the role of "narcotic guerrillas."

2.   The national strategy for peace building after the 1980s

The government began to address peace policy seriously starting with the Betancur administration. However, throughout the 20th century, the peace negotiation efforts remained at a complete impasse. President Uribe reversed course with a hawkish stance and forced the FARC into military decline through all–out resistance and a military build–up.

President Santos, after his administration took over in 2010 shifted to a more negotiation–focused position, away from the hawkish stance, toward Colombia's leftist guerrillas, which in turn brought a long–awaited change in the deadlocked peace process. After that, former–president Uribe, who had sought

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3 This is the Spanish term for the political structure, "Frente Nacional", which took effect in 1958. This was a system of divided rule based on an agreement between the Conservative and Liberal parties, under which the presidency alternated between Conservatives and Liberals every 4 years for the next 16 years. Seats in the Congress and governorships were also divided between the two parties.

to achieve peace through all–out resistance to the guerrillas, broke from his political allies and formed the Centro Democrático Party in 2013. Since then, there has been a partisan split in national politics between Uribe's faction and the ruling party.

Initial negotiations between FARC commanders and government representatives began in Oslo in October 2012, and it was agreed to continue negotiations toward a peace agreement in Havana, Cuba.

The Santos administration managed to draft a peace agreement, as part of its peace–building agenda, more than 4 years later, following a ceasefire. The details of the agreement drafted in Havana were noteworthy and did not only aim to build a post–conflict society but also addressed the reintegration of FARC fighters into the society following the end of hostilities, compensation for victims of the conflict, and the reconciliation of civilians. In addition, it promoted a political agenda related to structural problems in Colombia, such as the need to transform its political system into a more pluralistic democracy, the delayed development of rural areas（especially as related to land issues）, and disparate social stratification that was a major cause of the armed conflict. Consequently, the agreement was a valuable document. However, support for the Santos administration was low, and an increased distrust or a lack of interest in the peace process among citizens, especially those in urban areas, had become apparent.

The peace agreement survived with some modifications, after some ups and downs due to a rejection by a national referendum, and finally was approved by the Congress at the end of November 2016. After a series of disturbances, the peace agreement put the disarmament process into practice at the very end of that year.

Table 1: The Peace Process as Pursued by Successive Administrations

Year	Name of Administration	Major Policies and Results
1982–1986	Belisario Betancur (Conservative Party)	Undertook peace negotiations with FARC, which broke down in 1987
1986–1990	Virgilio Barco (Liberal Party)	Announced a "War on Drugs" against terrorist drug trafficking organizations
1990–1994	César Gaviria (Liberal Party)	Convened a constitutional convention, disarmed major guerrilla organizations such as the M-19, and expanded paramilitary groups; deadlock in meeting at Tlaxcala (Mexico)
1994–1998	Ernesto Samper (Liberal Party)	Corruption problems with the presidential election came to light; no progress with peace policy
1998–2002	Andrés Pastrana (Conservative Party)	Failure of negotiations at San Vicente del Caguán
2002–2010	Álvaro Uribe (2 terms) (Colombia First Party)	Built up the military and developed "all-out resistance" line. Collectively disarmed paramilitaries. Established the 2005 Justice and Peace Law and the Comisión Nacional de Reparaciones y Reconciliación
2010–2018	Juan Manuel Santos (2 terms) (National Unity Party)	Enacted the 2011 Victims and Land Restitution Law; reopened lines of negotiation. Created agreement with FARC (August 2016) through peace negotiations in Havana, Cuba. "No" vote in national referendum. Approved new agreement by Congress (November 2016)

Source: Elaborated by the author.

3.   Land laws and land problems in Colombia

3–1. The national context of land concentration and armed conflict until the 1990s

Colombia has maintained a historically concentrated structure of land ownership, which has become more extreme as a result of the war. The war provoked forced displacement from the land with few opportunities for return. In highly vulnerable conditions, displaced people are forced to take on precarious employment in which they are exposed to new types of exploitation. The impact of the war on the agrarian structure should be seen in the context of a development model exclusively focused on certain social classes and which tends to concentrate wealth through increased efficiency and access to international markets. As a consequence, rural populations have become increasingly impoverished (Osorio and Herrera 2012).

The rural sector has been besieged by legal and illegal investments of four types: agro–industrial companies (especially palm oil and timber), investments in illicit crops, extensive cattle ranching and companies in the mining and energy sector. This entire process takes place through relationships between those who control the resources and those who provide labour at very low cost, whether in the rural or urban sectors, which benefits the large–scale companies (Fajardo 2006).

Inequity in access to land constitutes one of the most important objective outcomes of the armed conflict, as it generates social exclusion and inequality (Comisión de Estudios sobre la Violencia 1987). The economic power of land generates political and social benefits, which in turn provide economic returns for broadening economic power. The bipolarised agrarian structure as well as limited economic growth in the rural sector has impeded the Colombian government from responding satisfactorily to demands for access to land. As a consequence, the historically persistent concentration of rural property reached a Gini coefficient of 0.86 (Ibáñez and Muñoz 2012: 301).

3–2.   Subsoil concessions for resource extraction under the "mining boom" in the global market

The awarding of concessions can lead to the expropriation of land, or impede the recognition of rights to land already inhabited and used by the rural population. In this way, between 1990 and 2010, around 10 million hectares of concessions were granted for mining activities, and applications were received for concessions on another 26 million hectares (CGR 2011).

This situation should be analysed against the current "mining boom", which emerged with increased demand in the global market, especially in relation to coal, gold and platinum. Colombia is a country gifted with rich petroleum and mineral resources. It is the leading producer of coal in South America, accounting for more than 80 per cent of the region's total production and is also an important gold producer, ranking as the fifth largest in the region. Finally, the country is the only producer of platinum group metals in South America, and is the largest producer of nickel and ferronickel in the world. Thus, there is strong global interest in Colombia's minerals (British Geological Survey 2016).

3–3. Post-conflict scenario: attraction of foreign investment to Colombia

Uncertainty in terms of public security has been one of the greatest barriers to foreign investors interested in Colombian mining deposits. After Uribe became president, security improved if one analyses it through conventional statistics or indicators, such as the level of "violence" (for example, the number of

homicides per 10,000 persons, or the number of kidnappings). Disarmament of major paramilitary groups and social rehabilitation programs for ex–guerrilla or paramilitary combatants served to publicize an image that Colombia is now recovering its security. And the peace agreement signed between the Santos administration and the FARC secured even more the attraction for global extractivist capital.

In 2001, after long polemical debates on reform, a new mining code was established with the passage of Law 685. The reform of the mining code had the aim of promoting competition of private capital, and particularly of bringing foreign multinational investment to the mining sector. The new mining code deregulated state control over access to land with potential mineral deposits and facilitated the procedure of giving concessions to private capital.

With the solution of these two problematic issues, major mining multinationals have increased their presence in Colombia over the last two decades. Exploration concessions have been given for most of the land where there are expected to be mining deposits.

At the same time, the government's fundamental mission is to support and qualify small–scale mining operations, which make up the majority of all miners. Small–scale mining operations apply the artisanal, traditional system of production with a low level of production, almost at the subsistence level. The government aims to formalize and integrate all existing small and mid–sized mining operations under the category of Mining Districts in order to facilitate its control over them.

There is one sensitive issue that has not yet been resolved. Small–scale mining communities are legally vulnerable when the area in which they have settled happens to be a part of the land for which a multinational enterprise requests a concession. Without a title deed for the land, the community has no other alternative but to move out.

Both these tendencies: intensification of land–concentration for large scale production (as represented by palm–oil production) and increased interest in mining exploitation by multinational capital, have marginalized family farming of traditional food production for subsistence and increased Colombia's food dependency on imports. Statistics for 2010 show a significant level of food dependency in Colombia: rice imports have increased by 64.4 per cent, corn 67.3 per cent, barley 35.6 per cent and wheat 21.1 per cent. Meanwhile, crops such as palm oil, cocoa and fruit have had their production boosted by policies oriented towards competitiveness in exportable tropical products (López 2012). The government's shift in priority from food production for the domestic market towards export–oriented agricultural industry has had negative effects on income generation and therefore morale in productive activities. This has led to land sales, changes in land use and migration of peasants, hitherto engaged in small–and medium–scale farming, to cities, diminishing their traditional contribution to the internal food market.

3–4. Measures employed by the state and their scope

State efforts at agrarian reform with a limited scope

In Colombia, policies and normative frameworks related to land ownership have proved to be insufficient in addressing the concentration of land ownership and changing the inequitable agrarian structure. Rather than redistributing land, the agricultural frontier has been extended to the south and east of the country (Ramírez 1981: 203).

In the 1980s, the government adopted a productive strategy designed to modernise zones in which the peasant economy predominated. Governmental actions regarding land were limited to the incor-

poration of new zones at the agrarian frontier. Productive efficiency, in the context of a process of opening up the Colombian economy, was intensified at the beginning of the 1990s. The current legal framework (Law 160 of 1994) is intended to consolidate a land–rights market approach, which was derived from the emergence of new land disputes and conflicts.

Lack of formalisation of land rights in rural areas

The basic procedure for registering land, including the clarification of whether property is public or private and the delimitation of land boundaries, has been delayed all over the country. There is an evident lack of formalisation of land rights in rural areas: 47.7 per cent of landowners do not have formal property titles, and the situation is even more critical for small landholders (Gáfaro et al. 2012). Some of these problems relate to the lack of clarity around property titles in much of the country, a backlog at the land registry office, the high costs of registry transactions and rural property legalisation, uncertainty over property and the lack of clear and definitive delimitation of which lands are public and which private, especially in places such as marshlands, riverbanks and communally used plains. All of this makes the process of identifying and reclaiming property difficult.

Table 2. Colombian agrarian reform laws

Name and year	Characteristics
Law 200 in 1936	This law created the concept of the social function of land, meaning that land should be distributed to landless peasants, specifically those occupying wilderness land. One of the main ideas of this law was to recognize the ownership of the land by the peasants working and living on it.
Law 100 in 1944	The purpose of this law was to avoid the land distribution effect caused by the previous land law. This law created barriers against peasants claiming their property rights, by enforcing land rights such as possession and tenure instead of property rights in favor of landless peasants.
Law 161 in 1961	This law was the result of the commitment of the national elite to the distribution of land to landless peasants. The policy created by this law laid the foundation for the National Institute of Colombia for the Agrarian Reform (Incora) and several institutions and norms, with the main purpose of giving land to peasants, and recognizing and formalizing property rights.
Law 4 in 1974	Also known as the 'Chicoral Pact' (named after a province ruled by the landlords at that time). This law was the result of a negotiation between the state and regional elites, and its purpose was to restrain the progress of the agrarian reform law of the 1960s, since agrarian reform was assumed to be a threat to their political and economic power.
Law 160 in 1994	The 1990s amendment of the agrarian reform law implied a shift from the state-oriented land policy to the establishment of a land market supported by the state. Despite this, the law also created Peasant Reserve Zones to protect access to land by peasants in wilderness areas, established limits to private titles to wilderness lands and recognized the territorial rights of indigenous and afro-descendant communities.

Sources: Machado 2004, 2017.

3–5. A new perspective in the current peace process: The last legal frameworks introduced during the Santos administration and the respective polemics

The decision to resume the peace dialogue between the government of the Santos administration and the FARC in 2012 put the issues of land concentration and deprivation back in the public arena. Although "integral rural development" was one of the principal themes of the peace agreement, up to the present, it has been very difficult to identify a change in attitude (or political will, or position of the political

leadership) of policymakers in relation to the land issue and respective policies.

The Land Restitution Law (1448/2011)

This Law is an important step towards the reparation and recognition of the rights of victims of the Colombian armed conflict (Bautista 2012; Uprimny and Sanchez 2010). Its purpose is not to redistribute land, but to repair and restore the rights of the victims of recent violence in the country. It is possible to see that the law has an important background in several international human rights instruments, such as the Deng Principles and the Pinheiro Principles. Nevertheless, several aspects of the law have been criticised as follows:

1) Restriction on the category of victims. Only those who suffered displacement and dispossession after 1991 are recognised. This creates an obstacle for those who were victimised in previous periods, and it clearly forms a limit to the human rights approach of the policy.

2) Limitations on property within the scope of restitution. The law established that only land can be restored, not property, houses, crops, farm animals or other possessions lost by victims. Overcoming this problem will depend on the enforcement of complementary policies, such as the provision of housing, rural development and technical support to the victims.

3) Inclusion of measures that limit the possibility of restitution. Article 99 stipulates that a restitution judge can establish a legal contract between the victim, as the owner of the restored plot, and the current users of the land only if the current users prove their innocence with regard to the original circumstances in which the land was seized, in which case they can continue to use the land.

Despite these problems, this Law is the current legal framework for reparation and the restitution of the rights of approximately 8 million victims in the country. By the end of November 2017, the Land Restitution Unit had received 109,902 requests from victims to be included in the National Register of Abandoned and Dispossessed Land, and these requests covered an area of 2,368,908 hectares[4].

The successful enforcement of this Law is greatly dependent on the capacity of the state to conciliate the interests of the national elite, who are interested in land restitution and the consolidation of a land market, and the many regional elites who see this policy as a threat. For the national elite, creating a dynamic land market through formalisation of the land tenure system is one of the indispensable conditions for providing security and encouraging foreign investment. The regional elites, however, see land restitution as a land distribution policy which would affect their power that is founded on land concentration.

It is important to note that the land restitution process is regulated by a temporary legislation (which will be valid until 2021). The procedure has not progressed as expected, because it requires several stages of document verification, and over 30 percent of demands are rejected before getting to the final stage. In some local areas where the presence of armed conflict was very serious and complex, many leaders of peasant organisations who claimed dispossessed land were subjected to intimidation, including death threats.

The ZIDRES Law (Law 1776 of 2016)

Just after its approval at the congress, the Law to regulate ZIDRES (zones of interest for economic and social rural development) became the focus of criticism by opposition parties such as Polo and Alianza

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4 https://www.restituciondetierras.gov.co/es/restitucion, accessed on January 10, 2018.

Verde, who argued that this law could almost completely undermine locals' peasant life and their economy.

According to the law, ZIDRES should be developed in areas far from urban centres, where the land requires considerable investment to prepare for cultivation and production. This would therefore allow that people pretending to run a ZIDRES project could request the land in a concession, or could lease national *baldío* (virgin land)[5]. In the legal framework of the ZIDRES, the government stated that the projects in question could provide more than 7 million hectares for food production, given the conditions of protecting forest resources and creating decent (well–paying) job in the countryside.

For the plaintiff in the case against the ZIDRES law, the fact that developers of a productive project could access national *baldío* land is itself a regression in terms of the right of peasants to access the land, and also a violation against public resources, since the use of such land for development projects has been restricted. They also suggest that in ZIDRES projects, peasants could lose their autonomy in terms of land use and management, and in terms of their own (peasant and family farming) productive projects, and therefore, their identification as local agents based in their own territory would be at risk. The cultural and traditional identity of the peasant economy has been protected by the Constitution, but in the ZIDRES law, there is no reference to the identity of the peasantry. Additionally, the Law overlooks the right to hold a prior consultation ahead of any development project, which has been guaranteed to ethnic groups (indigenous and Afro–descendent communities) and to victims of the armed conflicts who are in the process of land restitution[6].

The legal Bill for the New Land Law (to reform the current Law 160/1994)

The official statement of the government in justifying this Bill was to provide a normative framework to deal with the first pillar of the peace agreement with the FARC, namely that of promoting "integral rural development". The Bill is now being reviewed and discussed by the members of CSIVI (The Commission for Follow–up, Impulse and Verification on the Implementation of the Final Agreement).

Peña & Parada (2017) pointed out the following aspects of the legal Bill of the new land Law as problematic and contradictory to the peace agreement:

1) The new Law will establish the system of Register of Subjects for Legal Order (*Registro de Sujetos de Ordenamiento*: RESO), which classifies and prioritises persons who shall be the beneficiaries of the land policy.

2) It will modify the concept of the UAF (Unit of Agrarian Family)[7] and eliminate the (concept of) "families" as the basis for the land distribution policy, since in the new legal framework the concept of the "beneficiaries" (individual persons) shall replace them.

3) The new Law permits that other individuals (or subjects) than the vulnerable (poor) people may acquire the land in the category of "*baldío*" by paying for it.

4) The law also modifies the Civil Code and establishes real surface (land) rights, which allow the

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5 This concept refers to land which used to be virgin soil and under the control of the State. In theory, *baldío* land is not private property and in general is located beyond the frontier of agrarian exploitation or arable land. However, for their survival, landless peasants have occupied *baldío* land as *colons* and have developed the virgin soil. Most of them never claimed a title deed, as they have not intended to pay tax. However, once they are at risk of disposition of the land or forced displacement, the legal status of their occupied land becomes vulnerable.

6 For the further analysis on ZIDRES, see (Machado 2017).

7 UAF has been the basis for agrarian policy in Colombia for promoting the development of family farming.

transference of the rights of use and disposition of the land for productive projects, without transferring the ownership of the same lands.

In respect of these points, many civil society organisations and some congressmen have pointed out that the new land Law would encourage land concentration through the accumulation of *baldíos*, which, after all would legitimize land disposition from landless peasants, or in other words, from peasants who have occupied land without a title deed. The new land Law will also permit the acquisition of land occupied by ethnic communities (indigenous or Afro–descendent people) without completing the required prior consultations with these groups, as regulated by the Constitution. The new land Law shall also eliminate the few existing mechanisms of guaranteeing land access with the aim of protecting peasant rights on the land (such as Peasant Reserve Zones, and Collective land for Afro–descendent communities) (Peña & Parada, 2017).

These critical comments on the Bill for new land Law suggest that it would deregulate land use, which could cause more land concentration for large–scale agricultural industry projects. As Peña & Prada pointed out as a concern, in the new land legal framework, *baldíos* could be exploited by agricultural industry companies without transferring title deeds. For the small farmers who are not able to invest in their land to improve productivity, offering their land use rights to third parties could be an attractive option. However, given all of the above, the question might not be only about the concentration of land tenancy but <u>the change in land use, which may result in risks to food security and to the sustainability of the peasant economy and family farming.</u>

To make the things worse, some conditions required by the RESO system will impede landless and vulnerable peasants from accessing their lands. Under the RESO system, in theory, the most vulnerable subjects (peasants) have priority, but in practice, the projects on which most landless peasants base their claims to land tenancy or formalisation of their title free of charge shall not necessarily be prioritised over other productive projects. Deregulation of *baldío* land acquisition through payment will clearly favour entities with agricultural industry projects that are able to pay more than 500 legal minimum salaries in return. Vulnerable peasants cannot afford to compete for land tenancy under such conditions. The current constitutional mandate regulated in the current Law 160/1994 prioritises the use of *baldío* land for vulnerable peasants to improve their living conditions; therefore, the national government's political interest is to reform Law 160 in order to "recover national *baldío* land" for agricultural industry projects, which is the real intention for the national economic development policy.

Final remarks: How to understand the land problem and long-lasting armed conflict in Colombia given the expansion of global capital?

This paper reaffirmed that the land problem in terms of land concentration and extreme inequality in terms of land access has been the principal cause of the armed conflict in Colombia. The emergence of illegal armed groups in the 1960s in Colombia was influenced by the international circumstances in the Americas then, but social and economic segregation and the fight for land use by the vulnerable population has historical origins going back to the colonial period when the structure of the concentrated land tenure system was established.

The land problem has continued without an effective solution due to the so–called exclusionist political bipartisan regime, which, in turn, intensified the conflict over land access. Thus, until the 1990s, the

evolution of land problems and armed conflict was basically determined by internally–structured political and socio–economic factors in Colombia.

After the end of the Cold War and since the 1990s, the balance of world power changed and globalisation proceeded rapidly in terms of market liberalisation and increased mobility of goods, services, finance and human resources. This process soon built a new hegemony of multinational capital which has gained the greatest power in the global market. During this period, some South American countries saw the emergence of leftist government regimes (Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, Argentina, and Brazil), who claimed a political position of anti–Americanism and anti–hegemonic globalisation. In Colombia, there also was an increased momentum of seeking a more pluralistic democratic regime. However, the emerging leftist political party failed to build a majority political faction, while the leftist guerrilla groups lost their ideological backing to justify regular military activities. During this period, the guerrilla groups transformed into so–called "*narco–guerrillas*", taking advantage of the cocaine boom in Colombia.

Following the globalisation era, the persistence of armed conflict connected with land concentration in Colombia should be analysed more clearly from the point of view of the economic interests of global capital and of those (other internal actors) who benefit from the market mechanism of globalisation.

This is the reason why the armed conflict in Colombia lasted so long. While a war is ongoing, there is a part of society that profits from it, and this weakens the political will to end it. The government continued to neglect the peasant economy and their distressed conditions, because it was more convenient for the political elite class to provide humanitarian aid to displaced persons in the cities, leaving the rural sector without a subsistent peasant economy.

This tendency continued through the succeeding decades during the Uribe administration, but Colombia is now finally entering into a genuinely "post–conflict" era. As analysed in this presentation, however, land problems continue to be amongst the most challenging issues to be addressed as part of the government's intention to promote extractivist economic development.

With the ceasefire, peasant communities and ethnic groups recovered a temporary calm in their daily lives, but this does not guarantee their livelihoods. As we have reviewed, after the disarmament of the FARC, new "legitimate" actors, such as national and/or multinational companies have intervened in these communities (or local territories) with the threat of dispossessing them of their land, so as to explore the *baldío* land for export–oriented crops or subsoil mineral resources.

