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論文の

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Palmer氏は日本に来る前に外国語教育についていくつかの著作を発表したが、日本に在る間に、その旧著について語るのを聞いたことがない。人に聞かれると、Memorandum（「英語教授法事典」の附録に収めてある）を初め、日本に采てから発表した論文（The Bulletinに出したものや、単行本として出したもの）に触れ、または、これを読むことをすすめた。

その理由は、ロンドンで出した旧著は、日本の英語教育の実態をまったく知らないで書いたから、日本人にはあまり参考にならないと考えていたためであつたと思ふ。旧著の代表的なものを読んでみると、この推測は必ずしも誤つていない。

さて、上にあげたMemorandumは、日本へ采てから、地方の大都市の学校を視察して東京へもどつてきてから間もなく、英語教師の会合で行なつた講演の要旨である。

その内容は、ヨーロッパの外国語教育界では、革新的外国語教授法が前世紀から、さかんに増えられ、それが教師、教育行政担当者の間ですでに半世紀以上問題になつている。ところが、日本ではどこへ行つても訳読一偏倒、教師たちはヨーロッパの革新運動についてあまり聞いていないことがはつきり見えたので、その教授法改革運動の概要をまず紹介してみよう、と思つたという。

Palmer氏の日本における14年の活動を一冊の著作にたとえると、Memorandumはその序論ともいふべきものである。そして、結論にあたるのがTen Axiomsと、これに対する補遺（The de Saussure Doctrine その他）である。

Ten Axiomsが発表されたのは昭和9年3月（The Bulletin No. 101）で、Palmer氏が日本を去つた昭和11年3月末（2・26事件5日後）はちよつと、帰国の約2年前にあたる。

Ten Axiomsが発表されたとき、理事の中に、これに興味を示した人もあつたが、英語研究者からも、英語教師からもほとんど反応はなかつた。その理由は、当時の日本では英語研究者はたいていドイツ語を第2外国語として学んだために、フランス語で書かれたものに気がつかない、というのが普通であつた。かりにフランス語を学んだとしても、フランス人でないSaussureの「言語学原論」に注目した人はまれであつたに違いない。例えば、石川氏がTen Axiomsの日本語訳について相談に答へ得たのは神保裕氏だけであつた。

Palmer氏はフランス語を最も得意とし、若い時はフランス語を教え、本も書いた。しかし、彼は本を読んで知識を豊富にするだけで満足する人ではなく、どんなものからでも何かを学びとり、それを自分の仕事にとり入れよう、という積極的な人であつたから、Saussureの"langage-langue-parole"から、"language-code-speech"の関係が英語教育にとり入れることを考えた。そしてTen AxiomsをBloomfield, Jespersen, その他、海外の知人に送つてその意見を求めたのである。このAxioms発表後日本にいた2年間、これに基づいて長い思索をつづけたが、これに修正を加える必要がない、として日本を去つたのである。

EDITORIAL

Principles and Axioms

For the past fifty years or more, strenuous efforts have been made to substitute for wasteful and ineffective methods of language study methods that make for economy and effectiveness. Such efforts have been made by all sorts of bodies and individuals ranging from governmental committees and educational associations to the proprietors of language-courses and language-schools run on commercial lines. Upon the whole these efforts have been successful rather than unsuccessful. In the more progressive countries, parts of the reform programme are specifically recommended in the official regulations concerning the teaching of foreign languages in centres of learning, while the vogue of popular schools associated with such names as Berlitz show that non-academic as well as academic circles have realized the need for reform—even a very thorough-going reform.

The two chief obstacles in the way of a more general recognition and adoption of sound teaching methods are, first, the conservative and reactionary forces that are always doubtful of and even hostile towards any innovation whatsoever and, secondly, divergent views among the reformers themselves as to the relative importance of this or that factor in language teaching. Thus the one will pin his faith to spoken language and phonetics; the next will urge spoken language without phonetics; another will urge, above all reformed methods of learning to read; others see an equal value in each of the four aims; speaking, hearing, writing and reading. There are those to whom the needed reform consists for the most part in the reform of the grammar-book; others look almost exclusively towards vocabulary limitation and text simplification as the channels for reform. Some concentrate their efforts on the compilation of self-study courses while others look to teacher-training as the most effective means of causing languages to be studied as they should be studied. In short, each reformer tends to see one outstanding fact or theory (the one he happens to be the most interested in), establishes this as the nucleus of the system he favours, and makes everything else fit in with it.