After the 1990s (more precisely, after the establishment of the Constitution in 1991), landless peasants (or *colons*), indigenous groups and Afro–descendent communities have counted on certain legal frameworks to protect their livelihood, such as the ZRC (Peasant Reserve Zones), and the right of prior consultation before any development project by an external party. The political agenda signed in the peace agreement with the FARC emphasizes the government mandate to promote "integral rural development", even though the existing mechanisms to protect the rights of the vulnerable population have been totally ignored or not recognised at all in the recent new legal framework related to land. On the contrary, the bill for the new land law clearly pretends to "adjust" the existent legal framework in order to meet the government's interests, and thus the interests of global capital.

I would like to conclude this paper by pointing out a series of issues of concern for the future:

1) The national government policy to promote the agricultural industry and cooperatives as a mechanism of job creation for landless peasants will definitely increase food insecurity in the country.

2) Accumulation of *baldío* land for large–scaled productive projects for export–oriented crops would

aggravate environmental destruction and destroy eco–systems in areas destined to be protected for their biodiversity, such as Llanos Orientales and the Orinoco, where the ZIDRES projects are being planned.

3) If the current trajectory proceeds, sooner or later the peasant economy will disappear. The peasant cultural identity, which is rooted in their territory, will be lost. Although their economic conditions might improve to a certain extent in terms of monetary value, they will not be able to build social agency and autonomy in the local territory.

4) Given these problematic issues, how can the political agenda promised in the peace agreement progress appropriately, particularly within the current electoral campaign?

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和平合意後のコロンビアにおける土地問題[1]

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はじめに

　　グローバリゼーションの進展によって、新しい形態の社会的排除が生まれた。この過程で、弱者集団がこれまで育んできた独自の慣習や文化、生産の手立て（生業）を展開してきたローカルな空間が脅かされてきた（伊豫谷　2002）。このような議論は特別新しいものではないが、今日のコロンビアの状況をみると、まさにこうした現実があることがわかる。

　　コロンビアは半世紀を超える武力紛争を抱えてきた国であり、その過程で左翼ゲリラだけでなく、右派の準軍事組織であるパラミリタリーや、麻薬組織が武装化した自警団など、様々な武力集団が関わってきた。紛争地のコミュニティは、恐怖と欠乏（基本的サービスを提供するはずの国家の不在）に苦しんできた。

　　それでも 2006 年以降、政府は「紛争後時代の開発」を政策の中心課題として強調し始めた。現サントス政権は、2016 年についに FARC（コロンビア革命軍）との和平合意にこぎつけ、「紛争後」時代の到来を決定づけたのである。

　　土地問題は和平構築の対話（2012 年〜 2016 年）の間でも最も重要なテーマの一つであり、「総合的農村開発」は、和平合意文書における 6 つの柱の一つに組み込まれた。それでもなお、現在（討議中の）土地政策は依然として多くの課題と制約を抱えている。農民は武装組織による強制移住の圧力からは逃れたとはいえ、今度は、多国籍資本が後押しする大規模アグロインダストリー開発のための土地収用または鉱山開発のためのコンセッション取得によって、土地を奪われる脅威に対して相変わらず脆弱である。さらに状況を悪くしているのは、現サントス政権が任期の最終年にあたり、すでに 2018 年 5 月の大統領選挙を前に、国政は選挙キャンペーンに入っていることである。サントス大統領の支持率が下がる一方で、ウリベ前大統領[2]が率いる反対勢力の政治的影響力は侮れない。コロンビアにおける和平プロセスの進展と紛争後社会の構築政策の継続性が危ぶまれている。

　　本報告では、コロンビアにおける土地問題と長期にわたる国内武力紛争との因果関係を論じたのち、今日、紛争後社会を射程に入れたコロンビアの文脈において、土地問題は政府がグローバル市場における競争力を高めるために促進する「採掘主義的経済政策」の下で、最も挑戦的な政策課題であることを指摘したい。

1.　排他的二大政党体制に特徴づけられた政治動向

　　コロンビアの政治的暴力は独立当初に遡る。自由党と保守党とに二分したオリガルキー勢力がコロンビアの政治の舞台を伝統的に支配し、これが 1960 年代に設立された両勢力による政治的連合体

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1 本小論は国際シンポジウム「日本―アフリカ関係を通したグローバル資本主義の批判的検討：土地、空間、近代性」（2018 年 1 月 29 日に東京外国語大学にて開催）での報告用に準備したものである。（Hataya, Coronado, Osorio and Valgas 2014）および（幡谷 2016）に一部依拠している。

2 サントス政権の和平構築政策に対する反対勢力を牽引し、FARC との和平合意に関する国民投票に「No」キャンペーンを展開した中心人物。

制となった[3]。多くの研究者が、この政治体制を、伝統的二大政党によって操作されてきた排他的二大政党体制と解釈してきた（Kline, 1999; Livingstone, 2003）。左翼勢力である共産党や自由党のラディカルな改革主義派閥は、より平等な社会と多元的政治体制を求めてきたが、政治の舞台からは排除され、これが左翼武力組織の出現につながった。

　　FARC はコロンビアで結成された左翼ゲリラ組織の中では最も長い歴史をもつ。その創立者たちは共産主義に思想的影響を受け、マルクス・レーニン主義を推進していった。1980 年代末に FARC 兵は 4 千人に拡大し、最盛期には 3 万の武装兵を擁していたと言われている。

　　1990 年代にパラミリタリー勢力が拡大したことも左翼ゲリラ組織（FARC や ELN：国民解放軍）の武力による抵抗の強化に影響した。紛争地では、コミュニティや社会運動組織のリーダーなどの一般市民が、左翼ゲリラとの接触を疑われて、抑圧や殺戮のターゲットとなった。正規軍、左翼ゲリラ、パラミリタリー組織が混在する紛争地域では、多くの農民が、中立的立場を維持することが困難になり、強制移住に追い込まれた。約 6 百万人がこのような状況に陥ったと推計されている。

　　1990 年代はまた、政府の麻薬撲滅政策が奏功し、麻薬密売カルテルが勢力を弱めていった反面、FARC が麻薬密売に関与し始めるようになった。こうして FARC は農村部での拠点を拡大していった。しかし FARC の戦略の変化は、FARC のレーゾンデートルであった思想的支柱の喪失と、「ナルコ・ゲリラ」への変質を意味した。

2.　1980 年代以降の和平構築政策の経緯

　　政府はベタンクール政権下において和平政策に本格的に着手した。しかし、20 世紀を通じて、和平交渉の取組みはことごとく頓挫した。ウリベ政権は、FARC に対しタカ派路線を掲げ、徹底的な軍事抗戦で臨み、FARC の軍事力を弱体化させた。

　　サントス大統領は就任後、コロンビアのゲリラに対するタカ派路線から再び対話路線に舵を切った。ゲリラに対する軍事的徹底抗戦を掲げていた前ウリベ大統領（現上院議員）は、与党ともとを分かち、2013 年に独自の民主中央党（Democratic Center Party）を結党した。以後、国政ではウリベ派と与党サントス派との分裂が続いている。

　　2012 年 10 月にオスロにて、ノルウェー政府の仲介のもと、FARC 幹部と政府代表との間で事前和平交渉がもたれ、キューバのハバナで和平交渉が継続される方針が決まった。

　　サントス政権は 4 年の年月をかけ、2016 年 11 月末、停戦後の和平構築アジェンダとしての和平合意文書を作成した。合意文書の内容は、終戦後の FARC 兵の社会復帰、紛争被害者への補償、そして国民和解という紛争後社会の構築をめざすだけでなく、武力紛争の原因となっていた社会格差、特に土地問題をはじめとする農村の発展や、政治体制の多元化など、コロンビアの構造的諸問題に対する政策アジェンダを掲げたものであり、評価に値するものであった。しかし、サントス政権への支持率の低迷や、和平プロセスそのものへの国民の不信感、あるいは無関心が都市部を中心に広まっていたことも顕著であった。

　　和平合意文書は、国民投票で否決された後、紆余曲折したものの、多くの修正を施し、2016 年 11 月末にようやく国会で承認された。一連の障害を越えて、和平プロセスは 2016 年末に FARC の武装解除の開始までこぎつけた。

3　1958 年に発足した「国民戦線」（Frente Nacional）と称される政治体制。保守党と自由党の間で、4 期 16 年間大統領を交代で相互に選出し、議員も両党の間で折半体制にするという協約。

表1：歴代政権の和平プロセス

年	政権名	主な政策と成果
1982～1986	ベタンクール （保守党）	FARC との和平交渉に着手、1987 年に決裂。
1986～1990	バルコ （自由党）	麻薬密売組織のテロに対する「麻薬戦争」宣言。
1990～1994	ガビリア （自由党）	制憲議会召集、M-19 ほか主要ゲリラ組織の武装解除、パラミリタリーの拡大、トラスカラ（メキシコ）会議頓挫。
1994～1998	サンペール （自由党）	大統領選挙の収賄問題が発覚、和平政策は進展なし。
1998～2002	パストラーナ （保守党）	サン・ビセンテ・デ・カグアンでの対話交渉の失敗。
2002～2010	ウリベ（2 期） （コロンビア第一党）	軍備増強、徹底抗戦路線を展開。パラミリタリーの集団的武装解除、2005 年「公平・和平法」、CNRR（全国紛争被害者補償・和解委員会）設立。
2010～2018	サントス （国民統一党）	2011 年「紛争被害者および土地返還法」、対話路線再開。キューバの首都ハバナでの和平交渉による FARC との合意文書作成。（2016 年 8 月）。国民投票否決。新合意文書が国会で承認（同年 11 月）。

出典：筆者作成

3.　　コロンビアにおける土地法と土地問題

3-1.　1990 年代までの土地集中と武力紛争の状況

　　コロンビアでは歴史的に大土地集中型の土地所有構造を維持してきた。この傾向は、国内紛争の結果さらに著しくなった。国内紛争によって生まれた多くの強制移住者には、これまで土地帰還の機会がほとんどなかった。強制移住を余儀なくされた農民たちは、移住先（主として都市部）で極めて不利な就業条件のもとで働かざるを得ず、さらなる搾取を受けた。紛争が農村に与えるインパクトは、限られた社会階層を利する開発モデルという文脈から理解する必要がある。このような開発モデルは、経済効率性を追求し、国際市場へのアクセスを通じて、さらなる富の集中化を生み、農民は一層困窮する（Osorio and Herrera 2012）。

　　農村部門には、これまで合法・違法的なものを合わせて、次の 4 つのタイプの投資が行われてきた：アグロインダストリーの企業（特にアブラヤシと木材）、非合法作物栽培（コカ葉）、粗放的牧畜業、および鉱物・エネルギー資源開発会社によるものの 4 類型である。資源を支配するものと、極めて低価格で労働を提供するものとの関係性において成り立つこのこうした開発のありかたは、大規模企業（資本）を利するのである（Fajardo 2006）。

　　土地へのアクセスにおける不平等は武力紛争が掲げる具体的な目的の一つであったが、同時に紛争があらたな社会的排除と不平等を生んできた（Comisión de Estudios sobre la Violencia 1987）。土地を支配する経済的権力は、政治的社会的便益を生むが、それはその見返りに再び経済的利潤を提供し、さらに経済的権力を強化する。こうして二極化した農業構造においては、政府が農民に土地へのアクセスを推進することは阻まれてきた。農村部での土地所有権の集中は、ジニ係数で測ると 0.86 にも及んでいる（Ibáñez and Muñoz 2012: 301）。

3-2.　グローバル市場における鉱物資源ブームと地下資源開発の採掘権をめぐる問題

　　コンセッションの譲渡は当該地の収用につながり、すでにその地で耕作をしてきた農民の土地に対する権利の承認を阻むことになる。1990 年から 2010 年の間に約 1000 万㏊の土地に対して鉱物資

源採掘のためのコンセッションが与えられ、さらに 2600 万㌶の土地に対するコンセッション要請が受理された（CGR 2011）。

この状況はグローバル市場における「鉱物資源ブーム」（2000 年代）、に関連付けて分析する必要がある。南米随一の石炭生産国であるほか、金の生産でも域内の第 5 位の生産を誇る。さらに、南米で稀少なプラチナと関連鉱物資源の生産国であり、同時にニッケルとニッケル鉄の世界最大の産出国である（British Geological Survey 2016）。コロンビアが鉱物生産分野ではグローバル市場の需要に対して極めて魅力的な国であることが明らかである。

3–3.　紛争後のシナリオ：コロンビアへの外国投資の拡大

コロンビアの豊かな鉱山埋蔵量に魅力を感ずる外国投資家にとって、長年治安問題がその障壁になってきた。ウリベ大統領就任後、「暴力」指標（人口 10 万人あたり年間殺害件数や、年間の誘拐件数など）で測る治安状況は大幅に改善された。ウリベが導入した元 AUC 兵やゲリラ兵の武装解除と社会復帰プログラムなどもコロンビアが治安問題を解消しつつあるという対外的イメージ改善に役立った。サントス政権期の FARC との和平合意締結は、さらにグローバルな採掘主義資本のコロンビアへの投資意欲を決定づけたことになる。

2001 年に改正に関する様々な論争を経て、新鉱山法（法律第 685）が制定された。鉱山法改革は、民間資本、特に多国籍資本の招致を促すためのものであった。新鉱山法では、鉱物資源埋蔵が見込まれる土地へのアクセスに関する国家の統制を緩和し、民間資本にコンセッションを譲渡する手続きの簡素化を明示している。

これらの規制緩和措置により、過去 20 年で多国籍鉱山開発企業の存在は拡大した。鉱物資源の埋蔵が推計される土地の大半に、現在コンセッションが与えられている。

政府は同時に、既存の小規模開発業の生産性の向上への支援がある。国内で操業する大半が小規模開発業者の手によるものであるが、これらの技術は前近代的な手工業的なものが多く、生産性も低い。だが政府は小規模開発業者の法的な脆弱性の抜本的な改善を行っていない。現在操業中の小規模鉱山が、多国籍企業が大規模開発をめざして獲得したコンセッションが譲渡された土地に含まれる場合、使用中の土地の権利を持たない小規模開発業者とそれを生業にするコミュニティは、大規模開発の稼働によって、移住せざるを得ない。

輸出向け農業開発のための土地集中の過熱化と多国籍企業による鉱山開発への関心が高まるに従い、食糧生産に従事する自給的な家族農は周縁化され、食糧供給における輸入依存度は高まった。2010 年の統計では米、大麦、小麦の輸入依存度はそれぞれ 64.4％、67.3％、21.1％であった。一方、アブラヤシ、カカオと果物は輸出向け熱帯農作物の増進政策に支えられて生産を伸ばした（López 2012）。国内市場向け食糧生産から輸出指向のアグロインダストリーへの政策優先順位のシフトは、農村部の所得創出にはマイナスに働き、家族農の生産活動意欲にも影響した。その結果、土地の売却、土地利用の変化と中小規模農業に従事してきた農民の都市部への移住が助長され、彼らが担ってきた国内市場向け食糧生産はさらにそのシェアを落とすことになった。

3–4.　政府が取り組んだ政策とその成果

農地改革の失敗

コロンビアでは、土地所有の集中と、不平等な農業構造を改善するための土地所有に関する政策や制度的枠組みは極めて貧弱であった。土地の再分配は進展せず、むしろ国土の南部と東部に向けて農業フロンティアが拡大していった（Ramírez 1981: 203）。

1980 年代を通じて、政府は農民経済が支配的な地域の近代化を促進したが、これは農業フロ

ンティアに新しい開発地域を統合したにすぎなかった。経済自由化政策のもとで 1990 年代はさらに生産性の向上が強化された。農地改革に関する現行法（1994 年の法律第 160 号）の枠組みにおいて、土地権利の問題も市場メカニズムの適用がめざされたが、これがさらなる土地をめぐるコンフリクトを激化させた。

農村部における土地権利の正規化の欠如

コロンビアでは、土地所有権の公私の別を含む土地登録および土地区画の確定に関する基礎的手続き制度の整備が全体的に遅れている。農村部では土地権利の正規化手続きが欠如していると言ってよい。土地「所有者」の実に 47.7% が土地権利書をもっておらず、土地所有規模が小さくなるほどこの傾向は深刻である（Gáfaro et al. 2012）。これには地籍登録庁の記録更新の遅れ、地籍手続き料の負担、土地所有過程の不正確さ、湿原、河岸、コミュニティの共同使用地などにおける土地区分の不明瞭さ、なども影響を与えてきた。

3–5.　和平合意後の新しい展望：サントス政権が導入した新しい土地政策とその課題

2012 年にサントス政権と FARC とが対話による和平交渉に入る決意を固めたことにより、土地の集中化と剥奪の問題が公的議論に附されることとなった。しかし「総合的農村開発」が和平合意の柱の一つであるにもかかわらず、今日に至るまで、政府の土地問題と関連する諸政策について、これまでの方針を変える姿勢や政治的意思は認められない。

紛争被害者への土地返還法（1448/2011）

本法律は、国内武力紛争による被害者の権利の認識と補償を促進するための重要な一歩であった（Bautista 2012; Uprimny and Sánchez 2010）。主たる目的は土地の再分配ではなく、近年の武力紛争によって被害を受けた被害者の権利を修復し、回復することにある。同法には国際人権擁護の理念が反映されているという一定の評価はあるが、以下の批判点もある。

1）被害者の範疇に関する制限。紛争被害者登録制度を、1991 年以降強制移住や土地剥奪を受けたものに限っていること。

2）返還される所有物の範囲に対する制約。法が定める返還対象は土地のみであり、その他の所有物、家屋、作物、家畜そのほか失われた被害者の私有財産は認められない。

3）返還可能性を制限する手段を含むこと。当該地の現在の使用者は土地占拠や剥奪には関与していないことが立証されたときには、当該地を使用し続けることができる。

以上のような制約があるにせよ、同法は、累積 800 万人と推計される被害者に対する補償と権利の返還を規定する法律である。2017 年 11 月末までに、LRU（土地返還庁）は 10 万 9,902 人の被害者からの土地返還要請を受けた[4]。同法の成果は、政府がどこまで土地返還と土地市場の形成に関心をもつ国政エリートと、これを脅威と考える地方のエリートとの折り合いをつけることができるかにかかっている。国政エリートは、土地所有システムの正規化を通して動態的な土地市場が構築されることを、外資投入の活性化の条件として歓迎する。しかし、地方エリートにとっては、土地返還政策は土地再分配政策と見なされ、伝統的な土地集中に基盤を置いて獲得されてきた彼らの権力への脅威と映る。

土地返還法は 10 年間の時限立法であることも考慮する必要がある。土地返還手続きは、期待

4　https://www.restituciondetierras.gov.co/es/restitucion, last accessed on January 10, 2018。

されたほどは進んでいない。何段階も煩雑な書類確認が義務付けられており、要請件数のうち約 30% が最終段階まで進まないという。紛争が極めて厳しかった地域では、土地返還要請を起こした農民組織のリーダーが殺戮の恐喝を含む様々な抑圧を受けた事例も多い。

ZIDRES 法 （2016 年法律第 1776 号）

ZIDRES（農村の経済的社会的発展に資する地域）を規定する法律は、国会で法案が通過してまもなく左派政党（「民主主義のもう一つの核」や「緑の同盟」）から、同法がローカルな農民経済と農民の生業を考慮していないという点において、批判の的となっている。

同法によれば、ZIDRES は都市部からは遠隔にあり、耕作・生産を開始するためには多額の投資によって造成を必要とするような地域に設定される。ゆえに、ZIDRES 開発プロジェクトを提案するものは、コンセッションを得て土地を利用するかまたは国家が管理する未開墾地「バルディオ」（*baldío*）[5]を貸借することができる。

ZIDRES に関する法的規定では、政府は同地域で展開される食糧生産プロジェクトには森林保全を尊重し、農村部で高賃金雇用を創出することを条件に、700 万㌶まで土地を提供することができると宣言されている。

ZIDRES 法を違憲として訴えた人々は、生産プロジェクトの提案者（企業法人）が「バルディオ」にアクセスできること自体、土地無し農民の土地へのアクセスに対する逆行であると指摘する。また、「バルディオ」ではそもそも開発プロジェクトによる開墾は禁じられていたはずであるから、公的資源に対する違法行為であると指摘する。また、ZIDRES で推進される開発プロジェクトにおいては、農民は単なる賃金労働者となり、土地使用と管理、および農民経済と家族農という生産様式において自治権を失うことになる。よってテリトリーに立脚した社会的エージェントの確立が危機に瀕することになる。憲法では、農民経済の文化的、伝統的アイデンティティは保護されているが、ZIDRES 規定法では、農民のアイデンティティに関する言及が一切ない。さらに、エスニックグループや土地返還過程にある紛争被害者に対しては、第三者が提案する開発プロジェクトに先立ち事前審議をすべきであるという規定があるにも関わらず、この点が看過されている[6]。

新土地法案（現行の農地改革法 1994 年第 160 号の改正法案）

政府が同法案を正当化するのは、FARC との和平合意における第一の柱である、「総合的農村開発」を推進するために法的枠組みを用意する、というものである。法案はすでに上院の当該委員会で検討され、現在は CSIVI（和平合意最終文書のフォローアップ、推進、確認、実行委員会）が検討中である。しかし、同法案に対する世論やアカデミズムからの批判の声も大きい。Peña & Parada （2017）は、本法案の抱える問題点、特に和平合意内容に照らした矛盾点として以下を指摘している。

1) 新土地法が制定する土地権利受益者登録システム（Registro de Sujetos de Ordenamiento: RESO）は、土地政策の便益を得る対象者を割り出し、優先順位をつけるものである。

2) RESO はこれまで農村開発、農民の土地アクセスを推進してきた単位であった、家族農（UAF:

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5 本来未開墾地で国家の管理下にある土地を指す概念。理論上は「バルディオ」は何人の私有財産にもならず、耕作可能地または農業フロンティア外に位置する。しかしながら、生存のために、土地無し農民は開墾民として「バルディオ」に侵入し、開墾、耕作を行ってきた事例が多い。その大半が、課税を恐れて土地所有権の正規化を要求してこなかった。しかしひとたび土地収用や強制移住の圧力がかかると、その土地に対する占有権は極めて脆弱である。
6 ZIDRES 法の詳細については、（Machado 2017）を参照のこと。

Unit of Agrarian Family)[7] の概念を変え、土地再分配の基盤であった「家族」概念を抹殺する。新土地法では、「受益者」概念が適用されるからである。

3) 新法では、本来土地法の恩恵を受ける対象となるべき人々以外の個人が、有償によって「バルディオ」を獲得することを認めている。

4) 生産プロジェクトに対しては、土地所有権の譲渡なしに、土地（地表）利用権の譲渡を認めている点。

　　以上から、多くの市民社会組織や議員が、新土地法は、「バルディオ」の集積によって土地のさらなる集中化を生むリスクが高いと指摘している。これは、土地所有権なしに「バルディオ」を専有し、耕作を行ってきた農民から、再び土地使用権利を剥奪することを意味する。また、エスニックグループの土地を、彼らに対する事前協議という憲法が定めた規定を徹底せずに、収奪するリスクがある。さらに、農民に集団的耕作・管理によって土地使用権を保証する既存のメカニズム（農民保有地など）を削除する危険性がある（Peña & Parada, 2017）。

　　以上の批判は、同法が土地利用の規制緩和となり、企業的開発による土地集中を引き起こすことを示唆するものである。新土地法では「バルディオ」をアグロインダストリー企業は土地所有権の譲渡なしに開発することが可能となる。生産性向上に必要な資本をもたない小規模農家は土地利用権を第三者に譲渡する選択肢をとりがちになる。また、起こり得る土地利用の変化が及ぼすリスクもある。土地利用の変化が、国内の食糧安全保障を脅かし、生態系を破壊するだけでなく、農民経済と家族農の継続性を危うくする。

　　さらに、RESO が義務付けるいくつかの条件は、脆弱な農民が土地にアクセスすることを阻むことになる。農民がよりどころとする生産プロジェクトに基づいて無償の土地所有の正規化を求めても、第三者が有償による土地利用権の獲得を前提にした生産プロジェクトに対して優先されないことが多い。生産プロジェクトベースで判断されると農民は不利になる。「バルディオ」の有償獲得に関する規制緩和はアグロインダストリープロジェクトに有利に働く。「バルディオ」の獲得の代償には、土地単位あたり 500 法廷最低賃金までが課される。脆弱な農民はこのような条件では土地権利をめぐる競争力を持ちえない。現行の農地法（Law 160/1994）では、「バルディオ」の利用には、脆弱な農民が生活条件の向上のために資する土地利用として優先権をもつとされている。ゆえに、政府は国家が管理する「バルディオ」を国家の方針に資するように回復し、経済発展の国家戦略に沿う企業的開発プロジェクトが有利に使用できるように、同法を改革する必要があったのである。

結びにかえて：
土地問題と武力紛争を、グローバル資本の拡大との関係で理解する

　　1960 年代の非合法武装組織の形成は当時の米州における国際環境に影響を受けたとはいえ、脆弱な農民による土地をめぐる闘いと社会的経済的階級格差がその歴史的要因であり、これは植民地時代の大土地集中の土地所有制度の確立に遡る。土地問題は、いわゆる排他的二大政党政治体制によって実際的な解決をみないままに、土地へのアクセスをめぐるコンフリクトは一層激化していった。1990 年代までは、土地問題と武力紛争とは基本的に国内政治の構造的要因と社会経済的要素によって決定づけられてきた。

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7 UAF はコロンビアの農業政策における家族農推進の基本的単位であった。

　　　冷戦終結後、1990年代以降は世界の権力均衡が変化し、グローバル化が急進した。この過程は多国籍資本による新しい覇権を構築し、これがグローバル市場を支配する最大の権力となった。コロンビアでは、より多元的な民主主義体制を求める機運が高まったが、新興左派政党は国政において過半数の派閥を形成することができず、一方、左翼ゲリラはその軍事行動を正当化するだけの思想的支柱を失い、「ナルコ・ゲリラ」に変質していった。

　　　グローバル化時代に入ってもなお、コロンビアでは土地所有の集中化に連携した国内武力紛争が続行したことは、グローバル資本とその市場から便益を受ける階層の経済的利害によって明確に理解できる。これこそがコロンビアで国内紛争が長期化した原因である。紛争がある限り、そこから経済的利益を得る層が存在する。そしてこの循環が続く限り、戦争終結の政治的意思を鈍らせるのである。政府は農民経済とその貧窮した状況への対応を怠り続けた。政治エリートにとっては、農村から自給的農民経済を排除し、都市へ強制移住を余技なくされた農民に人道的支援を行うほうが、好都合であったからである。

　　　コロンビアは「紛争後」時代に突入したが、土地問題は政府が採掘主義的経済発展を推進する限り、最も困難な課題であり続ける。停戦によって農民社会や先住民共同体は一時的な平安と日常生活を取り戻したが、これは彼らの生業の保証には至らない。FARCの武装解除ののち、新しい「合法的」アクターが元紛争地に関与を始めた。国内資本企業や多国籍企業が、新たな土地集積を通して輸出向け農作物の大型栽培や、地下資源の開発に関与することで、農民の土地剥奪の新しい脅威が生まれつつある。

　　　1991年の新憲法制定後、土地無し農民（または開拓民）や、先住民、アフロ系コミュニティはその生業を保護する一定の制度的枠組みに頼ることができた。農民保留地や、第三者による開発に対する事前協議の要請などである。FARCとの和平合意で調印された政策アジェンダは、政府の使命として「統合的農村開発」を推進することを強調している。しかし、脆弱な農民の権利を保護する既存のメカニズムは最近の土地に関する新しい法制度枠組みにおいてすべからく軽視され、彼らの土地アクセスへの権利は認められていない。反対に、新土地法案は明らかに既存の法的枠組みを、政府の開発パラダイムに沿った利害、ひいてはグローバル資本の利益に沿った形に「調整」しようとしている。

　　　最後に、今後の考察課題をあげつつ本小論を締めくくることにする。

1）アグロインダストリーと農民に対する雇用創出機会としての協同組合結成の推進を謳う農業政策は、同国の食糧安全保障を弱体化するだろう。

2）輸出向け農作物の大規模栽培プロジェクトのために「バルディオ」を集積することは、環境破壊をさらに進め、生物多様性保護区の生態系の破壊につながるだろう。

3）現在の方針が進めば、いわゆる農民経済は早晩消滅するだろう。独自のテリトリーに基盤を置く農民の文化的アイデンティティも消滅するだろう。彼らの経済的状況は、貨幣的価値においてはある一定程度の改善をみるかもしれないが、これまで育んできた地域のテリトリーにおける自治や社会的エージェンシーを確立することはもはやできなくなるだろう。

4）これらの懸念材料を前に、そして、すでに始まっている選挙キャンペーンの真っただ中にあって、和平合意において約束された政策アジェンダは真摯に進められるのだろうか。

表 2：コロンビアにおける土地所有に関する法制度と政治体制の変遷

法（制定年）	内容	政治動向（括弧内は年）
200（1936）	「土地法」占有証書による土地所有の保護	自由党勢力と保守党勢力間の対立の中での寡頭支配。ロペス・プマレッホ（1934 〜 38）
100（1944）	小作契約法	ロペス・プマレッホ（1942 〜 45）
		「ラ・ビオレンシア」（内戦）（1948 〜 60 年代初頭）
		ロハス軍政（1953 〜 57）；軍事評議会（1957 〜 58）；「国民戦線」期（1958 〜 1974）
135（1961）	農地改革法 INCORA（コロンビア農地改革庁）設立	ジェラス・R（1966 〜 70）
1（1968）	官製の農民組織 ANUC（全国農民使用者協会）促進	
		パストラーナ・B（1970 〜 74）；「チコラル協定」（1972）
4（1973）	接収規定の改訂	
5（1973）	農牧融資基金の設立	
D¹ 2057/1269（1976）	DRI-PAN² 開設	ロペス・ミケルセン（1974 〜 78）
		トゥルバイ（1978 〜 82）
D¹（1982）	PNR³（国家復興計画）	ベタンクール（1982 〜 86）
30（1988）	DRI-PAN を推進	バルコ（1986 〜 90）
69（1993）	農牧保険システム導入。	ガビリア（1990 〜 94）
160（1994）	新農地改革法（ZRC 規定）	サンペール（1994 〜 98）
		パストラーナ（1998 〜 2002）
D¹ 1292（2003）	INCORA 廃止 INCODER（コロンビア農村開発庁）設立	ウリベ（2002 〜 2010）
1448（2011）	犠牲者補償・土地返還法	サントス（2010 〜　）
D¹ 1850（2016）	INCODER 廃止、ANT（国家土地管理庁）と農村開発庁を新設	
1776（2016）	ZIDRES 法	

注：

1. D= デクレト（政令）。他はすべて Ley= 法律。

2.「統合的農村開発」（Desarrollo Rural Integral）および「国民食糧・栄養計画」（Plan Nacional de Alimentación y Nutrición）

3. Plan Nacional de Rehabilitación

出典：Arango(1988), Machado (1998), Thomson (2011), Zamosc (1986) などより筆者作成。

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Struggles Over the Expropriation of Urban Space: The Case of Osaka

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Introduction

(1)　Neoliberal Urbanism and Revanchist Urbanism

The past few decades of global capitalist development have seen rapid urbanization and the spatial reorganization of inner cities. There has been two interrelated aspects in this global urbanization. The first aspect is neoliberalism. That is, recent urbanization has been spurred on by distinctly neoliberal urban policies, like gentrification, privatization, and large–scale exhibitions, or "mega events." These urban policies have, on the one hand, concentrated wealth in the hands of a few, while also imposing unemployment and poverty on lower–class workers and minorities. But these marginal groups have also been plagued by another consequence of urbanization. I call this aspect "revanchism." This concept combines two meanings, that of "taking back lost land" and "revenge." The first refers to the trend of the violent expulsion of groups like the working poor and homeless from the city through measures like eviction; this trend is driven on by the widespread notion that these groups have "stolen" urban space, especially the inner city. The second meaning of "revanchism" is expressed by the naked hostility displayed towards leftists and minorities, and how that hostility has manifested into heavy–handed and violent urban policies.

These two aspects of urbanization, neoliberal urbanism and revanchist urbanism, are visible trends in urban spaces across the globe. However, we can expect that the way these processes are structured, as well as the conditions they have produced, differ from city to city. Today's presentation will deal with this theme of global and local, and uses the example of Osaka to explore how neoliberal urbanization and revanchism play out in practice.

(2) The Class Structure of Urban Space and its Restructuring

Post–war Osaka saw rapid urban expansion due to the power of industrialization and suburbanization, due especially to the urban transformation that accompanied the opening of the Japan World Exposition in 1970. This process distributed the benefits of rapid economic development amongst much of the urban population of Osaka, yet also produced new divisions of wealth in the urban geography. This uneven development in Osaka was expressed in the differences between the northern and southern sections of the city. That is, economic and political activity was concentrated in the Naka–no–shima area, located in the traditional north of Osaka. Additionally, there was a great expansion of suburban housing for the expanding middleclass who worked in these jobs, located behind the mercantile hub around Umeda. In contrast

to the development in northern Osaka, the inner–city area of southern Osaka saw the formation of a dense proletarian living space. The geographical center of this area was the Kamagasaki (Yoseba). Kamagasaki became an area for day laborers during the process of urban transformation that came with the 1970 Japan World Expo, and was formed as migrant laborers came to Osaka from farming villages. Into this roughly one square kilometer space were packed over 200 *doya* flop houses, which housed over 30,000 day laborers. Kamagasakai thus became an area where hard labor, exploitation, unstable living, poverty, and other expressions of the myriad contradictions of urban life were concentrated.

The 1970 Japan World Expo was held at the peak of the period of high economic growth. In the decade that followed, a recession spread across the city, and industrialization and suburbanization — the cornerstones of the urbanization project — came to a standstill. By the 1980s, Osaka saw the beginnings neoliberal urbanism. However, this process of neoliberal reorganization was by no means smooth. First, there were advances and setbacks based on the economic climate. Second, neoliberal urbanism faced encountered fierce resistance. The forces of urban development emanating from the north of Osaka collided with that of the proletariat of the south, producing repeated struggles. Below, I will lay out the development of neoliberal urbanism and the resistance it provoked over three time periods. In due course we will see how these resulted in the revanchist city.

1.   Struggles Over the Expropriation of Urban Space

(1) The 1980s: Beginnings of Neoliberal Urbanism

In the 1980s, the financial sector and local municipalities undertook policies known as Event Orientd Policy, which consisted of urban development driven by large scale projects, or so–called "mega events." Holding up as their model the kind of urban space produced for the 1970 World Expo, such Event Orientd Policy sought to transform the entire urban space of Osaka along the lines of the Exhibition grounds. Kansai International Airport, which opened in 1994, was likened to the World Expo grounds as the front door to the city. Additionally, much of the city's coastal region, which had fallen into disuse due to the shrinking volume of material shipping, was rebranded as "waterfront" property, and saw ever–growing large–scale development. The opening of the Asia–Pacific World Trade Center in 1994 epitomizes the kind of development of this era.

The true spirit of Event Oriented Policy was most visible in the example of Tennoji Park. Following an exhibition held in Tennoji Park in 1987, the entire park was closed to the public for renovations. When it reopened in 1990, the park was now enclosed by a fence and had paid admission. The purpose of these changes was to elevate the image of Tennoji Park as the "Southern Door" to Osaka city proper, which greeted visitors after they arrived in Osaka from Kansai International Airport. The residents of Kamagasaki who had previously used the park – in other words, the day laborers and homeless – were deemed "undesirables" and excluded from the park space. In response to this transformation of Tennoji Park, formal objections were raised, first by the Kamagasaki labor unions and their supporters, then later from a vast segment of the urban population. More than anything else, these objections demanded to know just who the Tennoji Park belonged to.

In this way, the incipient neoliberal urban transformation had met an obstacle in mid–1990s. Osaka was in the midst of a drawn–out recession, and large infrastructure projects driven by public/private

partnerships had resulted in the accumulation of large amounts of debt. Moreover, following the failed 2001 bid to have Osaka host the Olympics, the energy of Event Oriented Policy was forced into an inevitable retreat.

(2) The 2000s: The Strengthening/Advance of Neoliberal Urbanism

Despite these setbacks, however, by the mid–2000s, new life was being breathed into event–based urban development. The timing of this change overlapped with the neoliberal reforms undertaken by the Koizumi administration at the national level. Therefore, Event Orientd Policy which sought profit through urban development, saw a strengthening of its neoliberal characteristics. At the same time, a crucial change had occurred in the Kamagasakai district. Due to the recession of the 1990s, many day laborers were deprived of both work and housing. These workers were scattered to the city's parks and river banks, where they erected tents to live in. Tent villages soon cropped up in parks across the city; these parks subsequently became a space for squatters. With this situation in the background, the forces of neoliberal urbanism met with resistance from squatters throughout the city.

To give a concrete example: in 2006, with the opening of the World Rose Convention, the tent villages of Utsubo Park and Osaka Castle Park, located in the center of the city, were forcibly dismantled. The next year, city authorities took the opportunity of the 2007 World Championships in Athletics to forcibly demolish the tent village in Nagai Park, located in the suburbs in the south of Osaka. In both cases, urban space was rendered safe for large exhibitions under the name of "Park Renovation." These forcible removals led to a storm of protest from the squatters and their supporters. For example, during the forcible removal of the Nagai tent city in 2007, these individuals erected a large stage to voice their indignation.

Yet despite this fierce resistance, the squatters were ultimately expelled from parks across the city. What I'd like to emphasize here is that, the Event Oriented Policy of this era had as its objective the "taking back" park space from the squatters. As mentioned in the beginning, "revanchism" contains the meaning of both "taking back lost land" and "revenge." In this era, we see the "taking back lost land" aspect make its first appearance.

(3) From Neoliberalism to Revanchism

The strengthened neoliberal urbanism of the 2000s has passed through the 2008 financial crises and 3/11 to today, where it is conquering the city with renewed force. The start of the policies of Hashimoto Tōru in particular represent the fulfillment of the past decades of neoliberal urbanism. Hashimoto Tōru has clearly demonstrated his hostility to the left, and has made no attempts to hide his sexism or exclusionism. It is precisely this animosity that reveals the revanchism of neoliberal urbanism. That is, Hashimoto's arrival has brought together the two aspects of revanchist urbanism: the taking back lost land, and vengeance against its enemies. Using heavy–handed measures, Hashimoto has initiated policies to make the city into a competitive corporate body [to run the city like a corporation]; in other words, we have seen the hardening of an entrepreneurial attitude for city governance.

a) Concerning the Status of Public Space in the City

Under the current city government, we have seen an unprecedented push to transform urban space into sources of profit. Hashimoto has introduced the same "Business Improvement District" policies

developed in New York City under Rudolph Giuliani. These policies privilege the operation and administration of public space by joint enterprises among private corporations. Regarding public parks, BID policies have been implemented through a kind of organization called PMO, or Park Management Organization. As a result, the administration of crucial sections of Tennoji Park has been entrusted to Kintetsu Real Estate. Another example is the administration of Osaka Castle Park, which has been entrusted to the Dentsū Corporation. Inside the park grounds, shopping malls have been established one after the other, containing stores like Starbucks. As mentioned in the opening, the Event Oriented Policy initiatives of the 1980s aimed to transform the city scape of Osaka along the lines of the 1970 Japan World Expo grounds. Now, we see the widespread accomplishment of these policies.

b) Concerning the Condition of Kamagasaki

Hand in hand with the aforementioned policies, Hashimoto has developed a program known as "Nishinari Special District Plan" to deal with the Kamagasaki area. In tandem with calls for proposals from various groups to act in a public/private partnership, the city has increased the number of security cameras in the area and executed more forcible removals of squatters from city parks. More than anything else, the goal of this "Nishinari Special District Plan" is to signal that Kamagasaki is now open for development. Under this policy, the likelihood that Kamagasaki will see rapid gentrification has increased dramatically. Recently, a large section of city property touching the Kamagasaki district was thrown onto the market and purchased by the luxury hotel company Hoshino Resorts. When a high–class hotel is established here, it will vastly speed up the gentrification of Kamagasaki. And yet, the voices raised in opposition to this plan have been ever shrinking.

Conclusion

According to the geographer David Harvey, the relative importance of the expropriation of land and property for global capitalism has vastly increased. Harvey calls this "accumulation by dispossession." The dual characteristics of urbanization identified here, neoliberal urbanism and revanshist urbanism, can be said to be concrete examples of this accumulation by dispossession. Supplementing one another, these two aspects of urbanization have produced a rise in the trend that sees urban space and nothing more than a source of profit. The Osaka of today is fast becoming a space where the existence of the working poor is not permitted. Now, all cities may be said to have their own unique characteristics. For example, we can say that Osaka had a unique trajectory in the fact that the slogan of "Event Oriented Policy" had been raised as early as the 1980s, and that through different twists and turns large–scale events kept occurring until today. The process of urbanization in a particular city can play out in many ways based on its unique social and historical context. To understand the movements of global capitalism, it is essential that we remain aware of such regional peculiarities while also paying attention to the similarities shared by cities across the globe. In Japan today, under the climate of an ever–shrinking opposition to the forces of dispossession and the waning of a once–critical urban studies, it is more important than ever to take such a global and local view.

translated by Michael Abele (Harvard University)

都市空間の略奪をめぐる抗争
——大阪のケース・スタディ

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1.　　はじめに

（1）新自由主義的アーバニズムと報復主義的アーバニズム

　　過去数十年のグローバル資本主義の発展は、世界の急激な都市化や、都市内部の空間再編を伴うものであった。この世界規模の都市化には、相互に関連する 2 つの側面がある。ひとつには、新自由主義の側面である。すなわち新たな都市化は、ジェントリフィケーション政策や私営化、メガイベントの開催といった、新自由主義特有の都市政策によって突き動かされる。これらの都市政策は、一方で少数の者に富をいっそう集中させ、他方で下層の労働者やマイノリティの住民に失業や貧困といった状況を押しつける。さらに、かれら労働者や住民は、都市化のもうひとつの側面によって、いっそうの苦境にたたされている。すなわち、revanchism の側面である。この言葉は、「失地回復」と「報復」という 2 つの意味をあわせもつ。前者は、都市——とりわけ都心部やインナーシティ——が貧しい労働者階級や「ホームレス」によって「盗まれた」という感覚を蔓延させながら、立ち退き（eviction）等によって暴力的にかれらを都市から追い払おうとする趨勢を指す。後者は、左派やマイノリティに対する剥き出しの敵意と、それがもたらす強権的・暴力的な都市政策を指している。

　　この 2 つの側面、すなわち「新自由主義的アーバニズム（neoliberal urbanism）」と「報復主義的アーバニズム（revanchist urbanism）」は、世界のさまざまな都市でみられる趨勢である。しかしながら、これら両側面が形成されていく過程や、それらが互いに結びつく様態は、都市によって異なるだろう。本報告は、このような問題意識のもと、大阪を事例として新自由主義と revanchism の両側面がいかに形成されたのかを検証する。

（2）都市空間の階級的構成とその再編

　　戦後の大阪は、とりわけ 1970 年に開催された日本万国博覧会に伴う都市改造によって、工業化と郊外化という都市化の力を急激に拡張させた。それは、都市住民の多くに高度経済成長の恩恵を配分しつつも、都市空間内に新たな分断を刻み込む過程であった。大阪における発展の不均等性は、南北の格差として表現される。すなわち、中之島一帯など旧市街地北部には経済的機能や行政的機能が集中された。また北部の商業中心地・梅田を起点とし、その後背地に広大なミドルクラス向けの郊外住宅地が開発されていった。他方でこれとはまったく対照的に、旧市街地南部のインナーシティでは、プロレタリアの空間が分厚く形成された。その地理的中心に位置するのは、寄せ場・釜ヶ崎である。釜ヶ崎は、70 年万博に向けた都市改造のなかで日雇労働力の供給地となり、農村から都市へともたらされる移民労働者の集積地となった。わずか 1㎢ のエリアには 200 軒を超えるドヤが密集させられ、そこに 3 万人以上の日雇い労働者が詰め込まれた。こうして釜ヶ崎は、過酷な労働や搾取、不安定居住や貧困といった都市の諸矛盾を凝縮させた空間となったのである。