This state of things obviously leads to overlappings, oppositions and waste. The various movements and schools of advocacy, having no common starting-point, start anywhere—and usually finish there. As a French philosopher wrote about a century ago: "Ce n'est pas la logique qu'il nous manque: c'est la base meme de la logique" (Of logic there is no lack, but what is lacking is the basis of logic itself). Of principles of language-teaching there is no lack, but principles are easy to draw up; we could easily point to half a dozen sets of principles each of which gives the appearance of soundness in theory and practice. But each of these sets of principles is found, upon examination, either to be in direct conflict with any of the other sets or to stress one particular point where others stress other particular points.

If classroom procedures should be conducted according to certain principles, the principles themselves should be founded on something underlying them. It is not enough that a language-teaching system should start off with some "Principle One: Our first effort should be to ensure a correct pronunciation; "the critic of the system merely comments: "Why should our first effort be to ensure a correct pronunciation? Why indeed should any sort of pronunciation be taught at all?" If some "Principle Two" should declare, e.g. that "The teaching shall be conducted with the minimum use of the mother-tongue of the pupils," "the critic again enquires "Why?" The enunciation of "principles" is not enough: it must be shown that they are drawn up in accordance with, or as the interpretation of, certain things that are more fundamental than "principles." These basic things should be postulates or axioms, things the truth of which is, so far as is humanly possible, beyond the reach of doubt or query. Thus a statement to the effect: "Hearing and reading must come before reading and writing" may be excellent as a guiding principle in schools that approve the oral approach, but it is no universally accepted axiom. Whereas a statement to the effect "In the normal linguistic history of

a child the skills of hearing and speaking are acquired before the skills of reading and writing" is in the nature of an axiom the truth of which cannot seriously be challenged, as is also "All except artificial languages existed in their spoken before their written form, if any." In such axiomatic utterances we are stating nothing that remains to be proved by experiment or experience.

It would seem, then, that the next stage of progress in connection with the movement for the reform of language teaching will start when a sufficient number of reformers agree upon one common basis of reform which shall take the form, so far as possible, of postulates the validity of which cannot be denied by those in possession of the facts. Not that this will bring about an immediate unity of method nor unanimity concerning the most desirable classroom procedures, for there will still remain individual interpretations of that which will constitute the common basis.

With a view to the furthering of this aim, the I.R.E.T. has drawn up a series of statements that may reasonably be looked upon as affording a common basis or starting point for those who are prepared to elaborate guiding principles. They are set forth in the present issue of the Bulletin under the heading: "Ten Axioms governing the Main Principles to be observed in the Teaching and Learning of Foreign Languages" and are accompanied by notes and explanatory matter which should make clear not only their import but their importance. Among them will be found no statement of which it may be said: "This is no accepted axiom, but an expression of opinion which may or may not fit the facts."

Ten Axioms governing the Main Principles to be observed in the Teaching and Learning of Foreign Languages.

While the Institute for Research in English Teaching, in accordance with its policy, refrains from drawing up any one hard and fast programme of English teaching, it has always recognized that there are certain fundamental postulates that underlie and afford the key to all sound teaching. On various occasions in the past, following the progressive results and achievements of its research in the fields of linguistics, linguistic methodology and speech psychology, it has expressed and published, in the form of declarations or findings, its views and convictions in regard to such postulates.

As the result of more recent research it has become possible to present these in a more concise and yet more complete form. They will be submitted to the Eleventh Annual Convention for ratification. They are set out as follows, each accompanied by explanatory notes.

Axiom I. That a language consists essentially of units that may be conveniently termed "linguistic symbols."

The term "linguistic symbols," first suggested by Dr. E. Sapir, is a logical and convenient one to designate not merely the words of a language, as set forth in alphabetical order in a dictionary, but also those elements that are less than words (e.g. inflexions and derivative prefixes and suffixes), those elements that are more than words (e.g. collocations, phrases etc.), and those elements that are in the nature of construction-patterns (e.g. as seen notably in substitution tables). Certain semantic varieties of any of the above may often conveniently be looked upon as independent linguistic symbols (e.g. spring [of a watch] and spring [of water] may be considered to be two separate symbols).

Axiom II. That a language may be looked upon and treated both as a "code"—the organized system of the language as exemplified by its dictionary, its grammar, and all the information and rules that can be given concerning it, and "as speech"—the sum of the activities involved in the using of the language.