　　　70 年万博は、高度経済成長の絶頂であり、その限界でもあった。万博開催後の 1970 年代には、不況が都市をおおい、工業化と郊外化を基軸とした都市化の過程は頓挫した。こうした時代を経た 1980 年代に、大阪における新自由主義的アーバニズムが始動していった。しかしながら新自由主義的な都市再編の過程は、決してスムーズに進んだのではない。第 1 に、それは経済の好不況にあわせて、前進と後退を繰り返した。第 2 に、この過程はときに激しい抵抗に直面した。北部を起点として広がろうとする都市開発の力は、南部からもたらされるプロレタリアの力と衝突し、抗争が繰り広げられたのである。以下では、3 つの時期に区分し、新自由主義的アーバニズムの展開とそれが引き起こした抗争を概観するとともに、やがてそれが revamnchism を結実させていく過程を提示する。

2.　都市空間の略奪をめぐる抗争

(1) 1980 年代：新自由主義的アーバニズムの始動

　　　1980 年代の財界および自治体は、「イベント・オリエンテッド・ポリシー」と呼ばれる、メガイベントと都市開発を融合させた都市政策を始動させた。この政策は、70 年万博の会場を目指すべき都市空間のモデルとして掲げ、都市全体を万博会場へと改造することを目的とするものだった。1994 年に開港した関西国際空港は、万博会場として見立てられた都市の表玄関として位置づけられた。また、物流機能の縮小により遊休化した湾岸地域は新たに「ウォーターフロント」と名づけられ、大規模開発が繰り広げられた。94 年に開業したアジア太平洋ワールドトレードセンター (WTC) は、この時期の開発を象徴する建造物である。

　　　なかでも天王寺公園は、イベント・オリエンテッド・ポリシーの精神をもっとも明瞭にあらわす空間であった。1987 年、この公園を会場として天王寺博覧会が開催されたのち、公園は全面的に閉鎖され、改造された。そして 1990 年には、全面がフェンスで囲まれた有料公園へと姿を変えられたのである。その目的は、天王寺公園を関西国際空港から都心へといたる「大阪の南玄関」として位置づけ、そのイメージ向上させることであった。公園を利用する釜ヶ崎の住人――すなわち、日雇い労働者や野宿生活者――は「望まれざる客」とされ、かれらの存在は公園から締め出されたのである。この公園改造に対しては、釜ヶ崎の労働組合や支援団体をはじめ、幅広い市民からの異議申立ての声があげられた。これらの異議申し立ては、なにより、「公園は誰のものか」という問いを突き付けた。

　　　このようにして始動した新自由主義的な都市改造は、1990 年代半ばにいったん頓挫した。長引く不況のなか、第三セクター方式により開発された巨大インフラは、財政の足かせとなる巨額の負債へと転化した。さらに 2001 年にオリンピック誘致運動が失敗したことにより、イベント・オリエンテッド・ポリシーの勢いは、後退を余儀なくされたのである。

(2) 2000 年代：新自由主義的アーバニズムの強化

　　　しかしながら 2000 年代の半ばに、イベントと都市開発の融合はふたたび息を吹き返した。そのタイミングは、全国スケールでの小泉政権下による新自由主義的改革と重なり合っている。したがって、都市開発を利潤の源泉とするイベント・オリエンテッド・ポリシーは、新自由主義的な性格をいっそう強めた。他方で釜ヶ崎においても、重大な転換が起こった。90 年代の不況により、多数の日雇い労働者が一挙に職と住まいを奪われたのである。かれら労働者は、都市内にある公園や河川敷へと拡散し、自力でテントを建設していった。都市内の大小の公園にはテント村が建設され、都市公園全体がスクウォット空間へと転じられた。このような背景のもと、新自由主義的アーバニズムの力とスクウォット闘争が、全市的な規模で衝突した。

　　　具体的には、2006 年には世界バラ会議の開催をきっかけとして、都心部に位置する靱公園

および大阪城公園において、テント村に対する強制撤去が遂行された。また翌年の 2007 年には、世界陸上の開催をきっかけとして、南部の郊外住宅地に位置する長居公園のテント村に対し強制撤去が遂行された。いずれも「公園適正化」を名目としていたが、現実にはイベントの会場とすべく遂行された。これらの強制撤去に対しては、スクウォッターとその支援者からの、激しい抗議活動が巻き起こった。たとえば 2007 年の長居公園における強制撤去に際してかれらは、大がかりな芝居の舞台を建設し、強制撤去の不当性を訴えた。

　　　このような激しい抗議にもかかわらず、各公園からスクウォットは追い払われた。強調すべきは、この時期のイベント・オリエンテッド・ポリシーは、公園をスクウォッターから「取り戻す」ことを目的として展開したということである。冒頭で述べたように、revanchism には「失地回復」と「報復」というふたつの意味が込められている。このうち「失地回復」の側面が、この時期にはじめて姿を現わしたのだといえる。

（3）新自由主義から revanshicm へ

　　　2000 年代に入って強化された新自由主義的アーバニズムは、2008 年の金融危機や 2011 年の 3・11 に代表される危機的状況を経た現在、さらなる勢いで都市空間を席巻している。とりわけ橋下徹市政の誕生は、数十年をかけて形成されてきた新自由主義的アーバニズムの総仕上げであった。橋下徹は、左派に対する敵意をあらわにし、また露骨なセクシズムや排他主義をためらいなく表明した。このような敵意は、まさに「報復主義」を示すものである。つまり彼の登場によって、「失地回復主義」と「報復主義」から成る revanchism が完成されたのである。その強権的手法をもって、都市を競争的な企業体へと変えようとする改革、すなわち都市企業家主義は、いっそう強固にされた。

a）都市の公共空間をめぐる状況

　　　この市政下において、都市空間を利潤の源泉へと変えようとする施策は、かつてないほど大規模に繰り広げられた。橋下市政は、90 年代ニューヨークのジュリアーニ市政下で生み出された BID（Business Improvement District：ビジネス改善地区 ）を導入した。すなわち、公共空間の管理・運営主体を私企業の共同事業体に委ねようとする施策である。公園に関しては、BID の手法が PMO（Park Management Organization：パーク・マネジメント事業体 ）という形態で適用された。その帰結として、天王寺公園の主要部分の管理運営は近鉄不動産に委託された。また、大阪城公園はその全域の管理・運営が、電通をはじめとする共同事業体へと委託された。これらの公園内には、スターバックスコーヒーなどを擁するショッピングモールが、次々と建設されつつある。前述したように、1980 年代のイベント・オリエンテッド・ポリシーは、都市全体を博覧会場へと転化することを目論むものだった。その目論見が、現在、大々的に実現されている。

b）釜ヶ崎をめぐる状況

　　　上記の施策と並行して、橋下徹は、釜ヶ崎に対しては「西成特区構想」を打ち出した。このプログラムにおいては、諸団体からの提案を重視する官民協働路線と並行して、監視カメラの増設、公園における強制撤去などの施策が遂行された。なにより重要なのは、この「西成特区構想」が、釜ヶ崎の開発可能性を広く知らせるシグナルとなったことである。この状況下で、釜ヶ崎におけるジェントリフィケーションの可能性は急速に高まりつつある。釜ヶ崎に隣接する広大な公有地は市場へと売りに出され、高級リゾート「星野リゾート」が買い取った。この高級ホテルが建設されたあかつきには、釜ヶ崎におけるジェントリフィケーションが一挙に加速するだろう。しかし、ジェントリフィケーションに反対す

る声は、いちじるしく少数化されつつある。

3.　　おわりに

　　　デヴィッド・ハーヴェイは、グローバル資本主義においては土地や資産の強奪といった次元が比重を増大させていると指摘し、これを「略奪による蓄積」と呼んだ。新自由主義的アーバニズムと報復主義的アーバニズムという都市化の両側面は、その具体的事例であるといえよう。この 2 つの側面が補い合うことで、都市空間の領有によりレントを抽出する趨勢は、いっそう高められる。かくして現在の大阪では、貧しい労働者の存在を許さぬような空間が、急速に拡大しつつある。他方で、それぞれの都市には固有の経緯もあるだろう。たとえば、はやくも 1980 年代から「イベント・オリエンテッド・ポリシー」というスローガンが掲げられ、その後もかわるがわるメガイベントが繰り返された点は、大阪という都市に固有の経緯といえるかもしれない。都市化の過程は、その都市が置かれた文脈によって、じつに多様でありうる。そのような過程の多様性を認識しつつ、さまざまな都市に共通する力を見出していくことが、グローバル資本主義の動態を認識するために欠かせない視座となるだろう。略奪に対する抗議が少数化させられ、都市研究の領域でも批判的な力が失われつつある日本国内の状況において、このような視座を確立することは、なおさら重要な課題である。

Politics of Land Acquisition in Contemporary India

Hiroshi SATO
(Contemporary political history of South Asia)

1.　Land acquisition in India, past and present

Since the times when meek sheep devoured men to the present day, expropriation of farmers' lands, and the diversion of agricultural lands into use for other industries have been the most violent turmoil in the age of industrial transformation. Marxist would call this historical process as "primitive accumulation."

Right from the colonial days, the Indian state had recourse to the principle of "eminent domain" and enacted Land Acquisition Act of 1894 (LAA in short) for public acquisition of land properties. When imperial capital was shifted from Calcutta to Delhi in 1911, it was with the force of this law that Britishers built a grand new capital over the vast farmlands.

An Anglo–American legal lexicon defines "Eminent domain" as;

"Right to acquisition, public acquisition, expropriation; an entitlement and exercise thereof by a government or an entity so deemed, of forcibly acquiring the property right of other governments or private persons.[1]"

In India, the right of acquisition has been exercised by the Union i.e. the Central government and the state governments. The independent India's Constitution apportions "Land" to the list of State legislative subjects, while "Property acquisition" is allotted to the list of Concurrent subjects, on which both Central and state governments can make laws. Politics of land acquisition thus straddles Union (Central) and states administration.

Although LAA has a section on Hearing of Objections (Section 5A) against state acquisition, District Collectors, the competent authority of land acquisition, have largely dismissed objections on the plea of "public purpose." Post–Independent public projects, including hydro–power reservoirs, irrigation canals, highways, and new industrial estates entailed huge scale of evictions, with no consideration to due compensation for life and property.

It wasn't until late 1980s that state action was called into question. First major protest was initiated by a movement against a dam construction over the Narmada River in central India. Narmada Bachao Andolan (NBA, Save Narmada Movement) was led by a woman social activist, Medha Patkar.

Later in the 1990s, economic liberalization policy initiated by the Indian National Congress (INC) party in 1991 boosted demand for lands not only by public entities, but also by private enterprises.

In 2006 Union and state governments launched Special Economic Zone (SEZ) program which in-

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1 Tanaka, Hideo (ed.) *Dictionary of Anglo American Law* (in Japanese), Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 1991, pp. 292-3.

volved acquisition on much larger scale to accommodate estates for information technology, energy, infra-structure and multi–purpose projects. In the urban neighborhoods, greedy estate dealers, in collusion with the local politicians, bought at concessionary price or simply usurped large chunks of state–acquired lands which, once developed, brought them exorbitant profits.

Land Conflicts Watch (LCW), a vigilante journalists' organization reports that currently in India there are 537 disputes relating to land acquisition, involving 7,338,232 people and 2,143,119 ha of lands (21,432 km^2 , 0.65% of total area of the country and a bit larger than *Shikoku* Island in Japan)[2].

LCW classifies sources of disputes into six categories; industry, infrastructure, land use, mining, power and protected areas. At the turn of the century, India apparently needed a law to enforce fair and due process for public land acquisition.

Against this backdrop, a land dispute over a car factory project of the Tata Motors Ltd. (TML) in West Bengal worked as catalyst for a new legislation.

2.　A land dispute that blew up the Left-Front government in West Bengal

It all started with an announcement in June 2006 by the West Bengal government that it intended to set up TML's One Lakh (100 thousand) Rupee Small Car factory in Singur Thana (County) in Hoogly District, some 30 km NE of Calcutta city.

The then state government led by the Left Front coalition, with the Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPI–M) being a dominant partner, had just emerged victorious in May state assembly elections. This was their seventh consecutive win since 1977. The government largely supported by rural electorate with its successful tenancy reforms and vigorous input in agricultural production, sought to reorient economic policy toward more industrialization to provide jobs and alleviate massive unemployment.

Despite the economic rationale behind the policy, decision was rather hasty. 90 per cent of the proposed 997 acres (400 ha) site was a single–crop farm land and the remaining 10 per cent was rich dou-ble–cropping field. Agitation against acquisition started in October with local general strikes and demon-strations. It was led by the Trinamul (Grass–root) Congress (TC), a splinter party from the INC and the dominant opposition in the state.

The state government through the agency of West Bengal Industrial Development Corporation (WBIDC) sped up the process and started paying compensation in December. Farmers and TC stood firm with their newly formed "Committee to Save Farm Lands (Krishi Bhumi Raksha Committee)". Rich farm-ers who invested in tube–wells found state compensation highly inadequate while poor agricultural work-ers losing jobs got no compensation. In December 2006 site was transferred to the TML, and after a suit in High Court lost in 2007, a violent phase started. The Committee resorted to physical obstruction. In return TML started removing machines and other equipment from January 2008 and finally declared withdrawal on the 3rd October 2008 (meanwhile the TML sought another location in Gujarat).

West Bengal at the same time was hit with another land dispute in the East Midnapore District. A petrochemical SEZ was planned in Nandigram Thana of the district and was fiercely opposed by the local people. In July 2007 fourteen people were fatally shot by the police and the state government had to con-cede their high–handedness in dealing with the SEZ turmoil.

The twin incidents of Singur and Nandigram testified to the crucial importance of land acquisition

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2 http://landconflictswatch, retrieved on Dec. 25, 2017.

in promoting industrialization, but grass–root party conflicts deeply embedded in West Bengal rural politics also aggravated the relation between state government and farmers[3]. In the Assembly elections held in May 2011, Left Front was defeated by the TC and 34 years of left rule in West Bengal came to an end[4].

Lesson was obvious. Colonial and obsolete LAA had to be dismantled and (to be) replaced by a new comprehensive legislation. This awareness led to a totally remodeled land acquisition act in 2013 under the INC–led coalition called United Progressive Alliance (UPA). Before examining the details of the 2013 law, the subsequent story of the Tata Car factory is briefly narrated.

3.　　Narendra Modi of Gujarat intervened

Four days after the TML announced withdrawal from Singur, TML Chairman Ratan Tata and Gujarat Chief Minister Narendra Modi held a joint press conference and declared Nano factory to be relocated to Sanand in Gujarat.

Modi was then stigmatized as a Hindu communalist for his role in the anti–Muslim pogrom in the early 2002. He expected that the invitation to Tata would improve his image as a pro–business performer[5]. Factory was completed within fourteen months and the first assembled car came out in June 2010. Extraordinary was not only the Modi government's swift action but the bountiful agreement of the state government with the TML. Agreement remained out of public eyes for several years only to be disclosed four years later by investigative journalists[6].

- Government offered one thousand acres of farmlands in Sanand (almost similar in size to the Singur factory site) with additional hundred acres for a township near Ahmedabad.
- Acquisition was announced on the 4th December 2009. Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation put the price at four times the market price which it sold TML at 3.6 million rupees per acre. Total cost for land amounted to four billion Rupees which TML was to pay in eight installments at 8 percent interest. Whereas in West Bengal, land was leased for 90 years at the annual rent of ten million rupees for the first year, with staged increase over 90 years.
- Government assured over 20 years a 95 billion Rupees loan with 0.1% interest, against TML's total investment of 20 billion Rupees. West Bengal government offered only a 2 billion Rupee soft loan. This was the most generous part of the Gujarat offer, as it offered in the case of Ford Motors, only 280 million Rupees loan with 10 % interest.

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3 West Bengal rural politics is highly politicized in the sense that among 240 members of the lowest strata of representative council, i.e. Gram Panchayats in Singur Block, only 4 were independents, whereas Trinamul Congress had 147 and Communist Party of India (Marxist) had 70 members. (http://www.wbsec.gov.in/(S(k4h01355jkwxa445utzspa2h))/FinalResult/FinalResult_gp_2013.aspx)

4 The suit for recovering Singur lands continued even afterwards. In August 2016, Supreme Court of India reached a verdict that Government didn't follow the procedure for acquisition laid down in LAA and ordered lands to be returned to the owners. One of the two ruling judges declared that Government acquisition of lands for the TML could not be regarded as "public purposes" (*Kedar Nath Yadav v. Govt of West Bengal,* https://www.legallyindia.com/supreme-court/legally-explained-why-the-sc-struck-down-the-singur-land-acquisition-and-what-it-means-via-mint-20160906-7942).

5 Mukhopadhyay. Nilanjan, *Narendra Modi, the man, the times*, Chennai: Tanquebar Press, 2013, p. 363; Sardesai, Rajdeep, *2014 the Election that changed India,* Gurgaon: Penguin Books India, 2014, pp.32-3.

6 On Government -TML agreement, see Telegraph (Kolkata), 21 Jan/ 2009; "Lure of public money many times its investment made Tata shift plant to Gujarat", 8 Oct. 2013, https://centreleftindia.wordpress.com/2013/10/08/lure-of-free-public-money-many-times-its-investment-made-tata-shift-nano-plant-to-gujarat-not-modis-newly-created-industrial-climate/ "Big scam with small car", 7 Aug. 2013, https://trythofgujarat.com/big-scam-with-small-car/(retrieved on 13 Dec. 2017).

- Preferential treatment as regards taxation, cess, electric power, water and sewerage was equally applied in TML case too.
- No commitment on jobs, although local preferential employment is a norm in Gujarat industrial policy.

With the TML coming in, Sanand has become a sort of auto–hub and such major car makers as Ford, Peugeot and Maruti started their projects in Gujarat.

Modi's dealing with the TML was much appreciated by business and industry. Consulting agencies' surveys on deregulation and "ease of doing business" in major Indian states ranked Gujarat high, especially in dealing with environment clearance and land acquisition[7]. It goes without saying that this one–size–fits–all approach to the "ease of doing business" ignores the diverse contexts of development in different states.

4.   Land Acquisition Law of 2013 by UPA government

Story of the Tata factory illustrated a contrasting picture of acquisition policy and its outcome in the two states. It is tempting to think that Gujarat managed better, but the entire process in Gujarat was "voiceless" while West Bengal's alleged "failure" was due to abundant "voice." What was common in both cases was that the public acquisition regime under the colonial law (LAA) had little room for accommodating the "voice" of the farmers and landowners.

To cope with the recurrent land disputes, the UPA government enacted in 2013 an entirely new law on land acquisition, "Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act (LARR in short)". The word "Right" is notable, as the act was one of the "rights–based" laws the UPA government enacted between 2004 and 2014 (See Table below). On UPA's politics of rights, we shall discuss it later in the concluding part.

Table: Rights-based legislation by UPA government (2004-09, 09-14)

- The Right of Information Act 2005
- Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act 2005
- The Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act 2009
- The Right of Citizens for Time bound Delivery of Goods and Services and Redressal of their Grievances Bill 2011
- The National Food Security Act 2013
- The Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act 2013
- Lokpal and Lokayukta Act 2013

LARR has 114 sections in 13 chapters with four schedules, whereas old LAA had only fifty–odd clauses. Provisions are related to the whole process of land acquisition, beginning from consent of land owners, social impact assessment (SIA), preservation of multi–cropping or irrigated lands, procedure of acquisition, resettlement and rehabilitations, and finally to disputes settlement mechanism.

Most dissatisfying provisions for the business interests were the ones for the need of prior consent and social impact assessment. They opposed LARR, alleging that land acquisition was made practi-

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7 *Survey of Business Regulatory Environment for Manufacturing - State Level Assessment, Vol. I, Final Report; Vol. II State Specific Findings* (Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion, DIPP Home Page, retrieved on 19 June 2015); *Best Practices to Improve the Business Environment across India*. Accenture, May 2014.

cally impossible due to these safeguards.

LARR may look too restrictive, cumbersome and time–consuming, but the practice under the old law (LAA) often entailed abuse of "public purpose", and/or excessive acquisition over the actual need of the projects. Safeguards in LARR were designed to make executives more responsive to the rights of land-owners and make them more circumspect in exercising administrative authority.

A year after LARR was enacted, India held the 16th Parliamentary (Lower House) elections in early 2014. Opposition Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) led by no other (person) than Narendra Modi, who invited TML car factory as the Chief Minister of Gujarat, won a landslide victory over the UPA, with strong backing from the business interests.

5.　Amendment proposal of 2013 Land Acquisition Law by Modi government

The Modi government set to amend LARR immediately after assuming office. Though BJP had comfortable majority in the Lower House, INC kept majority in the Upper House. On the last day of 2014, the Modi government issued a Presidential Ordinance to amend LARR, bypassing the parliament.

The core of the amendment was to exempt safeguard provisions of consent of land owners, social impact assessment and preservation of multi–cropped and irrigated agricultural lands, in case acquisition was necessitated for five specified purposes. Exemptions are;

a) national security, defence, any area related with defence production

b) rural infrastructure including electrification

c) affordable housing, housing for the poor

d) industrial corridors by government or related agencies, area within one kilometer of both sides of their (corridors') dedicated railways and roads

e) Public Private Partnership projects (where land rights rest on the government)

Amendment by the government incidentally kept provisions for price of lands, resettlement or re-habilitation untouched. Core concern of the government and business was with the safeguards of consent and social impact assessment. Making "doing business" easier had been the hallmark of the Modi admin-istration since his days as Gujarat Chief Minister. With Modi crowned in New Delhi, the "Gujarat model" became a national model every state had to emulate.

> "With these amendments, the objectives of the 2013 law which was to limit the mechanism of forced acquisition has been undermined significantly. ……With this one step the ruling party (BJP) had returned us to the days of the British enacted law where our citizens enjoyed no say in their development [8]"

But the discontents of farmers forced the NDA government to retreat. Farmers' bodies claimed that the five exemptions were so vaguely defined as to allow arbitrary interpretations. In March 2015, Modi had to let the presidential ordinance lapse and in the following parliamentary session, presented a bill with almost the same content. But this bill is yet to get parliamentary sanction.

After an unsuccessful attempt to amend LARR in the Parliament, the NDA government started

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8 Ramesh, Jairam and Muhammad Ali Khan, *Legislating for Justice, the making of the 2013 Land Acquisition Law*, New Delhi Oxford University Press, 2015, p. 128.

encouraging state governments to amend LARR exactly in the same way as it tried to do (note that states have also power to amend "land" laws). BJP–ruled states like Gujarat, Haryana, Goa and Rajasthan quickly responded and modified respective land acquisition laws along the lines of the central amendment.

Conclusion

The politics of land acquisition so far narrated centered around two interrelated themes; states' varied experiences on land acquisition and contrasting approach toward law reforms on land acquisition under two different political combinations; one led by INC and another by BJP. By way of conclusion, we will locate the narrative in a wider context of political economy in contemporary India.

Land, labour and Farmers' discontent

First of all, farmers' dissent has to be understood in connection with specific features of industrial transformation in India since the 1990s. Most characteristically the decline of agriculture in national economy has not been accompanied with corresponding decline in rural work force. Seventy percent of the total population still remain in rural areas, while agriculture's share in GDP decreased from 30% to 18% after two decades of liberalization. On the other hand, growth in the secondary and tertiary sectors has not been so vigorous nor in a way as to absorb fresh work force from the rural areas in large quantity. We do not go into details, as the matter needs deeper analysis, but, dim prospect for non–agricultural jobs is certainly a factor for farmers' unwillingness to part with their fragmented and uneconomic holdings. Further, the farmers from experience for the last decades learned that the land price soared after acquisition and they ended up feeling deprived by the low rate of compensation.

Politics of Rights, a mere political expediency?

Neo–liberal reforms in India started in early 1990s under the INC rule, and subsequently NDA and UPA, two coalitions led by BJP and INC respectively have framed their policy within the neo–liberal regime. We have witnessed a sort of "competitive neo–liberalism" in Indian politics. Apparently the case of INC's politics of rights and land acquisition law reform does not fit in this pattern, as the two coalitions substantially differ in their outlook.

Our case on land acquisition law reforms poses a question if the difference is only of political expediency, or if even under the neo–liberal policy regime, space for policy divergence could grow under certain circumstances, and finally if the rights–based approach offers an alternative to the neo–liberal policy regime.

Further exploration on the land acquisition in contemporary India along these lines will certainly enrich our studies on Indian political economy.

インドにおける土地収用の政治学

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1.　インドの土地収用問題 ―歴史と現在―

　　　おとなしい羊が人間を貪り食う時代から今日まで、農地の他産業への転用、農民からの土地の収奪は産業構造転換の時代を象徴する激動であった。インドでは植民地統治時代から、政府の土地収用権を優先的に認める Eminent domain 論とそれに立脚した Land Acquisition Act 1894（以下 LAA）にもとづいて、政府による土地収用が実施されてきた。

　　　1911 年に首都がカルカッタからデリーに移転された際、広大な土地に新しい都市が建設されたのは、この法律の力によるものであった。

　　　法律辞典の定義によれば、Eminent domain は「収用権、公的収用、公用徴収、優越的所有権；政府またはこれに準ずるものが、私人または別の政府の財産権を強制的に取得する権限またはその行使」を意味する[1]。インドの場合、「政府」とは連邦と州の政府であり、独立後のインド憲法では、Land は州管轄事項だが、Land acquisition は連邦と州の共同管轄事項である。土地収用には連邦政府と州政府が関わる。

　　　LAA には収用措置への県徴税官（District Collector）への異議申し立ては規定されているものの、多くの場合、異議は「公共目的」を理由に却下されてきた。インド独立後のダム、灌漑水路、道路、新工業都市建設などによる立ち退きは、補償すら不十分なまま強行されてきた。1980 年代末に至って、そうした状況に一石を投じたのがナルマダー川のダム建設に異議を唱えた「ナルマダーを救え運動（Narmada Bachao Andolan, NBA）」であった。

　　　さらに 1991 年の経済自由化以降、民間企業の土地需要の増大もあって、政府による土地収用は、各地で土地所有者との軋轢を生じさせることになった。2006 年の経済特区（Special Economic Zone, SEZ）制度の導入も、広大な面積におよぶ多目的特区や、エネルギー、インフラ関連の特区プロジェクトに転用される農地の収用をめぐって、住民や農民と政府、企業との摩擦を引き起こした。大都市の周辺農村では、公的な土地収用に便乗して、収用された土地の一部を有力不動産会社が政治的コネによって入手したうえ、高層マンション住宅用地に転用して法外な利益を手にするといった、不公正な企業行動もみられる。

　　　土地紛争を系統的に監視しているジャーナリストらによる団体 Land Conflicts Watch（LCW）によれば、全国で土地収用をめぐって 537 件の紛争が生じており、7,338,232 人が関わり、総面積は2,143,119 ha（=21,432 ㎢、全土の 0.65%；四国よりもやや広い面積）に及ぶという[2]。LCW の分類では、土地紛争は工業、インフラストラクチャー、土地利用、採鉱、電力、保護区の 6 分野にわたっている[3]。

　　　こうした状況から政府による強権的な土地収用に代わる土地収用手続きが模索され始めたのは当然であるが、その必要性を特に印象づけたのが、西ベンガル州で 2006 年に発生したターター自動車

1　田中英夫・編集代表『英米法辞典』東京大学出版会、1991、pp.292-3。

2　http://landconflictswatch, 2017 年 12 月 25 日アクセス。

3　近年の土地収用問題についてのゆきとどいた法的考察に、佐藤創「インドにおける経済発展と土地収用―「開発と土地」問題の再検討に向けて―」『アジア経済』第 53 巻第 4 号、2012 年 6 月、pp.113-137 がある。

社（Tata Motors Ltd., TML）による新工場建設の敷地をめぐる土地収用問題であった。

2.　西ベンガル州左翼戦線政権を倒した土地収用問題

　　　問題の発端は、TML 社が打ち上げた廉価車、10 万（one lakh）ルピーの自家用車、ナノ（Nano）工場を、西ベンガル州フグリ（Hoogly）県シングール（Singur）に誘致するとの西ベンガル州政府による決定であった。

　　　この計画は、2006 年 5 月の州議会選挙で圧勝した西ベンガルの左翼戦線（Left Front）政権が、州の経済構造を長期的に転換してゆくという目的をもって進めてきた計画の一部であったが、建設用地約 997 エーカー（約 400 ha）は、その 9 割が一毛作、1 割が 2 毛作の農耕地であった。2006 年 10 月初頭、州の最有力野党、草の根会議派（Trinamul Congress）が、工場建設用地の収用に反対するゼネストを呼びかけた。補償金の支払いが 10 月には開始されたが、管井戸に投資した富農と雇用の喪失に直面した農業労働者の間には不満が残った。州政府は小作人を補償の対象としたが、農業労働者には十分な配慮が払われなかった。

　　　草の根会議派は、他野党も含めて「農地を守る委員会（Krishi Bhumi Raksha Committee）」を結成し、農地の収用に反対するゼネストやハンストを繰り返し呼びかけ、これに「ナクサライト（Naxalites）」とされる極左勢力の一部が呼応した。また「ナルマダーを救え運動（NBA）」の指導者メーダー・パトカル（Medha Patkar）ら著名人の支持も運動を後押しした。市場価格の 1.5 倍で、更に 1 割の報奨金を上乗せした補償金の支払いは、12 月末には、957 エーカー分に達した。11 月末には、杭打ちによる土地の囲い込みが行なわれ、12 月末には敷地は TML に引き渡された。

　　　これに対して 2007 年 3 月に反対運動がカルカッタ高裁に LAA による土地収用の違法を提訴、これが 2008 年 1 月に棄却されると、運動は激化し、TML の工事用車両の阻止など実力行動が開始された。実力行使で工事の進捗を阻まれた TML は 2008 年 1 月からシングールの設備撤去を開始し、同年 10 月 3 日にはシングールでの操業を断念する声明を発した（後述のように、TML はすでに代替策を準備していた）。

　　　西ベンガルではシングールと同時に、2007 年 1 月には、東ミドナプル県（East Medinipur district）ノンディグラム（Nandigram）地区の石油化学プロジェクト経済特区用地でも、農民の反対運動が激化した。政府の発砲で反対派農民ら 14 名が死亡した。州首相は、計画が住民の頭越しに進められ、了解を取り付ける努力が欠如していたことを認めた。

　　　シングールとノンディグラムの事件は、土地収用問題が、州工業化推進のかぎを握っていることを示唆しているが、反対運動と左翼戦線州政府との熾烈な対立は、村落末端まで政党の影響力が浸透している西ベンガル州特有の先鋭な政治環境の反映でもあることに注意したい[4]。2011 年 5 月の州議会選挙では、1977 年から長期政権を運営してきた左翼戦線は、草の根会議派に敗れ、34 年間の統治に幕を閉じた。土地収用問題は間違いなく政権倒壊の引き金であった[5]。

　　　教訓は残った。西ベンガルでの紛争を背景に、土地収用の手続きや価格について、合意形成

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[4] 最末端の村落パンチャーヤト（Gram Panchayat）の議員構成をシングール地区（Singur Block）で見ると、2013 年に行われた選挙では、240 名の村落議員のうち無所属は 5 名に過ぎず、草の根会議派 147 名、インド共産党（マルクス主義）70 名ほかすべて政党関係者である。
　　（http://www.wbsec.gov.in/(S(k4h01355jkwxa445utzspa2h))/FinalResult/FinalResult_gp_2013.aspx）

[5] 土地返還をめぐる訴訟はその後も継続され、2016 年 8 月に最高裁の二人法廷は、西ベンガル州政府の収用手続きは LAA の規定にも反するとして、土地の所有者への返還を命じた。判事の一人は、さらにターター社への貸し付けを前提とする土地収用は LAA のいう「公共目的」にあたらないとも判断した（*Kedar Nath Yadav v. Govt of West Bengal*, https://www.legallyindia.com/supreme-court/legally-explained-why-the-sc-struck-down-the-singur-land-acquisition-and-what-it-means-via-mint-20160906-7942）。

のための中立的な制度（公聴会、対象住民の組織化など）を構築する必要性も指摘され、LAA に代わる土地収用をめぐる包括的な新法の必要性が高まってきた。それが 2013 年の新土地収用法の制定へとつながるのであるが、それを論ずる前に、ナノ工場のその後の顛末を語らねばならない。

3.　　グジャラート州政府の介入―モーディー州首相、財界の寵児に―

　　　TML がシングールでの操業断念を発表した 4 日後の 2008 年 10 月 7 日、自らの州首相就任 7 年目にあたって、グジャラート州首相ナレーンドラ・モーディー（Narendra Modi）は、TML 会長との共同記者会見を開き、ナノ工場のグジャラート移転を発表した。2002 年の反ムスリム暴動でヒンドゥー至上主義者のイメージが拭えないモーディー州首相にとって、インド財界の総帥であるターター財閥の経営する TML 工場の誘致は、経済発展の主導者としての新たなイメージを広める手がかりとなった[6]。14 か月で新工場は操業、2010 年 6 月に一号車が完成した。

　　　異例なのは、工場誘致の迅速さだけではなかった。誘致条件自体も例を見ない手厚さであった。モーディー州政権は、誘致条件の詳細を秘していたが、のちに明らかになった公文書によれば、2009 年 1 月に州政府と TML との間で、おおよそ以下の合意が交わされた[7]。

・　アフマダーバード（Ahmedabad）から西に 35 キロ、サーナンド（Sananda）、1000 エーカーの土地（ほぼ西ベンガルと同規模）、他にアフマダーバード近郊に 100 エーカーの市街化用地。

・　土地収用は 2009 年 12 月 4 日に告示、州工業開発公社（GJIDC）による買取価格は市価の 4 倍、TML への売り渡し額はエーカーあたり 360 万ルピー、関連費用も含め総額約 40 億ルピー、ただし 2 年間支払猶予ののち、年利 8％で 8 回にわたる分割払い（西ベンガル州は、90 年間の貸付。最初の 5 年間は貸付料年 1000 万ルピー、暫時引き上げ）。

・　20 年間に年利 0.1％で 950 億ルピーの融資（対 2008 年度州予算総額の 22％）。当初は 214 億を予定していた（西ベンガル州はすべてを一括して 20 億ルピーのソフトローン）、いっぽう TML の投資額は 200 億ルピー。フォード自動車の事例では 2 億 8 千万ルピー、10％利子の貸付。

・　一般に提供される租税、賦課、および電力、上水道などインフラの優遇措置。

・　グジャラート州の雇用政策では、工場用地の地元出身者に新規雇用の 85％ を割り当てることとされている。合意はこの点に触れていない。実際、地元雇用の少なさに周辺地域の農民から抗議の声が上がっている。

　　　これ以降、サーナンドは自動車産業のハブとなり、フォード、プジョー、マルーティなどの自動車会社が相次いでグジャラートに参入した[8]。

6　Mukhopadhyay. Nilanjan, *Narendra Modi, the man, the times*, Chennai: Tanquebar Press, 2013, p. 363; Sardesai, Rajdeep, *2014 the Election that changed India,* Gurgaon: Penguin Books India, 2014, pp.32-3.

7　以下の資料から整理した情報である。*Telegraph (Kolkata)*, 21 Jan. 2009; "Lure of public money many times its investment made Tata shift plant to Gujarat", 8 Oct. 2013, https://centreleftindia.wordpress.com/2013/10/08/lure-of-free-public-money-many-times-its-investment-made-tata-shift-nano-plant-to-gujarat-not-modis-newly-created-industrial-climate/ （2017 年 12 月 13 日アクセス ; "Big scam with small car", 7 Aug. 2013, https://trythofgujarat.com/big-scam-with-small-car/ （同上）。

8　ナノは 2017 年 4 月から 10 月にわずか 1,299 台と生産の落ちこみが激しく、事実上の事業破綻に陥っている。ターター社は電動自動車への転換を図っているという (*The Wire,* 27 Nov. 2017)。

　　　　ナノ工場の移転から操業に至る迅速さは、もともと企業活動環境が良好とされるグジャラート州の評価を高めた。いくつかのコンサルタント企業が、連邦政府の委託で作成した製造業部門における規制緩和の州別比較報告書[9]では、とくに土地、建物の認可、環境規制に関してグジャラート州はベスト・プラクティス州とされている。

4.　　UPA 政権による包括的な 2013 年土地収用法

　　　　こうして、TML のナノ工場用地問題は、土地所有者・住民の権利重視か、企業環境整備優先かという、土地収用をめぐる「二つの道」を浮き彫りにした。両州を比較すると、グジャラートがより良い成果をもたらしたかにみえるが、グジャラートでの経過には「声」の反映される余地は全くない。他方西ベンガルの「失敗」はまさに潤沢な「声」の帰結であった。むしろ重要なのは、植民期の LAA の下での土地収用プロセスには、農民や土地所有者の「声」を受け入れる余地がないという、両州に共通の教訓である。

　　　　経済特区やシングール問題など全国に広がる土地収用をめぐる紛争を背景に、2009 年に成立した会議派主導の第二期統一進歩連合（United Progressive Alliance, UPA）政権は 2011 年 9 月から 2 年がかりで、土地収用の手続き、収用価格、補償などに関する包括的な立法、「土地収用、回復措置、再定住における公正な補償と透明性に関する<u>権利</u>法（<u>Right</u> to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act、以下 LARR 法、下線報告者）」と称する長い標題の法律を、野党 BJP 提案の修正も受け入れて 2013 年 9 月に制定した（2015 年 1 月施行）。この法律は UPA 政権が制定した「権利」重視の一連の立法の一つであった（次表参照）。

表： UPA 政権（2004-09, 09-14）による「権利」重視立法一覧

- The Right of Information Act 2005
- Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act 2005
- The Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act 2009
- The Right of Citizens for Time bound Delivery of Goods and Services and Redressal of their Grievances Bill 2011
- The National Food Security Act 2013
- The Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act 2013
- Lokpal and Lokayukta Act 2013

　　　　LARR 法は、全 114 条からなる 13 の章に 4 つの附則を備えた包括的な法律である。13 の章は土地収用に伴う土地所有者の一定比率の同意や「社会的インパクト評価（SIA）」作成の義務付けから始まり、食糧安全保障の観点からの多毛作地、灌漑地の保全、収用手続き、回復措置と再定住の具体的な内容と手続き、紛争処理機関などにまで及んでいる。

　　　　しかし財界団体は事前の合意や評価手続きの導入には不満であった。2014 年の連邦下院選挙（Parliamentary elections）では財界の信頼をバックに、グジャラート州首相から中央に進出したモーディーがインド人民党（BJP）を率いて大勝し、新たな国民民主連合（National Democratic Alliance, NDA）政権を発足させた。

9　*Survey of Business Regulatory Environment for Manufacturing – State Level Assessment, Vol. I, Final Report; Vol. II State Specific Findings*（Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion、DIPP ホームページ、2015 年 6 月 19 日アクセス）；*Best Practices to Improve the Business Environment across India.* Accenture, May 2014。

5.　　NDA モーディー政権による 2013 年法の修正

　　自党が同意して成立し、施行後半年を経過したばかりの LARR 法について、モーディー政権は発足後三度にわたり（緊急）大統領令による修正を試みた。

　　モーディー政権による LARR 法の改正の核心部分は、次の 5 分野に関する土地収用については、土地所有者の同意条項、「社会的インパクト評価」条項、多毛作地・灌漑地などの保全条項のすべてについて適用が除外されるという部分である。5 分野とは、以下である。(a) 国家安全保障、国防、また国防生産に関係あるすべての部分、(b) 電化を含む農村インフラストラクチャー、(c) 手の届く価格の（affordable）住宅、貧困者住宅、(d) 政府および関係機関による工業回廊（industrial corridor）、その専用鉄道、および道路の両側面 1 キロ以内の範囲、(e)Public Private Partnership（PPP）プロジェクト（土地所有権を政府が保持するもの）。

　　この修正では、LARR 法の収用価格、補償、再定住などに関する部分には手をつけていない。同意と SIA 条項さえ除いてもらえれば、これらの条件については異議を唱えないというのが、財界、コンサルタント業界の意向であった。

　　政権が改正案の核心部分に固執しているのは、すでに見たように、土地収用の迅速性こそが、州首相時代のモーディーの最大の売り物であったからである。モーディーが中央政府首相となることで、「グジャラート・モデル」はすべての州への模範とされた。農村開発相として 2013 年法を手掛けた会議派のジャエラーム・ラメーシュらに言わせれば、「これらの改正により、2003 年法が目的とした土地の強制収用メカニズムの抑制はおおきく掘り崩されてしまった。（中略）この一つのステップで、与党 (BJP) は市民が開発に何らの発言権も持たないイギリスによる土地収用立法の時代に逆戻りさせてしまったのである [10]。」

　　しかしながら、全国の農民やその組織の反対は予想以上に強烈であった。上記 5 分野の規定が厳密性を欠き、適用の恣意的な拡大が危惧されることなどから、こぞって反対の意思が表示された。政権寄りの農民、経済団体も強く批判した。結局三度出された大統領令は、最後まで連邦議会での承認を得られないまま、失効することになった。

　　連邦議会での修正に失敗した BJP は、州政府レベルで、同趣旨の修正を行うことを奨励している（すでに述べたように土地収用は連邦と州の共同管轄事項である）。実際に中央政府と同じ内容の修正が、すでにグジャラート州、ハリヤーナ州、ゴア州、ラージャスターン州など、いずれも BJP 州政権の下で試みられている。

むすび　土地収用をめぐるせめぎあい ― その政治経済学的な意味

　　今日のインドにおける土地収用の政治を、これまで次の二つの問題を中心に述べてきた。

　　一つは州による土地収用への異なる対応であり、他の一つは、それぞれ国民会議派と BJP によって主導される中央の二つの連合政権による土地収用法改革への異なるアプローチである。こうした記述は今日のインドの政治経済学の文脈にどのように位置づけることができるだろうか。

土地、労働、そして農民の不満

　　第一に、土地収用に対する農民の不満は、1990 年代以降のインドの工業発展の特徴的な様相との関係で理解しなければならない。端的に言うならば、国民経済活動における農業の比重の低下がそ

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10 Ramesh, Jairam and Muhammad Ali Khan, *Legislating for Justice, the making of the 2013 Land Acquisition Law*, New
　Delhi Oxford University Press, 2015, p. 128.