This is our interpretation of the de Saussure theory which distinguishes between la langue (a language as code) and la parole (a language as speech). This view of the nature of a language being endorsed by so many linguisticians, speech psychologists and others, and being moreover so closely in accordance with actual linguistic experience, confirmed by work among the deaf and dumb, there can be no hesitation in regarding it as axiomatic.

When a language is treated more from the point of view of a code, theory embodied in rules of translation and grammar is the chief channel of approach towards it; when a language is treated more from the point of view of its "as-speech" aspect, practice in using it as an instrument of thought is the primary consideration.

In the foregoing axiom and the appended notes the term "speech" is used in the de Saussurian sense, and not in the narrower sense of "the language as spoken."

[In the Japanese version of this axiom, appearing elsewhere in the present issue, the wording differs rather considerably from the above, but the sense conveyed is identical with it.]

Axiom III. That, from the point of view of speech psychology, the learning of a language consists, in its essence, in coming to know the meanings of a sufficient number of these symbols ("identification" of symbols) and of so associating each of these symbols with its meaning that the symbol will immediately evoke the thing symbolized ("fusion" of symbols).

Insufficient prominence has been given in the past to the distinction between these two phases of vocabulary learning and teaching. The distinction corresponds very nearly to what is expressed in French respectively by renseignement and enseignement. One of the chief and most universal defects in teaching and learning foreign languages lies in the assumption that when the learner has come to know what a given word—or other linguistic symbol—means, the main business of learning that word is over. Whereas in point of fact the main business is to ensure the complete fusion between the symbol and the thing symbolized by it. For the purposes of mere "identification," both the direct and indirect methods may be used with profit, but for the purposes of "fusion" it would seem that the direct method alone is operative.

Axiom IV. That, from the point of view of linguistic methodology, the learning of a language consists, in its essence, in the developing of a number of skills, some which are primary, and others of which are secondary.

Whereas Axiom III describes the process of language learning from the point of view of speech psychology, Axiom IV describes the same process from the angle of linguistic methodology. The former expresses, so to speak, the "strategy" and the latter the "tactics" of language learning. A further elaboration of Axioms III and IV would bring the subject out of the field of the axiomatic and into the fields of Principles and Procedures.

Axiom V. That among the primary skills are those of hearing, and articulating in imitation of what is heard.

As, Dr. Cummings has pointed out, no one is able at birth to hear any language. One has by nature a capacity to learn to hear any language. This capacity is an ability to perceive sound, and this can be developed by practice into the skill of hearing a language. Correct hearing is the first step towards correct imitating. The combination of the skills of hearing and imitating what is heard results in the power

to form acoustic-articulatory images, which power, in its turn, facilitates the fusion of linguistic symbols to the things they symbolize.

Axiom VI. That among the secondary skills are those of reading and writing.

They are called "secondary" because in the ordinary course of language acquisition in the most favourable and natural circumstances and conditions, the development and practice of them presuppose a certain degree of proficiency in the forming of acoustic-articulatory images.

Axiom VII. That among the secondary skills are those concerned with translation.

Translation (in the most appropriate sense of the term) is the skill of thinking the same thought successively in two different languages, or alternatively, the skill of expressing in a given language, a thought or emotion presented to us in another language.

Axiom VIII. That pronunciation is not something apart from, or an accretion to, a language, but an integral part of it, and is concerned (a) with the sounds of that language and (b) their distribution in that language.

Unwritten languages (and all natural languages originated in unwritten language) have no existence apart from their pronunciation. The capacity to make all the sounds contained in the language is not sufficient; it must be combined with the capacity to use the right sound in the right place.

Axiom IX. That grammar is not something apart from, or an accretion to, a language, but an integral part of it, and is chiefly concerned with the building up of sentences from their component parts in accordance with the canons of usage.

It is universally admitted to-day by grammarians that grammar is not a series of injunctions as to how the language ought to be used but a series of statements as to how the language actually is used.

Axiom X. That the more or less thorough acquisition of a more or less small vocabulary is the best equipment for coming to acquire a larger vocabulary.

This axiom is the chief justification for the use of limited vocabularies and simplified texts. The relative importance or degree of frequency of occurrence differs enormously from one linguistic symbol to another. While some figure many times on any page of text, others are found only at extremely rare intervals. It has been estimated that 95% of the running words of all ordinary English texts is made up of the 3000 most frequently-occurring words, and that 80% is made up of the 1000 most frequently occurring words.

EDITORIAL

The de Saussure Doctrine

If we were asked: "What linguistic theory is likely to have the greatest influence on the linguistic methodology of the future?" we should answer: "The doctrine (or the main doctrine) of de Saussure."

What is this doctrine?

It is not easy to answer this question in English, for de Saussure formulated the doctrine in French, and in doing so used certain French terms, giving to each a specialized and technical connotation. He said, in effect, "To investigate the nature of langage we must look upon it as being both langue and parole. Langage=langue parole; parole=langage-langue; langue=langage-parole."

Now each of these three terms langage, langue and parole has as little inherent meaning as, for instance, the English words language, tongue and speech, so that even those who study linguistics through French are unable to grasp the import of this doctrine until they come to understand precisely the special connotation given to them by de Saussure. When, therefore, we discuss the doctrine in English we have first to find some appropriate English counterparts to these terms and then define them.

De Saussure himself states that "It is to be noticed that we have defined things and not words; the distinctions that we have established are independent of those ambiguous terms that vary in connotation from one language to another." Availing ourselves of the liberty of the translator, we may therefore use those English terms that are likely to convey best the three concepts that underlie the doctrine in question. We propose the following:

For langage: LANGUAGE (or A LANGUAGE):

For langue: LANGUAGE (or A LANGUAGE) AS CODE;

For parole: LANGUAGE (or A LANGUAGE) AS SPEECH.

The following corresponding Japanese terms have been suggested by Professor Kaku Jimbo:

For langage: GENGO 言語 (=language in general).

For langue: KOKUGO 言語 (a language as its canons of usage) or, more explicitly, HYOSHO NO TAIKEI TO SHITE NO KOKUGO 表象の体系としての言語 (=the language as a code of symbolization).

For parole: HAPPYO RYOKAI KATSUDO 発表了解活動 (activities, expressive or receptive) or, more explicitly, SHIRO NO DOGU TO SHITE NO GENGO 思考の道具としての言語 (=the language as an instrument of thought).

It was with this terminology that we worded (in our last issue) "Axiom II," stating that this was our interpretation of the de Saussure doctrine, as follows:

"That a language may be looked upon and treated both as a "code" —the organized system of the language as exemplified by its dictionary, its grammar, and all the information and rules that can be given concerning it, and 'as speech'—the sum of the activities involved in the using of the language."

We may now restate the doctrine in English: "To investigate the nature of language we must look upon it both as code and as speech. Language=code speech; Speech=language—code; Code=language speech.

We may here quote (by translation into English) from the Cours de Linguistique Générale:

1) Set forth in Cours de Linguistique Générale by Bailly, Sècheyne and Riedlinger (Payot, Paris, 1916).

"What is the code? We do not consider it as being identical with language; it is only a portion of it—an essential portion, it is true. It is both a social product of the faculty of language and a total of the necessary conventions adopted by the social body to allow the exercise of this faculty among individuals. Looked at as a whole, language is multiform and heterocite, astride of several domains, physical, physiological and psychological, it belongs also to the individual domain and to the social domain; it does not allow itself to be classed in any category of human facts, because we cannot determine its identity.

"The code, on the contrary, is a complete whole and in itself a principle of classification. From the moment we give it the first place among the facts of language, we introduce a natural order into a totality that lends itself to no other classification....

"It is not spoken language that is natural to man, but the faculty of constituting a code, i.e. a system of distinct symbols corresponding to distinct ideas....

"The code is not a function of the individual speaker....

"Speech, on the contrary, is an individual act of will and intelligence, in which we must distinguish (1) the combinations by which the individual speaker utilizes the language-code in order to express his personal thought, and (2) the psycho-physical mechanism that makes it possible for him to exteriorize such combinations.

The above is an approximate English rendering of the actual words of de Saussure used in formulating his doctrine.

To understand more clearly the distinction between the language as code and the language as speech, we may have recourse to analogy. The first is a (translated) quotation from Professor Sechehaye, one of the chief interpreters of the de Saussure doctrine: "The code is to speech what the kitchen recipe is to the dish of food." Similarly we may say "The code is to speech what the railway time-table is to railway travel, what the theory of music is to the capacity for enjoying music, what tailoring is to the wearing of garments, what life is to living..."

Another way of making the distinction clearer is to determine speech as "the linguistic activities exercised by a given person in regard to his mother-tongue who has never received instruction in regard to his mother tongue," for example, what an English child in his pre-school age is able to do with English. Similarly we may determine code as "the sum of the instruction that can be given to a person in regard to his mother tongue."