れに対応する労働力の移動を伴っていないという特徴である。農業と関連産業の国内総生産に占める比率は、経済自由化以降の20数年間で約30％から18％まで低下したにもかかわらず、全人口の約70％は依然として農村に滞留している。言い換えるなら、インドの第二次、第三次産業の発展は農村地域から大規模に労働力を吸収できるような活力と様式に欠けていたのである。この点についてはより深い分析が必要なのは言うまでもないが、非農業部門の雇用の見通しの暗さが、農地の細分化と並行する農業の低収益性にもかかわらず、農民が土地を手放そうとしない理由の一つである。さらにはこれまでの土地収用の経験が、土地価格が収用後にむしろ高騰することによって、土地を提供した農民のあいだに剥奪感を植え付けてきたことも挙げられるだろう。

「権利の政治」は政治的な方便か？

インドの新自由主義的改革は1990年代に国民会議派によって先鞭をつけられ、その後NDAとUPAという、それぞれBJPと国民会議派に率いられた連合が、新自由主義の枠内で政策を追求した。インド政治における「競争的新自由主義」ともいうべき現象である。しかし、会議派（UPA）による権利の政治と土地収用法改革は、二つの連合の政策がその方向性において明確に異なるという点で、明らかにこうしたパターンからは外れている。

この報告で取り上げた土地収用の事例が提起するのは、こうした差異が単なる政策上の方便なのか、あるいはまた、新自由主義的な政策枠組の内部においても、ある特定の条件の下では、政策的な差異、新自由主義的な政策に対する代替的政策が生まれる余地があるとみるべきなのかという問題である。この二つの論点に沿ってさらに深く考究されるならば、土地収用問題の研究は現代インドの政治経済学的な分析に貢献することができるだろう。

Uneven Development in the 21ˢᵗ Century

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(This is a preliminary version. Please do not quote this.)

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I feel uncomfortable to give a theoretical presentation, just after several presentations on concrete issues of specific regions and areas. This feeling stems from my knowledge that naive application of general theory to some concrete conflict or struggle might sometimes give rise to the worsening or deepening of it. Besides, our global age since the 1980s is characterized by increasing application of neoliberalism without taking the complexity of reality in consideration, by the package–typed policies all over the world, first under the name of structural arrangement and then of less forcing nuance of globalization. In fact, neoliberalism with the tendency toward financialization has increased the homogeneity of global capitalism, pulling the developments of many regions in the world into one direction, while increasing inequality and differentiation of wealth, to a considerable extent. This tendency has generally been dominating our global world until today, even there were some counter–movements.

1.

In my presentation, I introduce the concept of uneven development, proposed in the 20ᵗʰ century for thinking of the relation among land, space and modernity in a general perspective. This concept has been important in connecting the problems of land and geography with the idea of imperialism and colonialism. I emphasize that we could revive its importance as a conceptual devise in placing it in the context of neoliberalism of financialization. I mainly rely on a book by Neil Smith of the same title[1], a new 'classical' book to survey this concept and to investigate its meaning. I take his definition of uneven development, '(u)neven development is social inequality blazoned into the geographical landscape, and it is simultaneously the exploitation of that geographical unevenness for certain socially determined ends' (Smith 1984/ 2007, p. 206).

By the way, this book of Neil Smith was published in 1984, followed by the revised 2ⁿᵈ (in 1990) and 3ʳᵈ (in 2007) editions with long postscripts on the contemporary issues respectively. But it still lacks a fundamental perspective for the relation between financialization and uneven development. Here a book by Giovanni Arrighi, "Adam Smith in Beijing" (2007) [2] can be supplementary. Arrighi had been one of the

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[1] Neil Smith (1954 -2012): American geographer. After getting his doctor degree at John Hopkins University with the theme of uneven development, he taught at Pennsylvania University, Columbia University, The City University of New York etc.. He also wrote, *American Empire: Roosevelt's geographer and the prelude to globalization* (2003), and *The endgame of globalization* (2005), etc.

[2] Govanni Arrighi (1937- 2009): Economist and sociologist, born in Italy and immigrated in America. At the later part of his life, he collaborated with D. Harvey, the supervisor of Neil Smith's doctoral dissertation. In the Japanese translation

contributors to the theoretical construction of world systems theory since 1970s, together with Wallerstein, Frank and Amin, but especially in paying more attention to the factor of money and finance than others. Besides, this book showed some of his response to the critic that the world systems theory was schematic and simplistic ignoring the difference of periphery areas of Asia, Africa and Latin America[3]. As the title showed, it focused on the form and path of peculiar development of Asia (China and partly India), and its role in the world system. Arrighi wrote it as the sequel of his analysis of American hegemony deployed in his previous book, "The Long Twentieth Century". But having said that, I would like to emphasize the potentiality of the concept of uneven development for the analysis of land problem here.

2.

Following Smith's analysis, I make an overview of this concept as a theoretical devise, its place in the global history and history of theory, its range of application, and the key factor of its dynamism. It is a concept to question politically and economically the role of geographical structure of some place in the development of capitalism. Seen historically, it was Lenin on imperialism at the beginning of the twentieth century and then Trotsky on permanent revolution, who had critically examined this concept in a political perspective. But Smith took a distance to these contributions and, going back to the works of geographers and of Marx himself, made a theoretical survey of the relation between human beings and nature or environment. He set this as the foundation for analyzing "the production and reproduction of space" (a term by H. Lefebre). In so doing, Smith paid attention to the material dimension of global capitalism which brought both the equalization and differentiation of space in the sense of productions and reproductions of infrastructure that determined the landscape, which were the result of transformation, move, circulation of materials related to the construction by the will of those whom owned or habited around the place. And these activities caused problems and conflicts in the community or in the society.

Smith took highly of the contribution of world systems theory because it emphasized the structural heterogeneity of space in the world with the subjugation of periphery and semi–periphery to the hegemonic center. He saw it as the complement to the conception of uneven development[4]. But at the same time, his critic of world systems theory also deserves attention, that this theory focused only on the scale of global space (*Ibid.*, pp. 6–7), though there were several ranges of scale to apply to the concept of uneven development. These are city scale, the scale of nation–state, and global scale in the concrete appearance of unevenness as a result of capitalistic development (*Ibid.*, p.181). Especially, it is to be noticed that the scale of nation–state is not the only one justified for the crucial decision–making, even though it occupies a special place and role in land problems, exercising its sovereignty in the land reform or land expropriation, often determining the territory with the reasons of economic policy, public welfare or arrangement of sanity, etc..

Besides, as to the dynamism of development, it is the rent for some land that often gives stimulus and motivation for development of space. Smith discussed the theory of rent gap, which ascribed gentrifi-

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of "Adam Smith in Beijing, which I (Nakayama) had translated with several people, we included the last long interview to Arrighi by Harvey. His other works include, *The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power, and the Origins of Our Times* (1994) etc..

3 This critic was originally directed by Amin to Frank. Arrighi took over the reply (Cf. Nakayama 2015, pp.58-59).

4 In more detail, Smith especially consulted a book by Amin, "unequal development" published in 1976 (Smith 1984/ 2008, p.151).

cation to the disparity between the potential ground rent level and the actual ground rent capitalized under the present land use (*Ibid.*, p. 200, Smith 1996, p.67. Tomotsune 2017 (in Japanes), pp. 99–101). This indicates that the increase of importance of the concept of rent, contrary to the diagnosis of economic theories both of Marxism and of equilibrium that the category of rent would decrease in the meaning and eventually vanish in the future. But we also have to notice that the rent in our age of global capitalism is not determined by Ricardo's differential rent measured by the distance of concentric circle, but rather by unevenly distributed hotspots of mineral or other resources, which would become objects for license and intellectual property rights.

It is without saying that the rent becomes mostly important in relation to financial commodities and that land has to be counted among such commodities, where rent means the reward to let someone utilize some enclosed 'common'. Further, we have to notice that this rent may become negative in the phase of crisis of bursting bubble. As Neil Smith indicated, we might have to think of uneven decline (*Ibid.,* p. 208) instead of uneven development.

3.

As to financialization, Arrighi discussed the cycles of accumulation of capital with the transition of hegemonic centers for hundreds of years: According to him, a new hegemonic center emerged as such getting the assistance by some old financial capital and extending its domination in the global scale of uneven development, but it fell into the signal crisis at some point. Then, the center attempted to keep its hegemonic power by shifting its role into the center of financial capital. But this helped the potential next hegemony to appear in front, which resulted in the terminal crisis of the old hegemonic center. Arrighi discussed that this (West–centered) cycle reached its limit after several cycles, when the American hegemonic power had been failed to function as the financial center in the neoliberal period and China gradually appeared as the main actor from the Asian periphery.

On one hand, we can directly combine this analysis with the theoretical frame of uneven development, but on the other hand, it has gradually been clarified that the British hegemony or more exactly, the hegemonic power of the City in London has been maintained with good relationship to its tax havens all over the world in the middle of American hegemony in the neoliberal period. It was certainly a way of continuation of old regime of colonization, but it also served for the strategies of development and growth of periphery to become a new global city. We have to rethink of uneven development in such a perspective of global scale as well as city scale of space.[5]

China itself has also utilized Hong Kong as its financial center in relation to British hegemony, which is in no contradiction with Chinese vision of material development, 'One Belt, One Road (OBOR)' which has extended its range far into Europe, the Middle East and Africa. In analyzing such a situation, we need to combine the three scales Smith had indicated. Certainly "Adam Smith in Beijing" focused on the analysis of China as the main actor in the world system[6], but it has to be complemented by the analysis of

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5 Further we are gradually obliged to notice that so-called virtual currencies like Bitcoin, which do not need any physical space in the world and are free even from tax haven, have come to occupy a certain place in financial markets since 2017. We have been getting desperate measures of many countries, such as the sudden close of exchange of virtual currencies in China, a failure of such close in Korea, a counter-measure of North Korea to rely on virtual currencies against the economic sanctions, etc..

6 It attempted to include the analysis of the 'Orient' or the East in the sense of East Asian and South-East Asian countries,

social formations and cultural aspects of sustaining the domination. These issues are important because the appearance of Asia in the world system urges us to relativize the Western ideal of universalism and to reconsider the concept of Orientalism by Said[7], rethinking of global history in the longer run than the modern period of the rise of the West[8]. Uneven development has escaped to become the neutral theory by universalistic actors, but it may also be necessary to keep some distance from the practical motivation to think of the theory only for revolution and for social movement seeking for it.

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平田周 2017「なぜ空間の生産がいまだに重要なのか」『現代思想』9月号、vol. 45-18, pp.168-176.

which were not in the sight of world systems theory until the beginning of 1990s.

7 Frank explicitly stated that he wrote his book, "RE-Orient", taking Said's concept of orientalism in consideration.

8 Arrighi took over the problem-setting of Frank in "Adam Smith in Beijing" in his analysis of British hegemony in the perspective of India and made comparison with American hegemony (Nakayama 2015, p. 59). Besides, Arrighi emphasized Frank's contribution in connection to Pomeranz' "The Great Divergence" as global history shown as the analysis of global space, in contrast to that of Marxism to focus on factory and class struggle.

21 世紀の不均等発展を再考する

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（報告記録のため、ここからの引用はなしでお願いいたします）

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　具体的な地域に根差した諸報告の後で地域をもたない報告をすることに、いささか居心地の悪さを感じている。人間社会における対立や葛藤に関して理論的な枠組を当てはめることで、その対立や葛藤を変質させたり利害の差を生んだりする場合があるからである。まして、1980 年前後から現代まで至る時代は、理論と異なる現実を認めようとしない、いわゆる新自由主義の理論によって下支えされている。新自由主義とは、当初「構造調整」と呼ばれ、やがてグローバリゼーションというやや無害な枠取りで進められたパッケージ型政策の屋台骨である。それは金融化によってグローバル資本主義の均質性を増大させ、世界各地の発展 (開発) を一方向へと強く進める要因となったが、差異化や格差を大いに増大させてきた。そのため今日では多少とも下火になってきたが、なおも全般的には支配的であり続けている。

1.

　本報告では、グローバル資本主義における土地、空間、近代性のあいだに存在する関係をより一般的な観点から考察するために、20 世紀に用いられた不均等発展の概念を援用する。この概念は土地や地理と帝国主義、植民主義とを連結する重要な概念である。特にこれを新自由主義と金融化という時代的文脈に置き直すことで、概念装置としての有効性を再生させることが重要であると考える。おもな手がかりとするのは、ニール・スミス (Neil Smith)[1] が不均等発展をタイトルに掲げた著作 (Smith 1984/ 2008) と、ジョヴァンニ・アリギ (Giovanni Arrighi)[2] の著作『北京のアダム・スミス』（Arrighi 2007）である。

　前者は不均等発展の概念をサーヴェイし、意味を考察するために不可欠な古典的原論である。初版は 1984 年つまり新自由主義の早い時期に刊行されたが、1990 年と 2007 年、すなわちそれぞれ冷戦構造が崩壊しアジア発の金融・経済危機に直面した時代と、アメリカでサブプライム・ローンの破綻から世界的な金融危機が始まった時代に第二版、第三版への長いあとがきが付され、ヴァージョンアップがはかられた。とはいえ、金融化と不均等発展の関係について踏み込む全面的な改訂を行うには至ら

1　Neil Smith (1954 -2012) はアメリカの地理学者。ジョン・ホプキンズ大学でこの研究によって博士号を取得した後、ペンシルベニア大学、コロンビア大学、ニューヨーク市立大学などで教鞭をとった。他の著作に、*American Empire: Roosevelt's geographer and the prelude to globalization* (2003), *The endgame of globalization* (2005), などがある。

2　Govanni Arrighi (1937- 2009) イタリア生まれでアメリカに移住した経済学者、社会学者。特に晩年にかけて、スミスの博士論文の指導教授 D. ハーヴェイと理論的な影響を与え合った。『北京のアダム・スミス』邦訳にはハーヴェイによるアリギへの生前最後のロング・インタヴューが収録されている。他の著作に *The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power, and the Origins of Our Times* (1994) (『長い 20 世紀 : 資本、権力、そして現代の系譜』土佐弘之他訳、作品社) など。

なかった。この点を補足するのが後者である。

　　　アリギは 1970 年代頃から、ウォーラーステイン、フランク、アミンとともに世界システム論と呼ばれる理論体系の構築に尽力したが、とりわけ金融、貨幣の動きを重視するモデルを提示した。かれの著作『北京のアダム・スミス』は、世界システム論が世界経済をやや平板に図式的に把握し、とりわけ周辺とよばれるアジア、アフリカ、ラテン・アメリカ地域の違いを捨象しているという内的批判に対して、正面から取り組んだ成果である[3]。タイトルが示す通り、中国やインドなどアジアの諸国の独自の発展形態、発展径路を分析し、世界システムに果たす役割を分析の中心に据えた。そしてこれはアメリカのヘゲモニーの翳りを分析した前著『長い二十世紀』の続編である。

　　　これらを踏まえても、不均等発展はなおも「地理的景色へと描き込まれた社会的不平等（social inequality）であり、また同時に、何か社会的に決められた目的のためにその地理的不均等性をむさぼること」（Smith, p. 206）と定義される点において、説明能力の高い概念であり、その分析軸を活かすことで土地問題の考察に何らかの貢献をしうると思われる。

2.

　　　ここでスミスの分析を援用しつつ、不均等発展の概念の大枠、すなわち歴史・思想史上の位置、適用範囲、発展（開発）のダイナミズムにおける位置について確認しておきたい。

　　　不均等発展の概念は、ある場所の地理的構造が資本主義に果たした役割を政治的、経済的に問うものであり、20 世紀初頭にレーニンの帝国主義に関する議論、次いでトロツキーの永続革命論が、政治的観点から考察を行った。しかしスミスはこれらから一定の距離を保ち、地理学者やマルクスの著作（特に『資本論』）に立ち戻って、人間が自然や環境との関わりをどのようにとらえてきたかを概観し、これを資本による「空間の生産、再生産」（ルフェーブル）分析の基礎とした。グローバル資本主義は均質化と差異化を同時にもたらすが、いずれにおいても物質的な次元をもつことに、スミスは注目したのである。つまり個々の土地や場所には、労働力とされる具体的で多様な人間たちが居住し、そこに区別や差別、格差が生まれ、また彼らが所有したり使用したりする物質の変形や移動、流通があり、空間の景観を確定する各種のインフラの生産、再生産があるということである。

　　　この観点から、世界システム論が周辺や半周辺の中心への従属という構造的異質性を強調したことは、不均等発展の概念を補完するとして評価された[4]。とはいえスミスは、世界システム論がグローバル空間というスケールだけに注目した点を批判的にとらえた（*Ibid.,* pp. 6-7）。スケールに関する論点は、不均等発展の適用範囲の問題として重要である。グローバル空間のスケールととともに、都市空間、国民国家という二つのスケールが並置されるが（*Ibid.,* p.181）、これは資本主義的発展がグローバルな広がりを標榜するとしても、その不均等性は都市、国民国家のレベルでもそれぞれ表れることを示唆している。さらにいえば、土地や空間の編制において、国民国家は領土を確定し主権を握る特殊な位置、役割をもつとはいえ、唯一のアクターでないとされている点が重要である。土地改革や土地収用はその都度の政府によって経済政策や公共の福祉、衛生上の配慮などから実施されるが、国家がそれを独占的に行うアプリオリな正当性は根拠づけられないことになる。

　　　次に発展（開発）のダイナミズムとの関わりでは、特に都市空間の開発がレント（地代）によって惹起されることが注目される。スミスは、ありうる最高額の潜在（潜勢）的地代と現実の地代と

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[3] その批判は特にアミンからフランクに向けられたものであった。詳しくは中山 2015, pp.58-59。

[4] 特にアミンはスミスに先立って著作『不均等発展（unequal development）』を刊行しており、周辺部の発展経路を考察した。（ちなみに Amin1976 はフランス語で 1973 年に刊行された著作の英訳である。）スミスはこれを援用し、中心的資本主義は自らのもとに集中させて資本蓄積を行うのに対し、周辺の社会構成体は奢侈品の消費と輸出中心の経済構造によって、中心に従属したバランスの悪い発展径路を辿り、社会的に分断されると考えた（Smith 1984/ 2008, p. 151）。

の差が再開発、ジェントリフィケーションを生み出すという地代ギャップ論、地代格差論（*Ibid.*, p. 200, Smith 1996, 邦訳 115 頁 . 友常 2017, pp. 99-101）を論じた。かつてレント（地代）は、マルクス主義経済学においても均衡論的経済学においても、やがて消滅するカテゴリーと想定されたが、実際には逆にレント概念の重要性が増大したといえる。ただし現代のグローバル資本主義のもとでのレント（地代）は、リカード以来の古典的な差額地代論とは異なり、ホットスポット的に偏在する鉱物資源、特許や知財とも連動する生物資源との関わりからも規定されるなどの点にも、着目する必要がある。

　　また現代のグローバル資本主義において重要なレントは、圧倒的に金融商品のレントであり、土地も金融商品の一例であることを免れない。それらは、架空の空間を含めた「コモン」に対して所有的な囲い込みが行われ、これを他者の使用に供することで得られる報酬としてのレントである。さらには、スミスも指摘する通り、レントと不均等発展ではなくむしろ、頻発するバブル崩壊の危機における不均等減少（uneven decline）（*Ibid.*, p. 208）との関連から考える必要もあるだろう。そこではレントもマイナス値となりうるのである。

3.

　　アリギは数百年にわたるヘゲモニーの推移において、すでに蓄積されていた金融資本が潜在的な次期ヘゲモニー国の実物資本を助けることによってヘゲモニーとしての台頭を導くこと、新たな中心国はグローバルなスケールでの不均等発展を生じさせつつも予兆的危機（signal crisis）に至るまで発展（開発）を進めること、しかしヘゲモニー後半期には中心国自体が金融センターとして次なる中心国の台頭を準備しつつみずからのヘゲモニーの維持を試みるも、ついには終末的危機（terminal crisis）に陥り地位を譲る一連の流れを、資本蓄積サイクルとして示した。ただしそのサイクルは、アメリカから中国にヘゲモニーが移行する段階で、もはや限界に達したというのがアリギの結論であった。

　　ところが新自由主義の時代の到来と相前後して、アメリカがヘゲモニーを謳歌するかに見えた時代のただなかでも、イギリス、より正確にいえばシティのヘゲモニーが持続していたことが、近年次第に明らかにされてきた。それは世界各地にタックスヘイヴンを生じさせ、旧植民地時代の関係を持続させた。タックスヘイヴンや金融センターはグローバルシティの成立に重要な役割を果たし、各国の開発・成長戦略の重要な位置を占めてきた。こうした観点から、グローバルな空間のスケールと都市開発のスケールの双方において、不均等発展の概念を再考する必要がある[5]。

　　中国自体、イギリスとの直接的関係のなかで香港を金融センターとして成長させてきた経緯がある。持続的な金融的戦略は、たとえば昨今の実物的開発の構想である一帯一路構想と特に矛盾することなく進められ、そのグローバル資本主義的な触手は広くヨーロッパや中東、アフリカまで伸長している。スミスが示した三つのスケールを相互に関連させた総合的分析が喫緊の課題である。『北京のアダム・スミス』は世界システムに台頭しつつあった中国の分析を一つの中心課題としたが[6]、たとえばサイードのオリエンタリズム概念の援用などにより[7]、システム内の社会構成体の主体との関わり、たとえば歴史の担い手（知識人）の問題なども考察する必要がある。というのも、アリギやフランクの世界システム論的意図を引き継ぐとすれば、グローバルヒストリーを反転的に仕切り直し[8]、「西」の思想が目指した

5　さらにいえば、2017 年以降の動向として、登記上とはいえ必ず地球上のどこかであったタックスヘイヴンの段階を超え、仮想通貨が金融市場を大きく動かし始めていることも無視しがたい。中国による取引所の閉鎖、韓国による閉鎖の試みの挫折、北朝鮮による経済制裁への対抗措置としての仮想通貨への注力など、考察すべき事態が噴出している。

6　同書は中国のみならず日本や韓国など東アジアやアセアン諸国などの経済的台頭を視野に入れ、1990 年代に至るまで世界システム論に欠けていたアジア（オリエント＝東）への視点を補足する意図をもっていた。

7　フランクは、サイードのオリエンタリズム分析を意識して『リオリエント』を執筆したと述べている。

8　アリギはイギリスのヘゲモニーをインドの立ち位置から分析し、アメリカのヘゲモニーとの比較を行ったが、この点に関してフランクの『リオリエント』（1998 年）の問題意識を引き継いでいる（中山 2015、p.59）。またアリギは、近年経済史とグロー

普遍性を相対化する立ち位置からこれをとらえ直すことが重要だからである。不均等発展論自体、中立的かつ普遍的な主体による語りとは相矛盾する立場から提示されてきたが、今や革命論や運動論から距離を置いた立場で、再考することも必要である。

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平田周 2017「なぜ空間の生産がいまだに重要なのか」『現代思想』9月号、vol. 45-18, pp.168-176.

バルヒストリーを接合する研究領域で援用されるポメランツの『大分岐 The Great Divergence』を並置し、生産現場、階級闘争中心のマルクス主義に対置した。

Panel Discussion

Opening Remarks from Professor Sakai Makiko

"In Africa, land was originally prevented from being freely bought and sold. But as this resource now comes to be governed by the logic of the market, the issue of how to secure the rights and livelihood of small scale farmers and ranchers has come to the fore. There was a time when these groups in Africa could ignore the framework of the nation and live without any direct contact with state authorities. However, the issue of how to negotiate with governments have become a problem for these farmers and ranchers. From this perspective, Professor Takeuchi demonstrated how we see politicians [in Africa] governing based on dominant trends in international affairs; in contrast, Professor Sato showed how party politics in India are extremely functional [for local actors]. This possibility of a platform for dialogue [between local actors and the state] is surely something that we can learn much from.

Moving on to Professor Hataya's presentation, we see that as Colombia struggles to usher in a new era as it transitions from a state of civil war to peace following the [2016 peace treaty with the FARC], there are also concerns brought on by the issue of mineral resources, the trend towards commercial farming, and the unchecked influx of foreign investment. Across all of the presentations, we have a few common threads. These include: how to effect a relation to the land that prioritizes the values of various local actors instead of the logic of the market; how to communicate the value of things that cannot be calculated in cash; and how to reflect such priorities in the political realm. Now, I would like to hear the presenters' thoughts on the differences among the regions discussed today. In particular, I hope to hear your thoughts concerning the potential of creating institutions that can communicate [the needs of local actors] to state authorities."

Professor Takeuchi's Response (Three Points)

"First, I'd like to discuss the issue of land rent. In Africa today, there is a steady progression of farmland enclosures. In other words, there is a real sense that land rent is growing force in Africa. In Zambia, for example, the purchase of farmland by urban residents is the driving force behind farmland enclosure. Because Zambia has a weak social safety net, these urban residents view the acquisition of farmland as a guaranteed source of income in old age. To the salaried urban resident, farmland is an incredibly cheap commodity. Thus, when such individuals purchase land with cash, ownership rights over the land in question become clearly delineated [allowing for enclosure]. This is my first point. That is, we must recognize the importance of land rent.

My second point concerns enclosures. Although enclosure is proceeding at an extremely rapid pace, we cannot really say that villagers are being expelled from their places of residence [at a commensurate pace]. While land is being rapidly subject to enclosure in Africa, we do not yet see a fierce conflict [between villagers and city dwellers], making for a complex situation. On the other hand, although there have been cases where land titles have been granted, those that have been granted have been politicized; the current administration, as well as land title–granting localities, have issued land titles with no concrete owners. Such titles are easily subject to change based on individual circumstances, leading to instability.

If we speak in terms of primitive accumulation, it is normal to see an outside power forcibly expropriating land, then being granted legal title to this theft. However, those land titles that have been recognized at the political level in Africa lose their validity when the country experiences regime change. Such instances of political change have been common in African history. In my opinion, it is important to pay attention to this fact and how it influences events to come. In other words, this is a crucial dimension to consider for scholars in regional studies.

As for my third point, with regards to India, Professor Sato Hiroshi has discussed the policy differences of two regimes, and that these policy differences can be understood within the framework of neoliberalism. I find this point very suggestive, and agree that we can view things in this way. For example, in the former Bantustan of South Africa, there was no system of private land ownership, only an indirect form of ownership. However, following the abolition of apartheid, these Bantustan were reintegrated into South Africa. During this process of reintegration, there was a great deal of discussion in South Africa over how to deal with the administration of the land in the former Bantustan. Eventually, though the state did not establish any concrete policy, it was decided to vigorously prevent the intrusion of foreign capital into the former Bantustan. The experience of apartheid – and the expropriation of land from native black Africans that came with it – was still fresh in the minds of South Africans, and so the government did not take up any policies for foreign investment in those Bantustan areas. But the experience of other countries has been different – for instance, Mozambique is a nation that energetically introduced foreign investments. Furthermore, there are differences in land policy within the same nation. In Ethiopia, for example, policy differs markedly between land of high and low value. Considering this situation, I believe it is essential to consider state policy regarding land."

Professor Hataya Noriko Responds to Professor Sakai

"First, regarding the peace process and politics of Columbia, it is not accurate to say that Colombia has been in a constant state of civil war, nor that the new peace treaty has opened up a chance to build a new Colombia. Compared to other countries in Latin America, Colombia has had remarkably stable and fixed democratic institutions. But this political establishment is extremely exclusionary, and there is little chance for the emergence of political parties representing populism or leftism. The peace process itself is in a precarious position in the current political climate. Two years ago, when the peace proposal was put up to a popular vote, it failed. This was a result that shocked even those outside of Colombia, and a compromise measure was pushed through. Therefore, while we cannot say that everyone does not want peace, the struggle over the peace process is wrapped up in the political battles between President Santos and members of the previous administration. Additionally, this year (2018) is a presidential election year, and matters of land policy like that discussed earlier remain in the balance, and we cannot say how things will develop. Essentially, things are very precarious now.

Regarding the possibility of non–market values; Colombia is a nation where a neoliberal and pro–US faction have achieved dominance in politics. Therefore, while areas like the Reserve Zones or special grants to ethnic minorities have been protected by the government, such policies were the products of comprise. Currently, there is no move to reconsider going beyond the already–established areas. As peace progresses, we are likely to see an increase in foreign investment in Colombia. The protected areas, guaranteed to the farmers despite bitter feelings and stigmatism from the government, are not going to be

expanded, according to the current administration. Should large scale development begin, the government will draw from neoliberal designs, and advance development along their desired path. There is also suggested revision to the law. Now, there are alternative models of development not based on market principles, and I'd like to draw attention to these. One more issue is that, local initiatives for development are dispersed across the country; at the same time, we have movements have arisen to accept former guerrillas who are returning to society. There is friction between movements from below and the kind of order planted from the top down by the government. There are things we should pay attention to in the movements for alternative development, but there will certainly continue to be conflict with the official government policies."

Professor Sato Hiroshi Gives His Comments

"While I do not have a high opinion of democracy in India, I feel myself in a rather strange dilemma as I speak about Indian democracy. Now, regarding the issue of political parties staking opposite positions on the question of land, the parties are being pushed in this direction by outside forces. For example, NGOs and so–called social movements are particularly active in India, producing a multiplicity of opinions on the land issue, and the political parties have no choice but to reflect these interests. If party politics can be seen to have a degree of democracy, one reason is the strength of actors outside of the political parties. If we suppose that the parties were truly democratic and created policies that reflect the demands of the people, then surely we would see the debates over land policy taking place entirely within the realm of party politics. We have a politics base on vested interests, though during the previous regime we saw the beginnings of democratic politics, and we are now seeing a real impact of these democratic sprouts. There are the law of public information and initiatives against unemployment. Without these policies, it is impossible to speak of politics in India today. In the past, members of social movements helped to craft government policies as advisers. For that reason, when we think of Indian democracy, it should be within a large framework that considers these non–party actors in addition to the political parties.

Additionally, I'd like to offer the following three points. First, relating to the land reforms mentioned in Professor Takeuchi's presentation – well, these three points actually come from thinking of comparisons between Africa and India – regarding land reform, in the case of India, in the 1960s – well that is to say the reforms up to the early 70s – these reforms were actually land redistribution and tenancy reforms, whereas in case of Africa, the problem is to newly settle the landholding rights upon (individual) owners. Can we not suppose that such landholding rights were originally intended for making land a marketable commodity? This is because it would be impossible to commodify land and dispossess the original users without such landholding rights.

My next point deals with the establishment of these rights. This is an enormous issue in India, and I will offer one example using the land ownership of forests. The state has assumed total ownership over all forests, though this system was established at the same time as that for land rights. When we consider this issue in India with Africa in mind, it presents an extremely interesting opportunity for reflection. There are many more issues with effect both Africa and India, and one of them is the problem of Indians in Africa. In both eastern and southern Africa, seventy to eighty percent of migrants from India come from Gujarat. Those from Gujarat make up a sizeable portion of those Indians who actively mediate relations between India and Africa. Meanwhile, it is in Gujarat that we see the most enthusiasm amongst those who

effect cooperation programs at the government level.

Additionally, within the India–Africa cooperation, the current involvement of Japan is of great importance. As a growing sense of resistance to the influence of China develops amongst India and Africa, India does not desire to go it alone, but rather seeks partnership with Japan. This trend began with Mozambique. From Mozambique to Zambia, and then with Gambia, we have a joint India–Japan Africa project. Therefore, rather than speaking of the two nations of India and Mozambique, what is occurring in Africa now can be said to be a conflict over market penetration across several countries in Africa. This is how China enters the picture. Whenever India makes any kind of commitment to Africa, it must necessarily involve Japan acting in partnership."

Professor Tomotsune Gives the Following Comments

"To give my broad impressions, I am reminded of Benedict Anderson's work in *Imagined Communities*. When we think of global capitalism, our impression is often that of the developed nations of the OECD acting as the driving force of the global financial market, spreading neoliberal development out to the rest of the world without regard for mercy or humanity. However, in actuality it is local forces that act as the conduit for global finance and allow capital to penetrate into, and reorganize, localities across the globe. In other words, we must correct our image of global capitalism. One helpful suggestion in this direction is found in Professor Nakayama's "three scales:" global space, urban space, and the nation state. If we could perhaps have a more vivid explanation of this model, no doubt there is possibility that we will revise our image of global capitalism.

Next, I'd like to discuss Professor Gluck's presentation. What was suggestive about this presentation, which started with interviews with individuals from Lesotho, is the question of who is sustaining modernity? The questions of whose voice, whose ideas are supporting modernity. Moreover, the issue of realizing modernity through various approaches and through one's internal desires. In a concrete way, these are realized through a local power. Realized through legal revisions and institutionalization. If we think in this way, laws for the revision of land policy reveal the different faces of modernity. Modernity, land reform, and rent–based capitalism has many different facets with the same configuration.

Building on that, one thing that I'd like to ask Professor Haraguchi is, regarding the recognition of land and space, can we think of the phenomenon seen in Osaka as the same as that in Africa, India, and Colombia? In particular, in whichever country, in whichever region, local power holders play an enormous role. How should we understand the nature of this kind of power in Osaka? How should we think of the role of the Osaka city government? Additionally, you mentioned in your presentation that Osaka is really two places, the north and the south. In the north we have Minami, in the south Kamagasaki. This reflects class divisions. How is this class hierarchy reflected in the local authorities?

Regarding Professor Nakayama's point, to put it simply, this is uneven development, and not modernity. The relative intensity of uneven development may be different, but I think the answer may be found in the approach of Professor Gluck, which is comprehensive, all–inclusive. At the end of Professor Gluck's presentation, she mentioned that "Modernity is inhuman. However, modernity contains within it the potential to turn the inhuman into the human." In contrast, uneven development does not contain this possibility. Or, at least we can think that preestablished harmony is not possible. If we can think of the answer as lying here, then the true resolution is not to be found within uneven development."

Professor Haraguchi Responds

"First, I'd like to focus on the many keywords we've been using. An ill–disposition towards neoliberalism – that is to say the process by which the dispossession of land is actually realized – is the broad premise, and we can get inspiration from the various points we share. Here, through the experiences of African countries and others, when we once more examine the state of affairs in Osaka, it becomes clear that there are various forces at work effecting dispossession here as elsewhere. At the end of my presentation I mentioned the phrase "accumulation by dispossession" (a phrase comes from David Harvey's 2003 book), but this concept comes from Marx's idea of 'primitive accumulation.' Now, the 'primitive' in primitive accumulation refers to the process of accumulation that occurred before the age of capitalist production. Harvey uses 'accumulation by dispossession' because we actually see this process of capital accumulation occurring over and over again in the course of the history of capitalism, in particular in urban centers, and no only in the prehistory of capitalism.

Since the 1980s, in the age of neoliberalism, this process of capital accumulation has swelled enormously. There have been a number of empirical studies in the field of urban studies, showing how this process has occurred in places like New York and London, and many new studies are progressing now with this viewpoint in mind. Here I'd like to make some key points. First, there is a shared understanding of the problem of neoliberalism and its prioritization of market values. But whatever the region, to enact neoliberal policies, local elites are essential. If we take this view, it becomes clear that the market cannot function without the coordination of local elites. Now, there are cases when primitive accumulation occurs with great violence, and also cases where it proceeds smoothly. That is to say, because there are cases of eviction only with intense, violent struggle and cases where there is relatively little eviction, we must examine all the various possibilities of this process.

Moving on, there is one more important point I'd like to make, this one involving the cooperation between state and public corporations, particularly with TPP under the Hashimoto government in Osaka. We've seen many overbearing performances online and in the media, but there is another technique they use to actualize their policies, which is to request policy proposals, and then execute them with state power.

For my next point, I would like to think about the issue of class. When we speak of neoliberalism, generally we begin with the principles of the market, but as David Harvey has made clear neoliberalism is also the 'restructuring of society with class power by large corporations, and in particular finance capital.' This is to say, the class power that had dominated up to the 1970s based on Fordist model of production had stagnated. Through trial and error we have arrived at a new era of class dominance, and it is with this in mind that we should consider issues of land, power, and capital. With this in mind, I'd like us to pay attention to the fact that, while it is normal to not leave out industrial production and factories when we discuss cities, in today's presentation, such topics did not come up. We're speaking of agriculture, industry, and land, but we are in a situation where factories do not enter into our discussion. I believe this is the situation in Africa, and in Osaka, a city which is supposed to be an industrial city, yet where factories no longer hold any meaning. Instead, the current trend is debating whether or not to invite casinos into Osaka. Following this treat of commonality, it is possible to see how the shape of global capital has shifted from the dominance of industrial capital to finance capital."

Professor Nakayama's Response

"I agree with Professor Haraguchi's assessment that what matters is not within the factory anymore. In the realm of global development, international agriculture has shifted its form, and craftsmanship has been overwhelmingly deteriorating. That is to say, we have an industry that is premised on the enjoyment of wealth instead of the production of things to satisfy the needs of humanity. However, at the same time, international agriculture has shifted its form into a kind of industry, and the logic of industry has escaped from the factory and mingled with the realm of living things. By which I mean, industry gone beyond the area of factory, but affects the human body and other life – e.g., we can grow plants without natural light and combat food crises, and in the field of DNA we are almost recreating human beings. Industry has begun to target humanity itself, and so does not need to be in factories; we now see the logic of industry advance across all segments of life. Human beings have become raw material. There are many possible directions when the topic of factories comes up.

Regarding the comments about the relationship between modernity and uneven development, I was convinced by the first half of Prof. Gluck's lecture, but was disappointed in her discussion of "making the inhuman human." Being human or humanity itself is one of the main ideals of modern West, hence it is nothing more than reverting to the long–held standards of the West to have high expectation for this concept. Besides, it means to once more render invisible a history of incalculable violence done in the name of "humanity", like the case of humanitarian intervention. However, regarding the question of how to take over the heritage of modernity, though this was not a point that has come up yet in our discussion today, I would like to indicate the importance of "recognition" and "consciousness" or knowledge, different from mere information. Or, to use Professor Tomotsune's concept of "impossibility," though we are brought to despair when we recognize the impossibility to get out of uneven development which includes some while expelling them in other sense and which goes in hand in hand with differentiation as well as with identification at the same time, we can still find some hope in our 'consciousness' of partiality. Alternative ideals cannot always get enough power because they tend to be seen as a different kind of ideology, which then does not contribute to conflicting reality. Still, we do have hope for the power of modernity to keep room for partial and regional knowledge, including Western one this time."

Questions from the Floor

In the final section, we took comments from the audience. These were: concerning Africa, how can farmers use their own energies to raise the productivity of their own land; how can they achieve a sustainable existence. Additionally, regarding the complex systems of land administration in Africa, how can this be changed for the better, with a particular regard to the potential of SDGs (sustainable development goals). Finally, how can we draw on Japan's experience of land tax reform?

Professor Takeuchi's Response

"First, today's discussion is relevant to almost all of the seventeen objectives of the SDGs. In particular, in discussions surrounding SDGs, the sixteenth point of "governance" is often overlooked. In such cases, I believe it is essential that while planning for the rule of law and political stability, we also strive for growth which reduces poverty. Based on the shape growth takes, it can lead to stress on the social system, resulting in struggles.

Next, to speak of the expropriation of land in Zimbabwe, when considering the background of why the Mugabe regime initiated such policies of expropriation, one factor was the end of promised aid from the Blair administration, and that land reforms had not progressed in the slightest. South Africa was suffering in a similar predicament, and there, most of the land, especially the land of highest quality, was in the hands of whites. Black Africans had been robbed of this land during the history of colonialism, and were left with an extremely small amount of land to live on. The government promised to return this land that had been usurped by the whites, and yet because they could not just unilaterally seize possession of this land, the government took up a policy of buying land from those willing to sell and selling it to those able to buy. For this reason, there was no progression in the turnover of land.

With this situation in the background, arguments that land seizure should progress more vigorously have some strength in contemporary South Africa. Should such policies be enacted, it is likely that black Africans will be able to produce more due to the simple fact that they have more land, as we have seen in Zimbabwe. However, the political cost that comes with such an initiative is high, and it also leads to international friction. Therefore, if we consider the totality of the situation, these policies produce a negative result.

As the case of Zimbabwe illustrates, we cannot simply move from large plantations held by whites to small scale farms held by black Africans. So, what is the most desirable system of land administration? Africa is currently facing an issue where it does not have enough food to sustain itself. This is a fundamental issue, and in the background, there is widespread enclosure of farmland. Some of these enclosures are to support production for foreign export, and some is for the domestic market. In other words, we have enclosure to support bioengineering, which entails export to developed nations, and enclosure for agricultural production to support the various countries' urban populations. The latter is particularly important for a nation's economic development. On the other hand, the very real problem of insufficient calories continues to this day. Thus, how to raise productivity, and moreover, how to raise it to a level sufficient to end the state of precarious existence of many Africans. How can we provide fertilizer and high–quality seeds in sufficient quantities? These are the real, practical questions we must consider. Recently, there have been discussions regarding the possibility of introducing a system of raising productivity by providing fertilizer and seed through contracts while also preserving farmers' hold on the land. I believe it is possible to raise the productivity of farmland without the rapid consolidation of large plantations based on mechanized agriculture."

Professor Sato Gives the Following Remarks Regarding Land Tax Reform

"The land system developed in India under British control took shape from the late eighteenth to the mid–nineteenth century. So, there is no clear comparison with Japan. However, we can say that the land administration of Taiwan and Korea under Japanese control was clearly based on the system the British established in India. There are reports of surveys on British land administration in India within the document collections of the governor generals of Taiwan and Korea."

Professor Tomotsune Gives the Closing Remarks

"The issues discussed today have a practical importance and urgency for policy making, and are not just theoretical. Through the connections brought about by future Africa/Japan research and Japanese

language education in Africa, we must share a sense of importance and urgency surrounding the issues discussed today. Therefore, we must have international symposiums that take a different form from academic conferences.

Finally, both Professor Sakai and I would like to expressive our gratitude to all the presenters and attendees. It has been a great opportunity for the Institute of Japan Studies as well as the newly–established African Studies Center to hold this symposium. Today, we have heard presentations that have reinterpreted our understanding of modernity through considerations of pressing issues like land reform, as well as various other topics including contemporary Osaka. Thank you."