Let us now admit the distinction; let us grant that the distinction corresponds to a reality, that it is by no means that between tweedle-dum and tweedle-dee. Then what? A Japanese student and teacher of English remarked to us recently: "I am acquainted with the de Saussure theory; I have heard—and, I think, understood—lectures on it, but I am unable to see in it any bearing on the actual problems of the language teacher and language learner either inside the classroom or outside. It has seemed to me of academic interest only." Moreover, de Saussure himself and his more immediate disciples have never looked much further than the theoretical or academic side; they have worked in the field of pure linguistic research rather than that of linguistics applied to methodology and classroom needs. The present article starts with the question: "What linguistic theory is likely to have the greatest influence on the linguistic methodology of the future" and with the answer: "The doctrine of de Saussure." We have said, advisedly, "of the future," for if the doctrine as theory has now found acceptance in the circles where linguisticians congregate and compare notes, it has hardly yet penetrated to those places where foreign languages are taught and studied.

The practical bearing of the de Saussure doctrine is this: a language may be not only considered from the two angles of code and speech but may also be approached from either or both of those two angles. Here is a student of English who has no English-speaking environment, whose teacher is unable to use English as speech, who has nevertheless what is called "linguistic insight," who can digest and apply information concerning sentence-building, semantic varieties, patterns, collocations and derivatives. Let him approach English as code and make the fullest possible use of the code. Let us write for his benefit bookfuls of code-matter in the vein of Richards on English determinatives, of Faucett and Fawcett on English composition, of Daniel Jones on English pronunciation. The study of the code, however, means intensive and continual memory work; the student will never come to know more English than those portions of the code that have not slipped from his memory. A few years of neglect, and it is probable that he will have forgotten all that he has learnt. But with the study of the code acting as an initial impetus, the learner may succeed in transferring code-knowledge to the speech side, that is, in transforming code-knowledge into speech-skills.

Here is a student of English with an English-speaking environment, even if this environment consists only of gramophone records and textbooks presenting English as speech. He has little "linguistic insight," cannot digest even the clearest of codifications, but has a natural aptitude for casting his thoughts in the mould of a foreign language, profits by every corrected mistake, remembers every illustrative example, models his "production" on the sum of his "reception," achieves by blind groping what the code enthusiast acquires by organized synthesis. Let him approach English as speech and through speech. If the linguistic environment is adequate, if the student has daily the opportunities of hearing, speaking, reading and writing English as the instrument of communication with those who constitute his environment, his approach to English through speech need be the only approach: he may be independent of the code. If however his linguistic environment is inadequate, his progress must be quickened and furthered by the code.

The teacher who is teaching a language foreign alike to him and his pupils will tend to teach it as code. He will tend to tell his pupils (in the language which is common to them) the nature of that language, how its sentences are built, how its words are derived, how its sounds are made. If he does not possess the language as speech he will not use the language as speech. If he has gained his teacher's diploma as the result of an examination in which the code aspect has been emphasized at the expense of the speech aspect, he will naturally in his turn emphasize the code aspect at the expense of the speech aspect.

The teacher who is teaching his own language to pupils whose language he does not know will naturally tend to teach it as speech. If he does not possess his mother-tongue as code he will avoid the code aspect of it, and trust to whatever capacity his pupils may have for intuitive absorption.

The plan of teaching generally recommended by the I.R.E.T. is based very largely on the application of the de Saussure doctrine. See A Memorandum on Problems of English Teaching in the Light of a New Theory (1924).

It is briefly as follows:

For at least the first term (longer if possible) let the teacher present and the pupil approach the language as speech by means of the direct method. For the first six weeks at least let the teaching be oral, then let what has been learnt be recapitulated through reading and writing. When the pupil has thus come to possess a minimum vocabulary together with the most important grammar-mechanisms, let the language be re-approached as code. Instruction in the code will be given by

means of appropriate directions (rules etc.) and elementary exercises in sentence-building (for the most part direct-method composition exercises). From this time onwards the teaching will be an alternation of speech and code: new material introduced as speech and consolidated by code.

This is roughly the general plan adopted by the English department of the Fukushima Middle School, demonstrations of which were given, it will be remembered, at our last annual convention.

Because the distinction between language-as-code and language-as-speech has such a vital bearing on the very conception of a language course; because it affects to such a large extent the much-debated problem of the direct method, and because it helps to determine the attitude of the learner towards the language that is the object of his studies, we may say that the doctrine of de Saussure is likely to have more influence on the linguistic methodology of the future than any other doctrine or theory.

NOTE

For the sake of conciseness, we have called the theory of the twofold aspect of language-as-code and language-as-speech "the de Saussure doctrine." It is well however to bear in mind that this distinction, although the most fundamental of the teachings of de Saussure, constitutes only the starting point of his train of linguistic reasoning, which includes among many others such subjects as "The speech-circuit," "The symbol and the thing symbolized," "Synchronic and diachronic linguistics," "Concrete entities of the code," etc., etc.

A FURTHER INTERPRETATION OF THE SAUSSURIAN DOCTRINE

In our editorial of Bulletin No. 102 we suggested that the theoretical distinction made by de Saussure between *la langue* and *la parole* might be interpreted in English and for practical purposes as the difference between a language "as code" and a language "as speech." In the same issue we quoted the suggestions offered by Professor Kaku Jimbo as to the most appropriate corresponding Japanese terms.

To make certain that we were not thereby misinterpreting the doctrine as originally propounded, we communicated with one of the most eminent and authoritative disciples of de Saussure, viz professor Albert Sechehaye, of the University of Geneva, asking his opinion of our re-formulation of it. We said:

"Suppose that de Saussure had been English and clothed his thoughts in English, and that he addressed himself to those who read and listen to I.R.E.T. articles and lectures, is it not conceivable that he might have expressed himself in the sense of our article? and made the distinction between "the (or a) language as code" and "the (or a) language as speech"?

To our inquiry Professor Sechehaye has most courteously responded, and in the present issue we print his letter together with an English translation of it. This letter says, in effect: "Yes, you have succeeded in disengaging from the series of abstractions formed by de Saussure that part which is of concern to the practitioner and, to all intents and purposes, the English terms that you use correspond to the Saussurian conception in question."

The latter part of the letter, however, suggests a development of—if not an addition to—the Saussurian doctrine which is certainly worthy of further consideration. The writer points out that for practical purposes we may eliminate that part of "speech" that is not "organized." By this he would have us disregard such elements of speech as inarticulate cries and, perhaps, gestures. This point is interesting in view of the opinion of Mr. Thomas Beach (quoted elsewhere in this issue) that gestures are by their very nature linguistic symbols and as such must be included among "alogs" or "wordless symbols."

The following is the original letter from
Professor Sècheyaye:

Avant d'avoir reçu votre lettre du 12 avril, j'avais lu avec attention l'article du Bulletin que vous consacrez à la doctrine de de Saussure. Puisque vous m'invitez aimablement, je vous ferai volontiers part de quelques observations sur ce sujet.

Sur le fond de la question et sur l'application que vous faites de la doctrine saussurienne à l'enseignement des langues, je suis pleinement d'accord avec vous. J'insisterais peut-être plus que vous ne le faites sur l'interprétation courante des deux méthodes: celle qui traite du "language as speech" et vise à donner des exemples et des habitudes et celle qui procède en donnant des règles: "language as code." Meme l'enseignement le plus élémentaire (p. 6 en bas)¹ contient déjà un peu de "code" s'il est tant soit peu ordonné, s'il choisit et gradue la matière;

(1) For at least the first term (longer if possible) let the teacher present and the pupil approach the language as speech by means of the direct method; for the first six weeks at least let the teaching be oral, then let what has been learnt be recapitulated through reading and writing. When the pupil has thus come to possess a minimum vocabulary together with the most important grammar-mechanisms, let the language be re-approached as code. Instruction in the code will be given by means of appropriate directions (rules etc.) and elementary exercises in sentence-building (for the most part direct-method composition exercises). From this time onwards the teaching will be an alternation of speech and code: new material introduced as speech and consolidated by code.

et dans l'enseignement le plus théorique (celui que vous décrivez p. 5),² l'étudiant qui apprend par la grammaire se crée en lui-même des habitudes de "speech," soit en essayant d'appliquer les règles, soit en pratiquant des textes écrits dans la langue étrangère. Ce sur quoi il faut insister (et c'est le mérite de la doctrine saussurienne) c'est que la réalité pratique du langage est toute dans le "speech" et qu'à la rigueur on peut s'en contenter comme vous le montrez dans votre second cas théorique (pp. 5, 6.).³ Le code n'intervenant jamais dans l'enseignement théorique que comme un adjuvant qui permet d'organiser l'enseignement en isolant, classant, expliquant les difficultés. En lui-même il n'intéresse que la science abstraite.