パネルディスカッション

　　ディスカッションでは、まず、本学の坂井真紀子氏から次のような提起がなされた。アフリカでは、本来市場で取引されるべきではない土地が市場原理に還元されているなかで、「小規模な」農業従事者、自然条件に依拠した旧来の生業や牧畜を営んでいる人々の権利や生活をどうやって守っていくのか、という問題に直面している。かつてアフリカには、国という枠組みを無視し、国と接点がなくても生きてこられた時代があった。しかしこれからは、政府との対話の場所をどうつくるかが大事な問題になる。その観点から、武内報告では、国際的な潮流の流れに右に倣えで政治をやっている部分があることや、佐藤報告では対照的に、インドの国内の政党政治が非常に機能しているようすが紹介された。そこでは対話の場ができているというところで、学ぶところも大きいのではないかと考えた。またコロンビアは、幡谷報告では、内戦の混乱から和平の時期を経て、いわゆる新しく国を作り直すトランジットのせめぎあいの中で、鉱物資源の開発の問題や、商業的な農業への指向性など、外部からの投資がノーチェックで入ってきてしまいそうな懸念もある。そうしたなかで、市場のロジックではなく地域の人々が様々な価値をもって土地との関係を結んでいる実践や、貨幣に換算できない価値をどのように言語化し、その大切さをどう優先的に政治に反映していけるのかが共通の課題だといえよう。それぞれの地域の違いのところで、先生方の意見を伺いたいと思う。総じて政治的な対話の機会をどうやれば作っていけるのかという観点での討議を期待したいというものであった。

　　これに対して武内進一氏からは、次の３点の応答があった。

　　まずレントに関して。現在、農村の土地がどんどん囲い込まれている状況がある。すなわちレントのライジングフォースがきわめて大きいことを実感している。たとえばザンビアで、農村の土地が囲い込まれる大きな理由は、都市の居住者が土地を買っているところにある。ソーシャルセキュリティが弱いアフリカでは、都市住民は自分たちの老後の保障のために農村の土地を買う。都市の給与所得者にしてみれば、農村の土地というのはものすごく安い。それによって土地を現金で取得するというケースが、所有権が明確化されたことによって起こりやすくなっている。ということが一つある。これは、レントの重要性の一つだと改めて気づかされた。

　　２点目は、エンクロージャー＝土地の囲い込みにかかわることだ。土地の囲い込みはものすごく急速に進んではいるが、村に住む人たちが、住む場所を追われている状況がどんどん出ているか、というと、必ずしもそうではないのではないのかと感じている。アフリカでは土地は急速に囲い込まれてはいるが、まだ、フリクションは激しくは起きていないという微妙な状況にある。一方で土地の権利が与えられてはいるが、その与えられた土地の権利がポリティサイズされており、現在の政権や、土地権証書を発行した地域にもとづき、人的な登記、具体的な名前に紐づけられていない形の所有権になっている。そのような所有権は当然、人的な理由で変わりうるから不安定である。本源的蓄積であれば、最初に外的力が加わって土地が取得され、所有権に転化する。しかし政治化された所有権は、政権が変わったら効力を失ってしまうかもしれない。アフリカの歴史においてそうした前例は多い。そうしたことが今後どう動くかを見ていく必要があると思っている。つまり、これは、具体的に次元を観察するということが地域研究者としては重要ではないか、と思っている。

　　３点目として、インドとの関係で、佐藤宏さんが二つの政権による政策の差があり、その政策の差異がネオリベラルという大きな枠組みの中でもあり得るのか、と提起された。これは私にとってはとても興味深かった。私は、それはあり得ると思っている。具体的には、南アフリカでかつてバントゥー

スタンと呼ばれたところは、私的所有権がなく、間接的な所有権だけがあったが、そのバントゥースタンは、アパルトヘイト体制の廃止によって南アフリカの国に統合されることになった。この間、南アフリカで、かつてバントゥースタンだった地域の土地政策をどうするか、という非常に大きな議論があった。結論から言うと、まだそこにきちんとした法律は制定されていないが、政府方針として、その土地に対して積極的に外資の投入は行っていない。アパルトヘイトの経験があり、アフリカ人の土地が収奪されたという歴史的記憶があるので、そういう所に外資を入れるという政策を取っていない。国によっては、積極的に外資を導入するモザンビークのような国もあるが、国ごとにいろいろな対応がある。また、国の中にも対応がある。エチオピアなどは、高地と低地では明らかに政策が全く違う。そのことについて、政策の差異を見ていく必要があると思っている、と述べた。

続いて幡谷則子氏は、坂井氏からのまとめに対して次のようなレスポンスがなされた。

コロンビアの平和プロセスや政治プロセスについて、コロンビアはずっと内戦にあり、今になって和平プロセスで国づくりを始めたというわけではない。他のラテンアメリカ諸国と比べると、非常に安定した長期民主体制を堅持しているような優等生であるが、非常に排他的であったために、ポピュリズムや左翼政府が育てられるだけの政党政治体制が出来ていないイメージがある。和平プロセス自体も現在の国政の中で、天秤にかかっている状態である。二年前にも和平協定法案が国民投票において僅差で一回成立しなかった。これは、世界的にも非常に驚愕した国民投票結果であり、かろうじて修正案が通過した。したがって、みんな和平を望んではいるが、今のサントス大統領とそれまでのタカ派のウリベ派とに二つに分かれた国政の中で、その政争に巻き込まれているといえる。更に、今年（2018年）は大統領改選であり、今日話したような土地法案を、次の国会が開くまでは天秤のまま続き、そのあと5月の大統領選でタカ派のウリベ派が返り咲いたときどのように展開されるかはわからない。そういう意味では非常に不安定な状況である。

市場以外の価値についていえば、コロンビアはネオリベ・親米派を貫徹してきている国なので、リザーブ・ゾーンやエスニックグループが持っている特別に認められた土地は、地方では保護されてはいるが、それも妥協の産物だとみている。今回はその法をそれ以上見直さないという流れだ。和平が進めばどんどん外資が入ってくるだろう。農民が政府との間で、スティグマを与えられながらもかろうじて確保してきたものを、これ以上は拡大しないと政府は言っている。大型開発がはじまれば、政府はネオリベの方に引き寄せた法改革を、現実と政府の関心に引き付けた方に変えて進めるだろう。それが今回の法改正でもある。市場原理主義以外のオルタナティブな開発モデルもあり、私はそれに注目している。もう一つの問題は、ローカルイニチアシブで生まれてきているものが点在する中で、ゲリラ兵が社会復帰をするときにそれを受け皿にしようという動きが表れている。「下からのイニシアチブでやるもの」と「政府がトップダウンで植え付けてくること」とは、齟齬が出てきてしまう。そのオルタナティブについても注目すべきところではあるが、政府の政策とのコンフリクトというのは、これからも続いていくのではないかとみている。

続いて、佐藤宏氏は次のようにコメントした。

私はインドの民主主義はあまり高く評価しないが、こうやって話をしてしまうと、インドの民主主義を宣伝しているような、変なジレンマに陥るということを改めて実感している。

政党が土地の問題を争点にして対立を仕向ける立場をとるということについては、政党がそういうことを仕向けている。そういうことをしているということは、政党以外のアクターがある。例えば、NGOや社会運動と呼ばれるものがインドでは非常に活発で、ある種多元的な意見が生まれるところに、

政党がそれを反映しなくてはいけないという根本がある。政党政治がある程度民主的に見えるその背景は、政党以外に政治のアクターが豊かに育つというのが一つの条件である。もし、今日の話で政党が人々の要求を反映した政策において対立するというところで民主主義が見えるとするならば、むしろそういう全体の中で出てきた問題だと考えた方がいい。権利にもとづく政治というのもそういった背景があり、前の政権の時代にある程度芽生えた訳で、実際現実に実行力をもってある程度インパクトを与えたのは最初の二つだけだった。情報公開法と失業対策（雇用創出）。これを抜きにインドの政治を語ることができない。かつては社会運動家たちが政策のアドバイザーとして入ったりしてやっていた。そういう意味で、インドの民主主義を考えるさいに、少し大きな枠組みで考えていただけたら、と思う。

　　加えて、次の三つのことを指摘したい。一つ目は、武内さんの報告での土地改革に関連して、この三つというのはインドとアフリカということで見た時に感じたものだが、土地改革というと、インドの場合、60年代、例えば70年代初めまであった改革を意味するが、ここでの土地改革は、土地を収奪するために所有権を与えるというものだった。もともと所有権というのはそういうものだったのだろう。土地を市場化して収奪するためには所有権がないと成り立たないからだ。

　　もう一つは、権利の確定について。インドの場合は極めて大きな問題で、一つの例として森林の所有権が挙げられよう。森林の所有権というものを完全に国家が取ってしまったが、これも土地制度の確定の際に起こったことだった。アフリカのことを見ながら、インドで起こっていることを考えると、とてもおもしろいなと改めて受け止めることができた。現実の問題として、いくつか、インドとアフリカにまたがる問題としていくつか名前を出したが、東アフリカも南アフリカも、インドからの移民のかなりの割合70、80%がグジャラート人である。アフリカとインドのつながりを仲立ちするインド人というのは、グジャラートとして支持者が多くて、実際に政府レベルでやっているアフリカの協力プログラムというのは、グジャラートが一番熱心である。もう一つ、インドとアフリカの提携の中に、実は現在日本が噛んでいるということも重要で、インドとアフリカで特に中国に対して対抗意識を燃やして進出しようというときに、インド独自の進出だけではなく、日本をパートナーにしたいという。それはモザンビークから始まった。モザンビークからザンビア、ガンビアに入るルートは、日本とインド共同のアフリカプロジェクトとなった。であるから、モザンビークとインドの二国間というよりは、今のアフリカで起きていることは、多国間の市場争奪戦とでも言えよう。そこに中国が入っているという構図がある。インドがアフリカに何かコミットしようというときには、必ず、日本を巻き込む／巻き添えに一緒にやる、ということが一つのパターンになっている。

　　つづいて友常から次のようなコメントを述べた。

　　まず大きな枠組みの印象は、ベネディクト・アンダーソンの『想像の共同体』の方法論を思い出した。グローバル資本主義は、グローバル金融市場を先進諸国OEDC諸国が牽引役となって、世界中に無慈悲に展開していくという風に考えていたが、じっさいにはローカルな権力ルートをとおして実現され、ローカルな権力と地域を編成しながらすすんでいることに改めて気づかされた。つまりグローバル資本主義のイメージを修正しなければならない。そのひとつの手がかりとして、中山先生が提示した三つのスケール——グローバル空間と都市と国民国家がある。これをもうすこし生き生きと描くことができれば、たぶん私たちのイメージにあるグローバル資本主義というのは書き換えられる可能性があるのではないか。

　　次にグラック先生の報告について考えたい。レソト王国の人物に対するインタビューからはじまった報告が示唆しているのは、どのような声で、誰がモダニティを存続させているのかということではなかったか。——誰の声、誰の意思がモダニティを支えて存続させているのかという問い。しかも様々

な働きかけや、自分の内在的な欲望を通して、モダニティは実現される。それが具体化されるときには必ずある特定の権力ルートをとおして実現される。法改正や制度化をとおして実現される。そのように考えると、土地改革をめぐる法は、ほとんどモダニティの違う顔に見える。近代性と土地改革とレント資本主義は、同じ事態の異なる横顔に見える。

　　そのことを踏まえたうえで、原口先生に聞いてみたいのは、土地と空間の承認において、アフリカ、インド、コロンビアのケースと同じようなことが大阪でも進行しているという認識を持たれたかどうか。とりわけどの国においても、どの地域においても、地域権力というのがかなり大きな役割を果たすが、大阪における地域権力の性格をどう理解するか、大阪市行政をどう考えるかということに関わるだろう。もうひとつは、最初に原口さんは大阪はじつは南と北なんだと述べられた。北にミナミがあり、南が釜ヶ崎になる。これは階級関係を反映している。そうした階級は、この地域権力のなかでどのように表現されているのか。

　　中山先生については、シンプルにいえばその提起は「不均等発展だ」であり、近代性ではないのだということであったかと思う。不均等発展は強度がちがうが、グラック先生が伝えようとしているアプローチは、ある意味で答えを用意しているところがある。それは包括的だ。グラック先生が最後にレソトの話で終ったことには、「モダニティは inhuman である。でも inhuman なものからhuman なものを取り戻す可能性がモダニティなもののなかにある」という示唆が孕まれている。それに対して不均等発展論が示すのは、不可能性である。あるいは予定調和的な解答はないというイメージだと思う。これが解答だと思ったら常に不均等発展のメカニズムのなかに投げ込まれてしまって終わりがないということではないかと思う。

　　それに関わって、不均等発展が対立や不可能性をより顕在化させる方法論と考えていいのか。これは、革命の運動論とは区別したアプローチを考えたと言われたことであり、それはつまり不可能性をより顕在化していくということなんだろう。グローバル資本に対するさまざまな実践がある種のhuman なものを実現したかにみえても、それは常に不可能性を伴っていることを、より顕在化させていくための方法論として、中山先生の不均等発展という議論があったと考えてよいのかどうか。

　　これに対して、原口剛氏からは次のコメントがあった。

　　まず、共通するキーワードがいくつもあるということに気づかされた。新自由主義への怒り、つまりは土地の略奪というものが実現されるそのプロセスはその土地によって様々であることは大前提ではあるが、そこに共通する何かしらの力の手がかりを、インスピレーションをいただいた。その中で、アフリカやさまざまな国々の経験を経由することで、改めて大阪の状況で何か言えることがあるだろうかと言うと、たしかに大阪で働いている、さまざまな日本国内の土地でも作動している権力のあり様というのがよりクリアに位置づけられるようになったと思う。「掠奪による蓄積」という言葉を最後に出したが（これはデヴィッド・ハーヴェイが 2003 年の本のなかで示した概念だが）、元をたどれば「本源的蓄積」である。ただこの本源的蓄積「primitive」という言葉は、どうしても資本主義の前の段階で一回きりでおこるプロセスというニュアンスを含んでしまう。ハーヴェイは、そういった「掠奪による蓄積」が様々な都市で、絶えず資本主義の歴史のなかで繰り返されていること、今はとくに 1980 年代以降、ネオリベラルな世界のなかで、ますます肥大化しているということをしめすために言い換えた言葉である。実証研究としては、地理学の論文のなかで、ニューヨーク、ロンドンなど、様々な場所で起こっていることを見直していこうという論文・研究が進んでいる。そのなかで重要な論点がある。第 1 に、共通する論点としてネオリベラリズムというものが通常、市場原理主義＝市場の問題として語られるが、どの土地でも必ずなにがしかの権力を必要とする。権力のコー

ディネートがなければ市場というものが作用しないというのはむしろクリアに表れている。ただ、本根源的蓄積が極めて暴力的なパターンもあれば、スムーズにすすんでしまう場合もあることが指摘されている。そういう点でいうと、極めて強烈な立ち退きをもたらす場合もあれば、比較的立ち退きを起こさないようなかたちですすむ場合もあるように、多様な道筋を見ていくことも重要ではないかと思う。

　　　それから、もうひとつの重要な論点として、官民協働、TTP が繰り返し出てきた橋下徹市政の話をしたが、メディアやネット上ではものすごく威圧的なパフォーマンスが多いが、じっさいの政策現場ではもうひとつの手法があり、現場からの提案を求める、そしてその提案を次々と実現していくという手法を持っている。これはある意味でいうと、主体性を引き出し、その民衆・現場の主体的な発想から出てきたものを刈り取るという手法をもっている。今日は revanchism ということで暴力ということを強調したが、一方で新自由主義ならではの手法としては、民衆、現場、運動が発明したものを次々と刈り取っていく、その権力の作用をコインの裏表として作動しているということも考えさせられた。

　　　もう一つの論点として、階級という観点からだが——改めて思い知らされた部分だが——、ネオリベラリズムと言ったとき、どうしても通常、「市場原理」の意味合いが最初に出てくるが、デヴィッド・ハーヴェイは明確に、「大企業、とりわけ金融資本による階級権力の再構築」という定義の仕方をしている。つまり、70 年代くらいまでのフォーディズム的な資本蓄積および権力の組合せがどんづまりになってしまった。そのなかで試行錯誤された権力の再構築のあり方が今現在の土地と権力と資本との組合せになっているという論点があらためて重要ではないか。その論点からいうと、改めてはたと気づかされるのは、都市を語るのに通常、工場生産や工場という存在が絶対欠かせなかったが、今日の話のなかで工場というのはほとんど出てこない。農業、工業、土地ということで、むしろ工場が出てこない状態になっている。これはアフリカでもそうだったと思うし、工業都市であるはずの大阪でも工場について何か語ることがほとんど意味を持たなくなっている。むしろカジノを誘致するかどうかなどの方向に流れている。そういった共通の糸をたどっていくと、資本主義の有様がどれだけ変わったかに気づかされた。

　　　続いて中山智香子氏からのコメントは次のとおりであった。

　　　原口先生の、現場がもう工場ではない、という点はまったくそうだと思う。グローバルな展開のなかで、国際農業みたいなものが違う形になって、物づくりが圧倒的に劣化した。そういう意味では、インダストリーというものが、つまり物質を加工して人間の何かに役立てるという部分が——根本的にインダストリーというものは、そこから人々が豊かさを享受していくものなのだ、ということに対する視点が落ちていっている。しかしながら、反面インダストリーなロジックというのは工場を抜け出て、生き物のなかに入り込んでいる。つまりインダストリーというのは、もはや工場のなかにとどまらず、人間の体や植物（土地がなくても光を浴びていれば成熟して野菜がとれるし、食料危機にも対処できる）、遺伝子（DNA まで分解していってとか、人間を究極的には作れるとか）に入り込んでいる。インダストリーが人間をターゲットにし始めているので、工場なんて作らなくて良い、つまり、現実の世界のなかで、インダストリーのロジックを全面的に展開するということが起こっている。人間が材料になりはじめている。工場ということに関してはすごく考えることが多いので発言させていただいた。

　　　不均等発展とモダニティの関係については、前半で納得しながら、「inhuman なものを human に」というところで、すごくがっかりした。Human なものに賭けていると。つまり、それで、モダニティに逆にいいところがあるのだとしてしまうと、これは西洋がながく持ってきたスタンダードにもどることにしかならない。Human の名のもとに、様々な暴力を展開してきた歴史がまた見えなくなってしまうということである。後半部分の結論にいたる部分は私にとってはしっくりいかない。しかしなが

ら、モダニティをどう引きずるかということについては、今日は展開できなかった論点だが、最後に話した「認識」の問題は、モダニティが持っていた非常に良い部分を含んでいる。情報ではなく知識や認識でやっていくというモダニティが時間をかけて作ってきた蓄積があまりに蔑ろになっており、ある種のシニシズムとなって展開していくときには、理屈としては絶望的な話をみる。あるいは友常先生の表現でいうと「不可能性」ということになるが、この不均等発展の現状があって何かを包摂しながら何かを排除するというこの形、あるいは差異化と同一化のメカニズムで進んでいくということを知れば知るほど、理屈のうえで考えれば、現実的には絶望するということになる。そういうかたちでの理念のオルタナティブで語ると、イデオロギーの違いということで完全に平行線になり、紛争というのは全然なくならないということだと思う。知識は、領域的ではあるが、役割があるという意味では、モダニティにまだまだ可能性はあるとみている。

　　最後にフロアからの質問がいくつか出た。

　　アフリカにおいて、どのようにすれば農民が自分で土地生産性を上げ、自給的な生活が可能になるのか、また、複雑なアフリカの土地制度について、どのように変えていけばいいのか、とりわけSDGs（持続可能な社会）に関してはどうか。また、日本の地租改正のような経験は参照できるのかというものであった。

　　武内氏からのレスポンスは以下のようなものであった。

　　まず、17の目標のほとんどすべてに今日の話は関係する。とりわけ16番目のガバナンスの話が、SDGsの議論の中で見落とされる場合がある。その際、法的な秩序、政治的な安定を図りながら、成長なり貧困削減なりを努力していくことが重要だと考えている。成長のしかたによっては、それが社会にストレスを生むこともあり、結果的に紛争を陥ってしまうということがありえる。

　　次にジンバブエの土地収用についていえば、そもそもムガベ政権がなぜ土地収用に踏み切ったかという背景の一つは、ブレア政権が約束していた援助をストップし、土地改革が全然進まなかったという所にある。南アフリカも同じような事例で苦しんでおり、国土の大部分、特にいいところをいわゆる白人がもっており、アフリカ人は歴史的な過程で土地を奪われ、非常に狭いところに押し込められてきた。その白人の土地を返還するということを政府は約束しているが、無理に取り上げるわけにはいかないので、売りたい人がいるところで買える人が買うという政策を取っている。それゆえなかなか土地の移転が進まない。そういう状況があり、現在南アフリカでも、土地収用をもっと進めるべきではないか、という議論が力を持ちつつある。それをやれば、ジンバブエで起こったように、土地を単に移転し、それを黒人が取得することで生産が上がるかもしれない。ただし、それに伴う政治的なコストはとても高く、かつ国際的にも軋轢を生む。したがって総合的に考えると、経済的にはマイナスに働くかもしれない。ジンバブエの例が示しているように、単に白人の大農場から黒人の小農へ移転するということではすまなくなる。では、どういう土地制度の在り方が望ましいのか。アフリカの直面している問題は、食料が十分自給できていない、という根本的な問題があり、現在の大規模な土地の囲い込みの背景として、国際的な輸出向けの生産という側面と、国内市場向けの食糧調達という二つの側面がある。つまり、バイオエネルギーのために土地を囲い込むという先進諸国向けの囲い込みと、その国の都市向けの農業のための農業開発の土地の囲い込みがある。とりわけ後者はその国の経済成長のためには必要である。一方で現在に至るまで食糧自給に成功していないという厳然たる事実がある。そこでいかに生産性を上げていくのか、しかも農民たちの生活を脅かさないように生産性を上げていかねばならない。肥料や改良種子などを無理のない形でいかに調達し供給していくのか。こうした実質的な課題を真剣に考えていく

べきだろう。最近、土地は保持したままで、契約という形で肥料や改良種子を提供して生産性を上げていくような仕組みを導入することはできないか、という議論がある。いきなり大規模農園を作り、トラクターを使って機械化農業をやるようなスタイルではない形で、もう少し農業の生産性を上げてはいけないか、と考えている。

　　　また地租改正にかかわって、佐藤氏から次の指摘があった。

　　　　イギリスのインドにおける土地制度は、18 世紀末から 19 世紀半ばにかけて形を成していたから、日本の地租改正との関係ははっきりしない。ただはっきり言えるのは、日本の台湾・朝鮮統治は、明らかにイギリスのインド統治を勉強したうえで行われている。台湾総督府や朝鮮総督府の資料のなかに、イギリスの土地制度を調べた、という記述がある。

　　　　最後に司会としての友常からは、理論的な必要性や切迫性が実感されたこと、また、同時に実践的かつ政策的な切迫性がある。これからアフリカと日本研究・日本語教育などを通じてかかわりが生じてくるときに、そうした必要性や切迫性を共有しなくてはいけないこと、そのために学会とは違うやり方で組織された、こうした国際共同シンポジウムは必要であると提起した。

　　　　また同じく司会の坂井氏からは、新しくできた国際日本学研究院とこの 4 月に設立された現代アフリカ地域研究センターが、共催でシンポジウムを開催することができたこと、今回は、現在の喫緊の課題として土地問題を通して近代性を再考するというテーマで行なったが、日本の大阪からの報告も含めて、各分野から贅沢で非常に奥の深いシンポジウムが実現できたことに、心より感謝申し上げるという挨拶がなされた。

（文責：友常勉）

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