Dans ma lettre du Volume Commémoratif, j'ai dit que vous aviez saisi la doctrine saussurienne par l'angle qui vous intéressait. J'ai voulu dire par là que vous considérez le "code" plutôt sous l'aspect d'une série de règles formulées. Avant d'être cela, il est, comme de Saussure le dit et comme vous vous en rendez sans doute parfaitement compte, un ensemble organique d'habitudes que les sujets parlants ont acquises en apprenant leur langue et qui ne deviennent conscients qu'à la réflexion et par le travail du grammairien. Un explorateur qui décrit une langue sauvage ne crée pas le code, il le dégage par l'observation de la manière dont les gens parlent mais le code existait virtuellement avant

(2) Here is a student of English who has no English-speaking environment, whose teacher is unable to use English as speech, who has nevertheless what is called "linguistic insight," who can digest and apply information concerning sentence-building, semantic varieties, patterns, collocations and derivatives. Let him approach English as code and make the fullest possible use of the code. Let us write for his benefit bookfuls of code-matter in the vein of Richards on English determinatives, of Faucett and Fawcett on English composition, of Daniel Jones on English pronunciation.

(3) Here is a student of English with an English-speaking environment, even if this environment consists only of gramophone records and textbooks presenting English as speech. He has little "linguistic insight," cannot digest even the clearest of codifications, but has a natural aptitude for casting his thoughts in the mould of a foreign language, profits by every corrected mistake, remembers every illustrative example, models his "production" on the sum of his "reception," achieves by blind groping what the code enthusiast acquires by organized synthesis. Let him approach English as speech and through speech. If the linguistic environment is adequate, if the student has daily the opportunities of hearing, speaking, reading and writing English as the instrument of communication with those who constitute his environment, his approach to English through speech need be the only approach: he may be independent of the code. If however his linguistic environment is inadequate, his progress must be quickened and furthered by the code.

qu'il l'ait décrit. Donc en réalité le grammairien, la langue est dans la parole des gens qui parlent cette langue. Il y a là un point que la doctrine saussurienne implique, mais que sa terminologie et ses exposés ne mettent pas en évidence. Pour vous montrer les réserves que je fais à ce sujet et mes raisons, le mieux est de vous dire comment je vois et exprime moi-même la chose.

Le terme de langage (que Lommel a traduit par Menschisches Reden) est un terme vague et commode pour exprimer une idée générale en l'absence de toute analyse. Je m'en sers constamment, mais en réalité il ne représente rien de précis et de définissable.

Les deux choses précises et définissables qui existent ce sont

(1) La parole (Lommel: Das Sprechen); tout acte de "langage," de communication, quand ce ne serait qu'un simple cri ou un geste.

(2) La langue (Lommel: Die Sprache): l'ensemble des conventions établies dans une communauté linguistique et qui permettent d'exprimer des idées claires par des signes arbitraires groupés d'après certaines règles.

Il y a donc parole naturelle, prégrammaticale, non organisée, et une parole organisée qui utilise les conventions de la langue.

Vos formules algébriques de la page 3⁴ sont très justes, mais à condition qu'on remplace "langage" par "parole organisée" et "speech" par "parole naturelle," donc.

Parole organisée = parole naturelle + langue;

Parole naturelle = parole organisée - langue (c'est-à-dire une parole dépourvue de principe d'organisation);

Langue = parole organisée - parole naturelle (c'est-à-dire l'organisation de la parole isolée de la parole elle-même).

L'erreur me paraît être de donner au mot parole, ou à Language as Speech un sens ambigu en ne tenant pas compte du fait que la parole, quand on parle une langue, est une résultante de deux facteurs, et d'user simultanément du terme de langage qui ne représente rien ou qui ne peut être que synonyme de parole organisée.

Cela peut être mis en ordre par un moyen bien simple en restant entièrement dans la doctrine telle que vous la formulez.

Il suffit de poser en principe que vous vous intéressez uniquement à la parole organisée, c'est-à-dire, à celle des gens qui parlent une langue. "Language as speech" c'est une

langue parlée, une langue mise en acte. Or ce "language as speech" contient, sans que les sujets parlants s'en rendent toujours compte, le "language as code," il porte l'empreinte de la langue. Enseigner à quelqu'un à parler une langue, c'est lui inculquer les habitudes du "language as speech" et pour faire cela il faut beaucoup d'exemples et de pratique, mais on peut aussi avoir recours dans une certaine mesure aux prescriptions du code. Cela dirige et facilite le travail. C'est ce qui se disait plus haut.

Excusez cette longue dissertation. Je ne sais pas si son intérêt pratique vous paraîtra évident. En tout cas j'ai toujours cherché à travailler avec des idées claires et, si je me suis bien expliqué, j'espère que ces vues vous auront paru rendre bien compte des faits.

Veillez recevoir, cher Monsieur, l'expression de mes sentiments les meilleurs.

ALB. SECHÉHAYE.

(4) Language = code + speech; Speech = language - code; Code = language - speech.

Translation of the Above

Before having received your letter of April 12th, I had read with attention the article in the Bulletin that you devote to the doctrine of de Saussure. Since you kindly invite me to do so, I shall be only too pleased to send you a few observations on this subject.

On the fundamentals of the question and on the application you make of the Saussurian doctrine to the teaching of languages, I am fully in agreement with you. I would insist perhaps more than you do on the current interpretation of the two methods: the one that treats the "language as speech" and aims at giving examples and habits, and the one that proceeds by giving rules: "the language as code." Even the most elementary teaching (see bottom of page 6)¹ already contains a little of the code, however little it is systematized, if in it the material is selected and graded; and in the most theoretical teaching (that you describe on page 5)² the student who learns by grammar creates in himself habits of "speech," either in trying to apply the rules, or in practising texts written in the foreign language. What must be insisted on (and this is the value of the Saussurian doctrine) is that the practical reality of language is all in the "speech" and that if need be, one may content oneself with it, as you show in your second hypothetical case.³ The code never intervenes in such teaching except as an auxiliary, which makes it possible to organise teaching by isolating, classifying, and explaining the difficulties. In itself it has an interest only for abstract science.

In my letter in the Commemorative Volume, I said that you had taken the Saussurian doctrine by the angle that interested you. I meant by that that you consider the "code" rather than the aspect of a series of formulated rules. Before being that, it is, as de Saussure said and as you doubtless perfectly well recognize, an organic collection of habits which the speakers have acquired in learning their language, and which come into the consciousness only by dint of reflection and by the work of the grammarian. An explorer who describes a primitive language does not create its code; he deduces it by observation of the way in which the people speak but the code existed virtually before he described it. Hence in reality the grammar—the code—is in the speech of the people who speak that language. That is a point that the Saussurian doctrine implies but that its terminology and explanations do not emphasise. To show you the reservations that I make on the subject, and my reasons, the best thing to do is to tell you how I see and express the thing myself.

The term "language" (which Lommel has translated by Menschliches Reden) is a vague and convenient term with which to express a general idea in the absence of all analysis. I use it constantly, but in reality it represents nothing precise or definable.

The two things precise and definable are:

(1) La parole [=Speech] (Lommel=Das Sprechen): all act of "language," of communication, even if only a simply cry or a gesture.

(2) La langue [=Code] (Lommel=Die Sprache): the entirety of the conventions established in a linguistic community and which makes it possible to express clear ideas by means of

(1), (2), (3), See respectively the three footnotes appended to the original above.

arbitrary symbols grouped in accordance with certain rules.

There is, then, natural speech, pregrammatical, non-organized, and an organized speech which utilizes the conventions of the language (=la langue).

Your algebraic formulas on page 3⁴ are very true, but on the condition that "language" is replaced by "organized speech" and "speech" by "natural speech," thus.

Organized speech=natural speech code;
Natural speech=organized speech—code (i.e. Speech without any organizing principle),

Code=organized speech—natural speech (i.e. the organization of speech isolated from speech itself).

The error seems to me to lie in giving to the word parole or the term language as speech an ambiguous sense by not taking into account the fact that speech, when one speaks a language, is the resultant of two factors and in making simultaneous use of the term language, which represents nothing or which can be only a synonym of organized speech.

That may be regularized by a very simple means while remaining entirely within the doctrine as you formulate it. It is enough to establish as a principle that you are interested solely in organized speech, i.e. in that of those who speak a language. "Language as speech" is a spoken language, a language in action. Now this "language as speech" contains, without its speakers always being aware of it, the "language as code," it bears the imprint of the "language as code." To teach somebody to speak a language is to cause him to acquire the habits of a "language as speech," and to do that many examples and much practice is required, but one may also have recourse in a certain measure to the prescription of the code. That directs and facilitates the work. That is what I have already mentioned above.

Excuse this long dissertation. I do not know whether its practical interest will appear evident to you. In any case I have always sought to work with clear ideas and, if I have explained exactly what I mean, I hope that these views will appear to you to have taken the facts into account.

ALBERT SECHEHAYE